

**DEFENCE, DIPLOMACY AND DISCORD: THE IMPACT OF THE GREAT
WAR AND ITS EFFECT ON CANADIAN STRATEGY, 1920-1928**

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DEDICATION

For my wife, Krystyna, who encouraged me to do what I thought was right, for my mother and father, who taught me the importance of taking a stand on what matters; and for my professors, teachers, leaders, family, instructors and friends, who throughout the years, have given me the means of doing so.

ABSTRACT

Between 1920 and 1928 a section of the Canadian General Staff designed a plan for an invasion of the United States. The plan, and its author, L/Col. James Sutherland Brown, were treated by a considerable degree of derision by early scholars of Canadian military and diplomatic history, most notably, James Eayrs and CP Stacey. Others, such as Stephen Harris and JL Granatstein, have defended it. This study, however, seeks to explain why such a plan was composed – indeed it was the *only* plan available to the General Staff until 1931 – through a historical lens of memory. The Great War was the shaping influence for much of Canadian public and political life in the 1920s but it did not affect each segment of the population evenly. These differences in how the war was remembered made it impossible to create defence plans which were closely tied to improving relations with United States.

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Introduction: Memory, History and Strategy

Forethought we may have, undoubtedly, but not foresight.

- Napoleon Bonaparte.¹

In 1921, a military plan named Defence Scheme No.1 (United States) went out from Militia Headquarters in Ottawa. It identified the United States as Canada's most likely adversary. For operational reasons, Canadian forces would have to advance quickly in a massive pre-emptive-strike into American territory as "THE FIRST THING APPARENT THEN IN THE DEFENCE OF CANADA IS THAT WE LACK DEPTH. Depth can only be gained by Offensive Action."² In retrospect, the prospect of two neighbours with the longest undefended border in the world going to war after standing side-by-side in the Great War seems absurd. Why, then, did the document remain as Canada's only official military operational plan until 1931, at a time when the Canadian government was actively seeking a closer relationship with the United States, and while economic and cultural links were growing stronger?

This thesis will argue that the memories of the Great War influenced political leaders, professional military officers and the general public in manifestly different ways, and that it was these disparate interpretations of the Great War that led to a military policy which was so inconsistent with the political and cultural developments of 1920-1928. It is the aim of this study, after a brief review of the applicable scholarship, to examine the various legacies of the Great War, how they affected the development of Canadian diplomatic institutions and finally their impact on the development of a post-

¹ "Napoleon Bonaparte Quotes," *Brainyquote*. <http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/n/napoleon_bonaparte_2.html>. Accessed 3 July 2010.

²Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC,) RG 24 Vol. 2926-2927, Defence Scheme No.1 – United States, 12 April 1921, 4.

1918 strategy for both the defence of Canada and Canadian participation in wars outside its own borders.

Although there has been much relevant literature published on related topics, there have not been any in-depth examinations of the significance of public and professional memories of the Great War on Canadian institutions and Canada's international strategy, if such a thing existed, in the 1920s. Before embarking on such a discussion however, it is important to examine the roots and nature of what "strategy" comprises.

Both politicians and generals tend to agree that a guide to define objectives and identify the means to achieve those objectives is necessary. Until relatively recently, the word "strategy" was used almost exclusively by militaries to define this process: national leadership would specify particular aims that could be achieved through armed conflict and then armed forces would orient their training, operations and policies to support specific foreign policy objectives. But as the definition of "politics" has expanded, the term "strategy" has also grown to encompass "grand strategy" for large national objectives, a concept which ideally subordinates military, information and economic strategies to an overriding grand strategic goal. Despite the similarity of terminology, however, there is a vast gulf between how soldiers and political leaders think about such things. Politicians are naturally concerned with reconciling competing priorities under a general direction to prevent negative interference. Generals, on the other hand, are preoccupied with more specific concepts: what they need to do, what resources they need to do it and how they plan to carry out their tasks. Often the exigencies of politicking prevent the clear delineation of objectives so fundamental to

military planning. In these cases, military officers who generally crave clear direction and value preparation will often take it upon themselves to craft contingency plans based on a range of options which they believe supports national objectives in some way.

Carl von Clausewitz, the Prussian philosopher, general, and veteran of the Napoleonic wars, recognised the difficulties created by a mental separation between political indecision and the military's preoccupation towards specificity as a fundamental aspect of both policy and war. In Clausewitz' view, war in its purest form would take place in a political vacuum and consist of a single event that was undoubtedly decisive.³ But since these conditions are impossible, policy and the political process are permanently grafted to the conduct of war. Politics therefore prevents war from reaching its purest, or "absolute" form.⁴ More recently, it has become widely recognised that many of the factors that give rise to conflict – whether they be economics, ideology or geography – are present in peace-time decision-making. Whether they like it or not, politicians will create a circumstance that defines or creates a national strategy, however poorly defined. As such, strategy applies well beyond the narrow confines of active conflict. According to many writers, the supreme goal of strategy is to *prevent* conflict from occurring in the first place.⁵ Clear direction, then, is essential to prevent vague policy statements from becoming a series of specific plans and policies that are out of line with the original political intent.

³ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans and ed by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984):, 78.

⁴ *Ibid*, 86-87.

⁵ Peter Paret, ed. *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986): 3 and Sun Tzu, *The Art of Strategy*, RL Wing, trans. (New York: Broadway, 1988): 45.

The difficulty in defining the term “strategy” indicates that it is more of a practical than a theoretical concept. In the words of the renowned Clausewitz scholar, Peter Paret “[t]he history of strategic thought is a history not of pure but applied reason.”⁶ John Keegan takes this line of reasoning even further, arguing that it is cultural forces, not political and military institutions, that ultimately determine the causes and conduct of military conflict. In Keegan’s words this means that, “war embraces much more than politics: that it is always an expression of culture, often a determinant of cultural forms, in some societies the culture itself.”⁷ The impact of culture and societal values, however, are more likely to be sensed by a politician than a board of military officers and without the crucial link between those contemplating large national objectives and those tasked with carrying those objectives forward, it is more likely than not that the two parts of the same government will move in different directions. This is especially true in a democracy, where the impact of common opinions and widely-held attitudes are felt strongly, preventing a detailed, predictable delineation of national priorities to exist over a long period of time.

The impact of cultural expression on strategic thought was especially apparent following the Great War. The sometimes-creative destruction wrought by the conflict, ran so deeply that even the societies who experienced the war took years to feel its full effects. Jonathan Vance, in his well-known study of Canadian memory of the Great War, noted that,

[M]any things were shown and said about the Great War and the post-war period, yet contemporaries did not really ‘see’ the profound consequences of the conflict in which they had been actively involved. As in Hiroshima, where the

⁶ Paret, 3.

⁷ John Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, (London: Pimlico, 1993):, 12.

long term physical, psychological and political after-effects of the bomb were infinitely more destructive than its immediate impact, the inter-war generations failed to see how irradiated the post-war world had been by the Great War's culture of violence.⁸

Instead of focusing on the great loss of Canadian life during the war, commemoration ceremonies in the 1920s tended to emphasise at first a great victory of liberalism over autocracy, and later, in the 1930s, a great forging experience – that the crucible of war had welded a new nation together.⁹

This sentiment of a loyal Canadian called to arms in defence of his country was therefore persistent. In fact, after the First World War, the popular idea of the traditional, self-sustaining homesteader militiaman, who frequented rifle clubs and annual Militia camps, was replaced by the ideal of the hastily mobilised citizen-warrior, who only had to report on time to receive his uniform, his rifle and his orders as part of a *levee en masse*.¹⁰ This “militia myth” derided by so many historians is in fact part of a larger “unmilitary myth” that presents the Canadian as uninterested in military affairs until called up for service to a noble cause. This “unmilitary myth” combines two concepts; the first being an aversion to a professional standing army, and, more recently, the notion that Canadians do not fight unless attacked – in other words, that Canadians are driven more by altruism than by realism in their military policy.

In terms of Canadian strategy, having such a cultural antipathy towards what many would term realism made it difficult to develop defence policies between 1919

⁸ Jonathan F Vance, *Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning and the First World War*. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997): 4.

⁹ *Ibid*, 11.

¹⁰ James Wood, *Militia Myths: Ideas of the Canadian Citizen Soldier, 1896-1921*. (Vancouver, UBC Press, 2010): 265-266.

and 1929 based on an objective review of world conditions. CP Stacey noted the difficulties this posed in the official history of the Second World War:

Canada is an unmilitary community. Warlike her people have often been forced to be; military they have never been . . . None of these episodes [the Great War] proved sufficient to convince Canadians that there was a close connection between their nation's welfare and the state of her military preparations. Fortunately for the country, there were always some people in it who interested themselves in such matters and sought to maintain a degree of active military spirit; but they were always a small minority.¹¹

The First World War had clearly demonstrated that Canada, while hoping to hide safely behind three oceans, could easily be drawn into maelstroms halfway around the world. To many, the fact that the United States was the only power capable of realistically threatening invasion ensured that the country was “simultaneously indefensible and invulnerable.”¹²

Recent memory dictated otherwise. In 1914 an Archduke assassinated in Sarajevo led to a primarily European conflict that would draw in hundreds of thousands of Canadian citizens. Politically still tied to Great Britain, Canada was simultaneously beginning to see itself as a primarily North American country – but one which could not be troubled to spend too much on defence. Furthermore, the increasing sense of autonomy and internal growth of the country – along with a resultant expansion of international interests – made it increasingly important for Canada to have an independent national voice. This occurred in an era that saw the rise of the world’s first Communist power and the beginnings of Nazism, Japanese Militarism and Italian Fascism.

¹¹ CP Stacey, *Six Years of War The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific*. Vol.1. (Ottawa: DND, 1955): 3.

¹² Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, 5th ed. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 2007): X.

Kim Richard Nossal has advanced the idea that since Canada has never really fitted into standard conceptions of the 'state', its strategic culture must be viewed in the light of its political structure, which cannot be referred to as a nation-state *per se* but a more flexible "realm."¹³ In Nossal's view, the inter-war period was one of ambiguity whereby Canadians saw little reason to forge a strong presence on the international stage, making the development of a national strategic culture difficult and causing them to view very real threats – such as the rise of the Third Reich – with "indifference."¹⁴ Nossal's model is most useful when viewed in light of Keegan's conclusions on culture and war. National strategy, and the policies that are supposed to enforce it, are not part of a strategic culture so much as they are the result of a society's wider cultural currents.

This study will examine these currents, be they public, political or professional military, and how they affected the evolution of Canadian defence policy between 1920 – after Canada had signed the Treaty of Versailles – to 1928, when a series of important changes in Canadian society, diplomatic institutions and military leadership caused both the state machinery and philosophies which led them to change drastically. To accomplish this, this thesis intends to examine biographical, institutional, political and cultural aspects of the Canada of the time and how they influenced each other, reflecting the vital link between culture, institutions and strategy.

The literature applicable to this study falls into two broad categories: institutional history and memory studies. The former is significantly older than the latter, and more developed. The first histories of the Department of External Affairs, for example, began to emerge in the late 1930s through the 1940s under the auspices of the

¹³ Kim Richard Nossal, "Defending the 'Realm': Canadian Strategic Culture Revisited," *International Journal*, Vol.59, No.3 (Summer 2004): 504

¹⁴ *Ibid*, 509-512.

Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA). Early histories largely took the form of position papers, prepared for unofficial conferences where delegates from various voluntary organisations met to discuss international and constitutional issues in a phenomenon known as “unofficial diplomacy.”¹⁵ Taking what would now be called a largely Realist position, academics and interested observers writing in the 1930s and 1940s focused largely on geographical and institutional factors. Because Canada was geographically isolated with a small population, she had to limit her international interests – and because her interests were so limited, FR Scott argued in 1938, she was actually *safer* than a well-armed world power, which meant her defence policy was governed more by domestic politics than strategic reality. Indeed, since the world was dependent on Canadian grain, it would be forced to defend Canada – or simply invade, as Canada was geographically and militarily helpless.¹⁶

These authors also displayed an impressive nuance in their analyses. Before and after the Second World War, it was clear that the independence of Canada’s foreign policy would be inextricably tied to the development of institutions able to define and carry out her foreign policy objectives effectively, but, that these institutions would only develop out of progress in national political life. In other words, Canada would only be recognised as a nation if it could take full responsibility for its international affairs, but this would only be possible if the concept of Canada as an international power became a cultural reality.¹⁷ Some argued that Canada, by trade alone, was linked into a world

¹⁵ Lawrence T. Clarkson, “John Nelson and the Origins of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs,” *International Journal*, Vol.59, No.2 (Spring 2004): 387-406.

¹⁶ F.R. Scott, *Canada and the Commonwealth*, position paper (Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1938): 50-53.

¹⁷ H Gordon Skilling, *Canadian Representation Abroad: From Agency to Embassy*, (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1945): ix, xi-xii, xv and; Scott, 50-51.

system and was thus bound to be concerned with its defence, despite its isolation.¹⁸

These histories provided excellent insight on the evolution of specific constitutional issues, but, unsurprisingly, all of them contain a level of advocacy. This advocacy was for a clearer definition of Canadian foreign policy through more robust diplomatic institutions. Most argued that Canada did not really have a foreign service until 1928, when Canadian legations were opened in foreign capitals and the Department of External Affairs (DEA) was expanded.¹⁹

In the years following the Second World War, a detailed study of Canada's defence and international policies was long overdue. Military historians, with some justification, were engrossed in the operational histories of the Canadian fighting services between 1939 and 1945; although the most important event in the lead up to war was the re-armament programme of the 1930s. Little was written then – or even in recent years – on the early attempts in the inter-war period to eke out a distinct Canadian “strategy.” CP Stacey, in the official history of the Second World War, dismissed Defence Scheme No.1, and thus most of the defence policy in the years immediately following the First World War, as insignificant.²⁰ Between 1945 and 1960 there were few serious works covering Canadian international, trade and defence policy development: a summary of scholarship published by the CIIA described it as “much in need of revision. . . [but] indispensable.”²¹ John Bartlet Brebner's, *The North Atlantic*

¹⁸FH Soward et al, *Canada in World Affairs: The Pre-War Years*, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1941): 4-5.

¹⁹A Gordon Dewey, *the Dominions and Diplomacy: The Canadian Contribution*, (Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co., 1929): 2-3.

See also: Scott, 50-1; Skilling, ix, xi-xii

²⁰ Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 3, 4, 30.

²¹ Gaddis Smith, “Selected Readings on Canadian External Policy, 1909-1959,” in *The Growth of Canadian Policies in External Affairs*, Hugh L Keenleyside, ed. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1960):165.

Triangle (1945) stood out for the depth of its analysis and became a classic textbook of Canada's awkward position in between two world powers. Brebner argued that Canadian foreign policy was inextricably linked to the economic and political relationships existing between Canada, Britain, and the United States. Geography had ensured that there would be no unified people on the North American continent, and, after the independence of the United States was recognised in 1783, the British would increasingly devote their energies to European affairs. With the ties of trade well established between Washington, Ottawa and London, Brebner argued that Canada increasingly navigated its own course within this triangle.²² Brebner's work remains one of the few broad surveys of Canadian international relationships and policies, and was essentially the only work to touch on many questions similar to those of this study until a serious academic effort was undertaken in the 1960s to explain Canadian external and defence policies.

Even in the 1960s, however, Brebner's work on economic and institutional history would continue to form the core of the analysis. The most avid and productive scholar of this period was James Eayrs, who began his work on Canada's inter-war military and diplomatic policies with a short history of the DEA published in 1960.²³ But this was just a prelude to a massive, multi-volume work entitled *In Defence of Canada* published throughout the 1960s. Volume 1, which tracked the twin development of Canadian external and defence policies between 1918 and 1935, was published in 1962 and is still widely referenced today. Eayrs defined the classical view

²²John Bartlett Brebner, *The North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1966): 73-74. The book was originally published by Columbia University Press in 1945.

²³James Eayrs, "The Origins of Canada's Department of External Affairs," in Keenleyside, 14-32.

that, “[i]n 1918 Canadians turned away from Europe, leaving behind their dead. However misguided isolationism might appear to a later generation, drawn as their fathers had had been drawn into the vortex it was a natural response to the Western front.”²⁴ But this was written before more in-depth studies on memory appeared, and was thus assumed that all Canadians had a similar reaction to the war. Those who did not, like Sutherland-Brown, were not analysed but mocked as belligerent outsiders. The entire Canadian military was said to have been suffering from “lethargy.”²⁵

It is important to note that Eayrs was a political scientist first and a historian second. *In Defence of Canada* was largely intended to explain Canada’s strategic position in the early- to mid- Cold War. As such, the first two volumes attempt to explain the lack of a Canadian “national security policy” in the inter-war period, even though the terminology of a “national security policy” and its connotation was largely a product of the nuclear age.²⁶ In his quest for a *policy*, Eayrs is quick to make value judgements and loath to examine the professional and wider cultural context driving those decisions. Unfortunately, many of Eayrs’ shortcomings are replicated in the other noteworthy survey of Canadian diplomacy in the inter-war period by CP Stacey.

CP Stacey wrote widely on Canadian military and diplomatic history, including the official history of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. His two-volume work, *Canada and the Age of Conflict* (1977 and 1981), remains the only comprehensive work devoted specifically to the conduct of Canadian diplomacy in the

²⁴ James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, Vol.1. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968): 3-4.

²⁵ *Ibid*, 70-73.

²⁶ *Ibid*, ix-x.

inter-war period.²⁷ Much of the work is a summary of his extensive previous literature, making his choice of material revealing. “This book,” says the preface, “deals with a long and crowded era. I have had to omit many things, and to deal with others very briefly. I have tried to concentrate upon the topics that seem to me important.”²⁸ It is surprising, then, that the official historian of the Canadian Army in the Second World War chose to more or less omit the relationship between Canadian military and external policies prior to 1939, despite being critical of Canadian diplomats for making remarks about Canada being a “fire-proof house,” noting that “Canadians who went through the fiery trial of the Second World War would remember with wry humour that remark.”²⁹ While being critical of diplomats, politicians and military planners,³⁰ Stacey neither asks nor answers the question of *why* military and diplomatic policy failed to coalesce into a coherent strategy before 1939.

The late 1970s and 1980s saw another wave of literature published on the subjects of Canadian defence and diplomacy in the 1920s, and, for the first time, countervailing views of the mainstream view of military planning and defence policies of the era. For the first time, military historians began examining seriously the rationale behind Defence Scheme No.1 and the reasons for its adoption. This trend actually began in 1977 with the publication of Richard A Preston’s *The Defence of an undefended Border: Planning for War in North America, 1867-1939*. Preston devoted twenty pages to examining the context of Defence Scheme No.1 and its American counterpart, War

²⁷ It should be noted that Stacey and Eayrs collaborated on much of their research and analysis, including co-editing. See Eayrs, v.1, xi.

²⁸ CP Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies*, vol.2, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981): ix.

²⁹ *Ibid*, 61

³⁰ Stacey, *Conflict*, 156-158.

Plan Red, in his general study of war planning in North America since Confederation. Despite the relative brevity of his analysis, Preston shattered the myth that Sutherland-Brown was a madman, working in his dark office, completely out of touch with reality. Preston revealed much of the tacit approval displayed by Sutherland-Brown's superiors for the plan up through 1927 and the fact that Americans, for their part, were planning an invasion of Canada in roughly the same period.³¹

Just a year after the publication of *The Defence of an undefended Border*, Norman Hillmer published "Defence and Ideology: The Anglo-Canadian military 'alliance' in the 1930s" in *International Journal* – the periodical of the same institution that had published the early histories of the DEA in the late 1930s and 1940s.³² This article quickly became a classic among diplomatic and military historians alike. Although it dealt with Anglo-Canadian military relations the 1930s, Hillmer's article provides a sound basis for understanding the complex calculations and perceptions in both Ottawa and London: Canada may seem to have been lacking on its active contributions to imperial defence, but, what were the odds that the British would go to war with the United States over Canada? Far less likely than Canada responding to a war on the European continent. There was thus a distinct clash between imperialist and nationalist ideologies and hard reality: by the 1930s, even the British had acknowledged that Canada was firmly in the sphere of American influence.³³ Seen in this light, the decisions of the era cannot be viewed as simply imperialist or anti-imperialist, but

³¹ Richard A. Preston, *The Defence of an undefended Border: Planning for War in North America, 1867-1939*, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977): 216-217.

³² Norman Hillmer, "Defence and Ideology: The Anglo-Canadian Military 'Alliance' in the 1930s," *International Journal*, Vol.33, No. 3 (Summer 1978): 588-612.

³³ *Ibid*, 588-592.

choices made in a vague accumulation of political currents and hard geopolitical realities.

This ambiguity and the difficulties it brought to defence planning was highlighted by Stephen J Harris in his groundbreaking 1988 book, *Canadian Brass*. In it, Harris argues that it was not until the Great War that Canada gained a corps of professional military officers.³⁴ His scope is restricted mostly to senior officers and their attempts to convince Canadians as well as political leaders that a professional military force was vital to the country's defence. In Harris' view, a straitjacketed officer corps could never convince political leaders of the importance of a strong and independent policy for national defence. The resulting lack of direction had dire consequences for those who were sent off to war in 1939.³⁵ Harris' work is an excellent, focused study of the officer corps, however, it excluded an examination of larger political or cultural factors which shaped their environment.

This in-depth look into the development of the Canadian Militia in the inter-war period was paralleled by a series of excellent biographical works on contemporary Canadian diplomats that provided insight into the birth of the modern DEA. Jack Granatstein published *The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935-1957* in 1982 which established what is now known as the "mandarin thesis." Granatstein argues that a meritocratic elite of young, energetic, close-knit civil servants, led by the more senior OD Skelton, coalesced into a ruling caste of sorts as Canada sought to move towards a modern nation-state. Although this group of mandarins were effective at building institutions and policies from scratch, their necessarily narrow focus – a result

³⁴ Stephen J Harris, *Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988): 6-7.

³⁵ Harris, 7.

of the relatively similar backgrounds which allowed them to work with such synergy – prevented them from building defence policies into their national vision.³⁶ Also from the 1980s was an excellent biography of Loring Christie by Robert Bothwell, a general printing of his 1972 PhD thesis, which followed the rise, fall, and return of the powerful civil servant in the DEA. In doing so, Bothwell tracks the complex course of ideas and institutions that took place from the Borden government through to that of the Mackenzie King era.³⁷ The 1980s also saw the publication of *Sam Hughes: The Public Career of a Controversial Canadian, 1885-1916* by Ronald Haycock, which provided deeper insight into just what went wrong – and right – with the mobilisation of 1914.³⁸ These biographies are well-researched case studies into the workings of the Canadian government of the 1920s. Because they examine the life and times of key protagonists, they provide an excellent window into the interaction of personal and institutional factors – if only on an individual level.

William Lyon Mackenzie King was Prime Minister for enough time between 1921 and 1948 to receive admiration and condemnation from legions of contemporaries and historians. Nonetheless, in terms of his motivation with regard to foreign and defence policies, a few threads are identifiable in the historiography. The classical view is that of the master politician, infinitely pragmatic, but not necessarily good at foreign policy - passing from crisis to crisis, avoiding a potentially divisive foreign policy at all costs.³⁹ Another view, that of Joy E. Esbrey, paints a picture of a deeply Christian man,

³⁶ JL Granatstein, *The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935-1957*, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1982): xi, 1, 4-5, 10-13.

³⁷ Robert Bothwell, *Loring Christie: The Failure of Bureaucratic Imperialism*, (New York: Garland Publishing, 1988).

³⁸ Ronald G. Haycock, *Sam Hughes: The Public Career of a Controversial Canadian, 1885-1916*, (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1986).

³⁹ Stacey, 3-7.

who above all desired peace - and therefore showed little interest in becoming entangled in foreign commitments or spending much time worrying about preparations for war.⁴⁰ A third view is that King did, in fact, understand the stakes of international politics, but, he intentionally chose to remain aloof as part of a masterful strategy that furthered Canada's interests at minimal costs.⁴¹ It is important to note, however, that as Mackenzie-King was a domestically-oriented leader with a complex personal life, so the scholarship has focused on his domestic policy. The general consensus among the three views above was that King chose to be ambiguous about his external policy. Whether it was political calculation, religious reservation, or savvy diplomacy, the sense of deliberate ambiguity remains the same. For the purposes of this study, that is the single most important conclusion on the subject of this controversial but undeniably influential figure.

The 1990s and 2000s gave us some welcome military biographies to complement the diplomatic and political biographies. Most notable are two collections, *Warrior Chiefs*, a brief overview of Canadian senior commanders in a long historical period, and *The Generals: Canada's Senior Army Commanders in the Second World War*.⁴² *The Generals*, written by Jack Granatstein, was explicitly written as a complement to *The Ottawa Men* and expands on Harris' work by examining the background and intellectual training of the regular army officers in the inter-war

⁴⁰Joy E Esbrey,, *Knight of the Holy Spirit: A Study of William Lyon Mackenzie King*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980): 200.

⁴¹ Bernard Brister, "William Lyon Mackenzie King: Master Politician or Master Procrastinator?" *London Journal of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 24 (2008-2009): 5-27.

⁴² Bernard Horn and Stephen Harris, eds. *Warrior Chiefs: Perspectives on Senior Canadian Military Leaders*. (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2001).

period.⁴³ Granatstein also advances the interesting thesis that there were two distinct groups of officers: the institution-building generals of the inter-war period, who tended to be less-than-stellar wartime commanders but who built a solid foundation for the fighting generals who emerged during the war.⁴⁴ These “fighting generals” have yet to be honoured with an extensive biographical literature, but, this is beginning to happen: of note is Doug Delaney’s biography of Bert Hoffmeister. Hoffmeister, a part-time militia officer who rose to become one of Canada’s best-known fighting generals, provides an essential case study for the impact of inter-war military structures on Canada’s wartime policies.⁴⁵

The 1990s also saw the beginning of an effort to study the history of Canadian defence policy in depth in order to identify a “Canadian way of War” or “Canadian strategic culture.” Much of this came from a desire to root out a “peace-keeper myth” prevalent in Canadian society which held that Canadian military forces were altruistic peace-keepers, not armed forces tasked with protecting the national interest. Some of the early “Canadian Way of War” literature did not go much further than this: the introduction to *The Canadian Way of War: Serving the National Interest* declares, “[w]hether through outright action by Canada, or the failure thereof, or reticence on its part to develop a doctrine or strategy of its own, a generally consistent philosophical and practical approach to the use of the military or military force, to further national interests is always discernible.”⁴⁶ This provides little guidance beyond restating the argument

⁴³ JL Granatstein, *The Generals: The Canadian Army’s Senior Commanders in the Second World War*, (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2005): xvii.

⁴⁴ Granatstein, *The Generals*, 5-8.

⁴⁵ Douglas E Delaney, *The Soldiers’ General: Bert Hoffmeister at War*, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005).

⁴⁶ Bernard Horn, ed. *The Canadian Way of War: Serving the National Interest*, (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2006): 15.

advanced by Clausewitz in the early nineteenth century— that armed forces are there to further advance a political object through a variety of means.⁴⁷

Desmond Morton provided a more finessed explanation in his 1985 book, *A Military History of Canada*, where he argued that Canada, being a small, relatively indefensible nation, participated in alliances because it lacked the capability to do much else. By contributing resources to larger organisations, be they the British Empire or NATO, Canadian leaders secured international influence they would not have been able to do otherwise.⁴⁸ Sean Maloney took this line of reasoning one step further. In Maloney's 2002 book *Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means*, he says that, "Canada, does, in fact, have a rich history of power projection: a 100-year strategic tradition called Forward Security."⁴⁹ The forward security thesis argues that Canadians have been engaging in a relatively coherent *modus operandi* of engaging in operations outside national borders, unilaterally if necessary, in order to secure economic advantage and prevent a global destabilisation that would affect Canadian security.⁵⁰ This is an interesting concept, but is too determinist to fully incorporate much of the Canadian experience from 1885 to 1939 and is based largely on Maloney's expertise in Cold War history. The "way of war" histories suffer from an inclination towards historical 'alchemy' in that they search for a very definite concept – "a Canadian Way of War" – in what is inevitably a complex world, made up of many elements, which are not amenable to distillation within such a narrow definition.

⁴⁷ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Pater Paret and Michael Howard, eds. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984): 90-93.

⁴⁸ Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, 5th ed. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2007): x-xii

⁴⁹ Sean Maloney, *Canada and UN Peacekeeping: Cold War by Other Means, 1945-1970*, (St. Catherine's: Vanwell Publishing Ltd, 2002): 3.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 3-4.

More recent work has sought to define a Canadian strategic culture with more precision. Of note is that of Kim Richard Nossal, who argues that Canadian history reveals little, if any, evidence of a distinct “strategic culture” as it is commonly defined. Nossal argues that scholars have used inappropriate terminology and political conceptions in understanding the Canadian reality. In Nossal’s terminology, Canadian strategic culture is elusive because Canadians do not serve a narrowly-defined political state, they protect a more ambiguous “realm.”⁵¹ As the conception of “realm” changes from imperial (1867-1918) to transitional (1919-1939) to the nation-state (or form thereof) in the Cold War (1945-1991), definitions of security change along with concepts or moral obligations and Canada’s standing in the world.⁵² This was especially true during the constitutional confusion between 1919 and 1939, leaving an exasperated Joint Staff Committee to note in 1936 that, “When it comes to an explanation of the constitutional and political operation of that conglomerate known as the British Empire, international jurists are of no avail.”⁵³ Nossal’s work is intriguing, but he focuses on larger political concepts and vocabulary, thus denying sufficient importance to individuals and giving little consideration to domestic political issues. In this sense, the author of this paper is fortunate to have a growing body of the literature surrounding Canadian memory of the Great War.

The other body of literature that applies to this study is still in its developmental phase; that is, the literature of memory. Memory of the First World War has garnered

⁵¹ Kim Richard Nossal, “Defending the ‘Realm:’ Canadian Strategic Culture Revisited,” *International Journal*, Vol.59, No.3 (Summer 2004): 504-505.

⁵² *Ibid*, 506-512.

⁵³ DHH2, “Memorandum by the Joint Staff Committee, Department of National Defence: An Appreciation of the Defence Problems Confronting Canada with Recommendations for the Development of the Armed Forces.” JSF 2002/17 Box 125 File 27: 1.

increasing interest since the publication of Paul Fussel's *The Great War and Modern Memory* in 1975.⁵⁴ Canadian perspectives have been more numerous since Jonathan Vance's 1997 publication of *Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning and the First World War* where, through an analysis of Canadian monuments and ceremonies commemorating the Great War, he found not just the public's remembrance, but also its myth-making. Vance advances the idea that not only was remembrance about loss, but that it was also about the public's self-assurance that Canada and her liberal-democratic allies had trumped the autocratic Prussians in a victory that not only defeated autocracy, but promised to unite the country.⁵⁵ Another more general, but very applicable social study of war in the mind of Canadians is James Wood's recent work *Militia Myths: Ideas of the Canadian Citizen-Soldier 1896-1921*, which traces the historical roots – many of which go back far beyond the call-to-arms in 1914 – of the popular impression of the First World War in Canada. Interestingly, Woods charts the shift from a public advocacy for a long-serving, trained militiaman to the untrained volunteer – the “hero under every jacket” that emerged from 1919-1921. In this sense, Woods provides the invaluable service of tracing the public's memory on the reorganisation of the post-war militia.⁵⁶

Fussel, Vance, and the others who have followed them have chosen to concentrate on public memory, and, as a result, have produced noteworthy contributions to social history. But in understanding national political life, it is important to

⁵⁴ Paul Fussel. *The Great War and Modern Memory*. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2000. This study will be using the most recent edition of Fussel's work.

⁵⁵ Jonathan F. Vance, *Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning and the First World War*. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997): 11.

⁵⁶ James Wood, *Militia Myths: Ideas of the Canadian Citizen Soldier 1896-1921*, (Vancouver and Toronto: UBC Press, 2010): 253-254, 267.

understand the impact of the Great War on political leaders. So far as politicians and some of the mandarins are concerned, this is well-documented in biographies and biographical articles.⁵⁷ However, the effects of the war on the professional officer corps has received remarkably little attention. Stephen Harris published a dedicated article in 1982,⁵⁸ and Granatstein did include a brief discussion of the subject in his 2002 survey, *Canada's Army*.⁵⁹ *Canadian Brass* and *In Defence of Canada* have provided a rich debate on the nature of the gulf between military institutions and the political establishment throughout the inter-war period, and studies of memory have provided insights into individual interpretations of the Great War; but, in terms of a detailed comparative study of memories in the 1920s, there is a dearth of material, which this thesis hopes to help alleviate.

Understanding official policy and its connection to competing memories will require, first and foremost, analysis of primary documents. In terms of diplomatic documents, access is not difficult. Besides the papers freely available at Library and Archives Canada (LAC), though these are often difficult to find, there are also well-arranged collections published by WA Riddell (Canada's former representative at the League of Nations) and an extensive series of published volumes released by the DEA in the 1970s.⁶⁰ In terms of military documents, the researcher is fortunate to have found

⁵⁷ Of note is Norman Hillmer, "OD Skelton and the North American Mind," *International Journal*, Vol. 60, No.1 (Winter 2004/2005): 93-100.

⁵⁸ Stephen Harris, "Or There Would be Chaos: The Legacy of Sam Hughes and Military Planning in Canada 1919-1939," *Military Affairs*, Vol. 46, No.3 (October 1982): 120-126.

⁵⁹ JL Granatstein, *Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press: 2002): 147-175.

⁶⁰ Lovell C Clark, ed. *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, Vol.3 1919-1925, (Ottawa: DEA, 1970) and Walter A Riddell, *Documents on Canadian Foreign Policy 1917-1939*, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1962).

the well-organised papers of James MacBrien and defence planning generally at LAC,⁶¹ along with the extensive Joint Staff Fonds at the Directorate of History and Heritage archives in Ottawa. Some of Sutherland-Brown's papers are available at the Queen's University Archives, although many of these papers are now in a state of outright neglect. Furthermore, QUA regulations make it extremely difficult for any researcher not living in Kingston to have regular access to the documents themselves.

These difficulties aside, the most valuable research is bound to originate from primary documents. Contemporary journals on defence and international relations, most notably *Canadian Defence Quarterly* and *Foreign Affairs*, will also serve to provide useful insight into the prevailing attitudes and debates of the period. It is hoped that the combination of different methodologies and multiple archival sources will reflect the complex interactions between diplomats, soldiers and the public in the turbulent years between 1920 and 1928.

This brings us back to the beginning of the analysis, just after the brutality of the Western Front ended. Although the firing line had fallen silent, the Great War lingered on – even in areas never physically touched by the fighting. In Canada, the struggle triggered a series of events leading to the creation of a truly independent Canadian state. But even as the country moved forward, it had reason to look back with caution. The ghosts of the Great War would haunt Canadian politicians, diplomats and military leaders for a long time to come, even though the poltergeists would not always agree on what the scars of the war should look like.

⁶¹ See LAC MG 30 E63 Vols. 1-8 (MacBrien Papers) and LAC RG 24 Vol. 2925-2927.

Chapter 1: Experience, Memory, and Approaches to Policy

Canada is an unmilitary community. Warlike her people have often forced to be; military they have never been.
CP Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 1955.⁶²

The Great War can be said to have changed virtually everything it touched, from the people who fought it to the news media which recorded it, the weapons which made it so deadly and the administrative structures which made it possible. But the war did not change everything or everyone equally, and it did not do so instantly. The victory of Vimy Ridge in 1917 is widely touted as Canada's seminal point in the symbolic rise to nationhood, yet, the army that marched to war in 1939 still wore uniforms of British design and served, for most of the war, in a British-led organisation. Indeed, the Canadian constitution only came under the control of the Canadian government after 1982. Clearly, some things and people were affected more seriously than others, and some in particular ways. Just as the war affected every Canadian differently, the memory of the war was far from universal. Different memories of the conflict ensured that it carried different meanings for different parts of society, and thus different lessons to those who held them. This chapter will argue that the different ways in which the general public, political elite and professional military officers made it impossible to create a consensus on what a single national strategy for the maintenance of peace, security and self-determination.

In terms of the study of the Great War's impact on memory, the public and the rank-and-file have received much academic attention, as part of the cultural shift that occurred in historical writing around the same time that memory began to establish itself

⁶² CP Stacey, *Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific*. Vol.1 (Ottawa: DND, 1955): 3.

as a desirable and well-examined field of history.⁶³ Yet to understand the inter-war world, and to dissect the sharp differences in the prevailing ideology between the General Staff of the 1920s and the politicians whom they served (as well as the veterans they formerly commanded), an understanding of the particular inter-war memories and ideologies among the elite is essential.

Romanticism was one of the most notable casualties of trench warfare, and its loss was visible in memories of the war among politicians, soldiers and citizens alike. The application of modern weaponry, which viciously punished uncoordinated attacks even among troops who possessed impressive *elan* and vigour, demanded that officers carefully plan, organise and execute operations.⁶⁴ The soldiers of the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) learned this lesson early on and the Canadian Corps became noted for its pronounced technical expertise, leading to the ideal of the heroic leader being replaced that of the “military manager.”⁶⁵ Paradoxically, the development of weaponry and tactics using a rational, scientific method created battlefield conditions so deadly that they necessitated the development of ideologies, often framed in romantic terms, to get men to the front and out of their trenches. Clausewitz understood the importance of public opinion and listed national will as an essential wartime resource in

⁶³ An exact definition of “memory” in social-science circles will of course be up for vitriolic in-fighting among those wishing to attach a higher degree of “theorisation” to the field of History, and it is not intended for this study to become engrossed in such a discussion. For the sake of clarity, however, the author will borrow Tony Judt’s description of the study of memory in the context of studying European memory of the Second World War: “the ways in which the memory of [an] experience [is] distorted, sublimated and appropriated, [and] bequeathed to the postwar era.” In Tony Judt, “The Past is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe,” *Daedalus*, Vol.121, No.4 (Fall 1992): 84.

⁶⁴ For an excellent discussion of the debates between the schools of firepower and mass psychology, see John A English and Bruce I Gudmundson, *On Infantry*, revised ed., (Westport: Preager, 1994).

⁶⁵ Geoffrey W. Hayes, “The Development of the Canadian Army Officer Corps, 1939-1945.” PhD dissertation. (London: University of Western Ontario, 1992): 7.

his oft-cited trinity of people, government, and army.⁶⁶ Clausewitz, however, was not writing in the day of a modernist mass democracy, where the army was drawn from the people but expected to be technically proficient – previously the realm of a select group of a long-serving aristocratic officer class.

The confusions created by fighting a technical war on romantic terms evidenced themselves in Canadian society. The combination of a powerful democratic ideology and the exigencies of industrial production and modern warfare curiously led to the adoption of romantic terms to justify the conflict, while the soldiers themselves became increasingly clear military managers. The First World War seemed to have defied the notion of useful political ends, especially for Canadians. For many, the struggle became a Holy War of sorts, a war for civilisation, for the King and Empire and Canada that represented all that was right with the world.⁶⁷ This seems to defy simple notions of political objective, of rational calculation and of geopolitics: indeed, did anyone fully understand why Canadians killed Germans in Flanders because Austria had declared war on Serbia? Or why, because of an assassination in Sarajevo, Germany had declared war on Russia – but invaded Belgium first? Was there a reasonable explanation for how the apparent readiness of European empires to go to war over a matter of “national honour” should have led to the mobilisation of a fisherman on Prince Edward Island to fight a cause thousands of miles away? Such questions are difficult if not impossible to answer in a satisfactory way. This disconnect between a war fought for unclear ends with scientific means was plainly evident in the public memory of the war.

⁶⁶ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976): 89.

⁶⁷ See John Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, (London: Pimloco, 2004): 21 and Stephane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, *14-18: Understanding the Great War*, trans. Catherine Temerson. (New York: Hill and Wang, 2002): 97, 115-117.

Clausewitz viewed the combined emotion of the population as a source of “primordial violence,” the natural driving force behind the war effort.⁶⁸ Interpreted in a cultural context, this can be seen as the ideological and cultural power sustaining the conflict. The ideology of the Empire and Canadian society was, for the most part, that of an imperial liberalism. Soldiers fought for a King and Country that was the beacon of reason and light, for individual rights and moral righteousness against what was perceived as autocratic Prussian barbarism.⁶⁹ This underlying liberalism formed a vital part of the overall effort from the Canadian national perspective. The First World War occurred at a unique cultural juncture of mass literacy and a common interest in literature, poetry and the classics, and wartime narratives were often framed in the words of famous poets such as Keats or Tennyson.⁷⁰

The belief in the righteousness of the cause continued unbroken into the immediate post-war years. Rouzeau and Becker note three stages of “cultural demobilisation” during the inter-war period. Between 1919 and 1925 it was generally assumed that despite the Great War and the disappointment of Versailles, much had not changed. Around the middle of the decade, it became more apparent that the world had fundamentally changed, and truly bitter condemnations of the war, and war in general, began to surface late in the decade.⁷¹ Jonathan Vance, in his much-celebrated work on memory of the Great War in Canada, noted that a true revisionist movement did not take hold in mainstream Canadian culture until the mid-1930s.⁷² At that point, the war was

⁶⁸ Clausewitz, 89.

⁶⁹ Rouzeau and Becker, 97-99.

⁷⁰ Paul Fussel. *The Great War and Modern Memory*. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2000): 157.

⁷¹ Rouzeau and Becker, 170

⁷² Jonathan F. Vance, *Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning and the First World War*. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997): 7.

made mythic, and the goal of the myth was largely to transform the Canadian nation into a more unified entity.⁷³ Even after the revisionism of the 1930s, novels such as *Barometer Rising*, based in Halifax around the time of the Halifax Explosion, were still made popular with passages such as:

He had come home [to Halifax] and seen his city almost destroyed, yet he knew beyond any doubt that the war was not all powerful. It was not going to do to Canada what it had done to Europe. . . . The war might be Canada's catastrophe, but it was not her tragedy; just as this explosion in Halifax was catastrophic but not tragic. And maybe when the wars and revolutions were ended, Canada would begin to live; maybe instead of being pulled eastward by Britain she would herself pull Britain clear of decay and give her a new birth.⁷⁴

The memory of the war and its contribution to the growth of a liberal ideology of social justice, national unity and individual rights was most strongly expressed not as rhetoric, but as vocal support for specific policies which were seen as embodiments of these ideals. A summary example is the advocacy of the Royal Canadian Legion, which was founded as a result of a merger between disparate veterans' organisations across the country in 1925. The Legion's aims were stated as "assisting the widowed, the orphaned and the needy; striving for improvement in pensions; seeking re-establishment measures for the disabled; promoting harmony and loyalty among Canadians; strengthening the ties within the Empire; and fostering the spirit of peace."⁷⁵ Meetings and pronouncements concentrated on veterans' pensions and the rulings of compensation and appeals boards. Commemorations, such as Remembrance Day, also took a high priority.⁷⁶ The three founding principles of the organisation were democracy, non-

⁷³ Vance, 11.

⁷⁴ Hugh MacLennan, *Barometer Rising*. (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pierce, 1941): 299-300.

⁷⁵ James Hale, *Branching Out: The Story of the Royal Canadian Legion*. (Ottawa: The Royal Canadian Legion, 1995): 20.

⁷⁶ Hale, 23-25, 27-28.

sectarianism and political non-affiliation, and the term “comrade” was used to denote members.⁷⁷

Veterans’ groups, then, were very much inwardly-focused. The only policy advocacy that came out of the Legion not directly tied to compensation was a call for caps on non-British immigration to the West that might interfere with veterans’ resettlement and even then, the nativist bent of Legion activities did not preoccupy many in the movement until 1928.⁷⁸ This liberalism was local and worked on the assumption that the war had preserved democracy and humanity from the conscripted hordes that had threatened to overrun Europe and the Mother Country. What mattered at the moment was taking care of veterans and memorialising their sacrifice. To many, including Great War veterans, the victory of the “untrained” militiaman in 1918 proved that Canadians were natural-born shock troops. Why bother wasting money on training when there was a hero deep in the soul of every Canadian?⁷⁹ These sentiments would not be lost on politicians, where the influence of vocal veterans and the effects of the war would be clearly felt when the parliamentarians sat to forge a post-war defence policy. One of the most sensitive issues was that which had, in many ways, defined the politics of the war: conscription.

Despite some accounts to the contrary, there was some support for conscription among returned veterans. Many years ago, James Eayrs painted a picture of conscription as having no support whatsoever among the Great War Veterans’ Association (GWVA),

⁷⁷ *Ibid*, 19

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, 25-28, 33.

⁷⁹ James Wood, *Militia Myths: The Idea of the Citizen Soldier, 1896-1921*. (Vancouver and Toronto: UBC Press, 2010): 265-266.

although some branches had passed resolutions in favour of it.⁸⁰ Nonetheless, it is clear that this was a secondary issue, and the veterans were more focused on forming a unified voice for veterans' rights, rather than aiding the military in its manpower problems. Furthermore, political support for conscription was based largely on the desire of some political leaders to encourage a level of social cohesion and protect against internal disturbances from recent immigrants, especially in the West. The schemes advanced in Parliament, therefore, more closely resembled large citizenship training camps, not blueprints for building an operationally effective national army.⁸¹ As such, the issue simply was not worth the large political capital that it would take to press it through a vote. Mackenzie King, having sensed the prevailing mood in a public tired of war and having a history of opposing conscription, would certainly not take up the issue, beyond using it as a weapon against the Tories and Unionists in Quebec.⁸²

Mackenzie King had good reason to be deliberately vague. Besides public disinterest and disdain for military affairs, there was no clear consensus on Canada's role in the Empire. Even within his own party, the Empire was not a sure bet after 1918. Mackenzie-King, on a personal level, took the Empire and the monarchy very seriously but resented direct control of Canadian affairs from London. He saw the decentralisation of imperial affairs as the only way of saving the Empire from more radical critics.⁸³ Among his unofficial advisers was John W. Dafoe, a journalist very close to Prime

⁸⁰ The GWVA is often described as the "predecessor" to the Royal Canadian Legion, but, the Legion incorporated many other groups which had considerable autonomy and distinct agendas. It is safe to say, however, that the GWVA certainly provided much of the administrative and ideological core for later Legion practices. See: Hale.

JL Granatstein and JM Hitsman, *Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada*. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1977): 107-108 and Earys, 68-69

⁸¹ Granatstein and Hitsman, 109-110

⁸² *Ibid*, 110-111.

⁸³ Stacey, 12-13

Minister. Dafoe would eventually deliver lectures entitled “Canada: An American Nation,” whereby he argued that Canada was essentially North American in character, sharing its lot not with the British Empire so much as with a league of Anglophone countries and especially its continental neighbour, the United States.⁸⁴ JS Ewart, another close confidant, was downright rabid in his anti-British attitudes:

[The] question is simply this: Shall Canada participate in the next European war? Everybody agrees that the arrival of another great struggle cannot be long delayed. Preparation for it and security against defeat in it are the predominating features of European (including British) thought. . . . And it is but cowardly, and disastrous dodging to say that the answer depends upon circumstances – that we shall make such reply as we may think when the hour arrives.⁸⁵

Dodging the question of Canada’s place in the world and the role of its defence forces with regard to its allies may have been cowardly to Ewart, but it was undoubtedly good political sense for an Anglophile Liberal Canadian Nationalist like Mackenzie King, who would avoid making such statements even upon the outbreak of war in 1939.

King was faced with a very difficult situation when he became Prime Minister in 1921. The Canadian political scene had been effectively balkanised by the Great War, and a series of strong regional leaders emerged within the Liberal Party. Mackenzie King was elected to party leadership with the support of Quebec and made Prime Minister by dissatisfaction with conscription that led to the collapse of Union and Conservative support there. On the other hand, he could not appear too Quebec-friendly, lest he lose his base of English-Canadian support from the Grit caucus.⁸⁶ This was

⁸⁴ John W. Dafoe, *Canada: An American Nation*, (New York: Morningside Heights, 1935).

⁸⁵ JS Ewart, *The Independence Papers, Vol.1 1925-1930* (Ottawa: Self-published between 1925 and 1930): 2-3.

⁸⁶ John MacFarlane, *Ernest Lapointe and Quebec’s Influence on Canadian Foreign Policy*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999): 33-34.

especially true after the 1925 election, where 60 percent of the Liberal caucus originated from Quebec.⁸⁷ King began to rely heavily on Ernest Lapointe, his Quebec lieutenant, who correctly identified issues of empire and foreign policy as inherently divisive, whereas trade questions had less effect on linguistic and cultural problems.⁸⁸ As a result it is no surprise that the elections of 1921 and 1925 centred mostly on trade and involved very little discussion about the role of Canada in the Empire, the League of Nations or in the world.⁸⁹

Although in a position after his election in 1921 to clearly define Canada's strategic aims and goals, King had every reason not to do so. The debate would inevitably harm what he cherished most: national unity and an emotional, if not administrative and governmental, connection to the British Empire.⁹⁰ In terms of the newly-founded League of Nations, the limitation of commitments became the primary concern.⁹¹ Until the Great War broke out, the military ideal in the Canadian social memory of war was the militiaman ready to defend his homestead. But the Great War had effected a powerful transformation from the prominence of the trained militiaman in the very literal defence of his home to the mobilised volunteer who fought abroad.⁹² In the early 1920s, there were no enemies to actively defend against and the last thing Canada needed was another divisive issue and another possible commitment of troops to Europe. Norman Hillmer goes as far as to argue that with so many internal problems and such a deep emotional attachment to Britain, the opportunity for cementing a distinctly

⁸⁷ *Ibid*, 35-36

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, 40-42.

⁸⁹ Stacey, 3

⁹⁰ *Ibid*, 12-13.

⁹¹ Stacey, 59.

⁹² Woods, 241-243, 253—254.

Canadian role in the world would not present itself until the Cold War, and until then the best foreign policy for a politically knowledgeable leader was none at all.⁹³ This was very good for a politician, but no help to those charged with arranging and training Canada's armed forces: what were they to be organised and trained to do?

Distaste for conscription, or even for an extended debate and decision on defence policy and international questions, was part of a larger political trend of looking inwards after 1918. Astute politicians were merely mirroring the political and cultural trends in Canadian society. Since the myth of the Canadian soldier was one of voluntarism, and the mood of the times was concerned with the peace dividend, ambiguity was the basic attitude towards defence and foreign policy. Perhaps, at some other time, these questions would be examined, but in the years immediately following the war it was clear that the Allies had won a great victory - and the notion of another war was simply beyond contemplation.

On a professional and technical level, however, self-criticism was to be the key theme of remembrance. Canadian society generally was experiencing a period of professionalization and occupations were increasingly being seen as dedicated crafts requiring extensive expertise. While public support for applying this to things military was not present (part-time militia, or NPAM,⁹⁴ summer camps had to be cancelled in 1919 and 1920 due to lack of interest,) the professionals would take up the debates on Canadian defence and military policy that had involved general population extensively

⁹³ Norman Hillmer, "The Foreign Policy that Never Was, 1900-1950," Conference Paper, 2002 <http://www.orghistcanada.ca/files/conference_papers/2002/4a-hillmer.pdf> :3.

⁹⁴ Non-Permanent Active Militia, or part-time citizen soldiers. In modern parlance the "Militia" is a colloquial term for the Army reserve, but in the inter-war period, the entire land force was known as "The Canadian Militia" with the NPAM being the part-time component.

before the war.⁹⁵ However, the professionals of the Permanent Force had their own distinct memories of the war.

For those who had led Canadian forces in battle from 1914 to 1918, the Great War produced a memory which focused on the problems of maintaining and employing troops in battle. The Canadian officer corps had emerged as a professional organisation by 1918, after a long struggle with amateurism and political interference. Canadian soldiers had gone off to war in poor condition in 1914 and had been subjected to extensive political interference. The Minister of Militia and Defence, Sir Sam Hughes, completely redesigned a mobilisation plan that had been carefully crafted since 1911 by the General Staff. Hughes advised the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Borden, that the troops were ready before mobilisation had been ordered – or, in fact, before Britain had declared war on Germany.⁹⁶ He subsequently cabled each militia commanding officer (CO) directly, ignoring the commanders and formations that had already been assigned for mobilisation. He also ordered that the newly-minted Canadian Expeditionary Force be concentrated at a camp that did not yet exist: Valcartier. To his credit, Hughes managed, through the liberal, no-bid contracting of Tory businessmen, to build a camp in less than two weeks.

Hughes' pervasive and continuous interference in even minor technical details of the mobilisation turned the whole affair into a shambles. Many of the men drilled with no weapons or uniforms and recruits arrived in varying states of readiness. Canada's one regular infantry regiment, the Royal Canadian Regiment, full of veterans from the Second Boer War (1899-1902) and specifically mandated to train the Canadian Militia

⁹⁵ Woods, 241-143.

⁹⁶ Ronald Haycock, *Sam Hughes: The Public Career of a Controversial Canadian, 1885-1916*. (Ottawa: Wilfrid Laurier University Press and the National Museums of Canada, 1986): 177-179.

in the event of mobilisation, was sent overseas by Hughes – to replace British troops on garrison duty in Bermuda. It would eventually sail directly to England in 1915 to be thrown against the Germans on the Western Front before it trained any Canadians.⁹⁷ These logistical and leadership problems, however, could be resolved relatively quickly. More complex military problems arising from the war continued to occupy the minds of soldiers and politicians alike after the shooting stopped.

Apart from problems with equipment, weapons and training which could be addressed with relative ease, the Great War experience raised a far more complex problem of command authority and institutional legacy. Because of Hughes' seemingly wild, unplanned and spontaneous preparations for war, important constitutional problems relating to the control of Canadian troops were not addressed during mobilisation. The Militia Act had no clear provisions about sending a truly "Canadian" contingent overseas, and faced with a restless army in Valcartier, the government decided to designate the CEF as an "imperial" contingent whose officers had commissions not just in the Canadian Militia, but in the imperial army as well. The men from Valcartier became an administrative and legal entity distinct from the original units of the Canadian Militia, becoming numbered battalions of the CEF instead of the named regiments of the pre-war order of battle. Technically, because of its designation as an imperial force paid for by the Dominion government, the CEF was an army separate from that of the Militia under the control of London, not Ottawa. Canadian control was not established until 1916 by an act of Parliament, and, by this point, the CEF was

⁹⁷ Bernard Horn, *Establishing a Legacy: The History of the Royal Canadian Regiment*, (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2008): 77.

rooted as a distinctly different organisation than the antebellum defence forces.⁹⁸ This arrangement virtually guaranteed that any attempt at preserving the fighting efficiency of the CEF after the war would be fraught with difficulty.

And there was every reason to maintain the Canadian Corps. By the end of the war, the disorganised Canadians had transformed themselves into a premier fighting formation. As the final campaign to break the backs of the German Army, known as the Hundred Days, continued, Sir Douglas Haig, the commander of all Empire forces began to rely on the Canadians more and more heavily. Despite the injection of increasing numbers of American troops into the line, the experienced Canadians were needed to act as the vanguard of the Allied push.⁹⁹ Understandably, those who had recently been through the war were not keen on having the pre-war Militia continue at the expense of the shock troops returning from Europe. Major-General AC Macdonnell, commanding the 1st Division, gave a good summary of the view of the senior CEF leadership when he noted that “Better a dozen peace regiments should go to the wall than the CEF units be lost.”¹⁰⁰ The professional officers now had a new arsenal of technical, leadership and staff experience behind them; additionally, they had a cause to fight for.

Professional officers would mount their campaign to transform the pre-war militia system largely through how they recalled the early days of the Great War. Hughes’s biographer, Ronald Haycock, notes that despite much of the criticism Hughes received, Valcartier was probably a logistically sensible choice and there were serious

⁹⁸Tim Cook, *At the Sharp End: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1914-1916*, (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007): 34-37.

⁹⁹ Cook, *Shock Troops*, 550-551.

¹⁰⁰ Granatstein, 158

political and military problems with the existing mobilisation scheme.¹⁰¹ Justifiably or not, Hughes was to be the focal point for much of the blame for the chaotic mobilisation of 1914. Canadian soldiers had been, in the words of Colonel James Sutherland-Brown,¹⁰² supplied with “clothing, Equipment, Arms and Transport [that] was from indifferent to bad, some was abominable, and it was almost criminal for some of it to have been supplied to the troops.”¹⁰³ Brown was not exaggerating. Among Hughes’ innovations were cheaply made boots that came apart in the mud of Salisbury Plain; poorly-designed shovels designed to double as a rifle guard but were useful as neither; and outdated, shoddily manufactured webbing.¹⁰⁴ Even worse was the Ross rifle issued to the men in 1914 and kept in service by Sam Hughes and his political apparatus until 1916. Prone to jamming under field conditions, unwieldy, unpopular with a self-detaching bayonet, Hughes used a network of politically-appointed COs to ensure it would remain in Canadian service.¹⁰⁵ Leadership, it appeared, was another problem in the early days of the CEF.

Sutherland Brown, who would lead Canada’s post-war military planning effort, had formed his first impressions of Canada’s participation in the war by helping to organise the despatch of the First Division of the CEF. In a subsequent report on the mobilisation of 1914, he noted that the Canadian Expeditionary Force “had no Divisional Staff and in fact had no commander when we left the shores of Canada. It was incomplete in Transport, incomplete in Armament, incomplete in Equipment,

¹⁰¹ Cook, *Sharp End*, 179-182.

¹⁰² Colonel James Sutherland-Brown would go on to lead the planning section of the General Staff, the Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence (DMO&I) after the war.

¹⁰³ Directorate of History and Heritage, Second Section (hereafter DHH 2), “A Comparison between Mobilization, 1919 and 1922,” JSF 2002/17, Box 124, File 9. November 1922: 11.

¹⁰⁴ Cook, 75-76.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, 129-130.

incomplete in Personnel, incomplete in Staff and Specialists, and what Arms and Equipment and Transport and Clothing we had was, to a great extent, bad and worse than bad.”¹⁰⁶ In fact, the minister’s meddling affected more than arms and equipment. Hughes had politicised the Canadian leadership to an extent that Haycock has described the organisation as “Hughes’ Hydra.”¹⁰⁷ For every staff or command action that was designed to check political influence and streamline the CEF’s functioning, there seemed to be two Hughes appointees in the way, blocking the reforms.

Hughes tightened his grip on the Canadian war effort by using a series of personal contacts to circumvent the authority of Sir George Perley, Canada’s High Commissioner in Britain.¹⁰⁸ He then inserted personal friends and allies, regardless of their qualifications, to important staff and command appointments, often by encouraging them to raise their own battalions rather than a more thorough, rational process of recruiting. This was followed by the removal of professional soldiers from important posts, provoking the ire of the British regulars trying to get on with the war and stirring up unnecessary antagonism between Canadian and British allies.¹⁰⁹ Eventually, even many politically-appointed officers found that despite benefitting from Hughes’ interference, the impact of his meddling was simply too detrimental to military efficiency. Junior officers who were given military positions on political recommendation found their reinforcement battalions broken up upon arrival in England but refused to take a demotion to serve as platoon commanders. As a result, a caucus of embittered commissioned officers built up in the training system, demanding to see

¹⁰⁶ DHH 2, *Mobilization*, 12.

¹⁰⁷ Haycock, 258.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid*, 256-261.

¹⁰⁹ Haycock, 264-267

action, while those with experience at the front could not pass on valuable lessons to those who were supposedly learning how to survive on an industrial battlefield.¹¹⁰ The challenge for the professionals who inherited the legacy of 1914-1918 was to ensure that these severe problems resulting from political interference would not be repeated.

JL Granatstein postulated that the generalship in the inter-war period constituted a “cover crop” that preserved and refined the institutions of the Canadian Militia and attempted to solve the complex civil-military problems emanating from the Great War. This allowed the fighting generals of the 1939-1945 war, such as Bert Hoffmeister and Guy Simonds, neither of whom had Great War experience, to focus on leading soldiers in combat. In other words, the inter-war years produced an institution capable of creating an army, but not necessarily able to lead it in war, which, given the very small size of the inter-war officer corps, was the best that could be hoped for.¹¹¹ This cover crop would grow to produce some remarkably refined work on the nature of Canadian strategy and the conduct of war in the modern world.

This introspection required an intellectual blossoming within the professional officer corps. Although much of the structure of professional officer training would remain similar to that from before the war, the vigour and experience of the returning veterans gave the Militia a much stronger emphasis on professional development. Given the dearth of funds for practical exercises, intellectual and theoretical activities held new interest for those interested in “real soldiering.”¹¹² Admission to various Staff College courses in the United Kingdom, and British India ensured that ambitious young

¹¹⁰ Stephen J. Harris, *Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988): 108-110.

¹¹¹ Jack Granatstein, *The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War*. (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2005): 5-8, 9, 32-34.

¹¹² Harris, *Canadian Brass*, 193-194.

subalterns spent much of their time studying military affairs.¹¹³ One sign of such new intellectual vigour was the emergence of Canada's first serious inter-service military journal, *Canadian Defence Quarterly* (CDQ), which published its inaugural issue in October 1923. In its simple, factionalised original form, individual sections were managed by various service associations, such as those devoted to cavalry and infantry. The result was that its articles were almost entirely recent histories of actions at Cambrai or other operational narratives, save for a brief discussion of air policy by the Air Board. The finances were managed by individual associations and distribution was also decentralised.¹¹⁴ It was not until late 1924 that the journal was revamped under an independent editorial board (the editing had been previously managed by the service associations). Once it became a regular publication, it quickly grew as a sounding board of sorts for the intellectual life of Canada's military services.

Tommy Burns, who was easily one of the most intellectually astute generals in Canadian service in the inter-war period and the Second World War, reasoned that this emphasis on intellectualism eventually allowed a small Canadian army to develop the capacity for answering increasingly complex questions surrounding military operations and the world situation, even if its small size and the fast pace of technological change prevented it from coming up with any specific strategic proposals for the future.¹¹⁵ The first of such questions dealt with the role of the military within government policy and society, and it produced an interesting, quasi-militarist dogma known as "readiness."

¹¹³ Granatstein, *The Generals*, 14-15.

¹¹⁴ *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol.1, No.1 (October 1923): 1-64. See "Air Policy," p.59-63 and rear cover (p.64.)

¹¹⁵ "Air Policy," 124

Canadians had been caught unawares when Canada had gone to war in 1914, and this resulted in much unnecessary death. A romantic call to arms or *levée en masse* may be an effective way of mobilising the people and their “blind natural force,” but the bloody folly of mass tactics and attrition strategy had been made transparently clear by hardened, trained, professionals. In this sense, there was a growing impression within militia leadership after the war that the people must be brought into the fold, or at least must understand, the object of the military, which was to understand “the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam.”¹¹⁶ The evolution of command theory from the heroic general to the well-managed platoon and section operating advanced weaponry had blurred the Clausewitzian triangle.

Thus, if the people were to be effective upon mobilisation, they would need to have some sort of prior military skills and there needed to exist a robust military structure for handling the mass. This is the concept of *readiness* as a central assumption in military thought. Achieving readiness would require a blending of the two corners of Clausewitz’s trinity by infusing a sense of military realism into the population. This is a far cry from “militarism” in the classic sense. Although definitions of militarism, like any technical term in the social sciences, are in a constant state of flux, a central component of a militarist ideology is the centrality of the military in defining the nation or state and is a key consideration in its policies, both foreign and domestic.¹¹⁷ The

¹¹⁶ Clausewitz, 89.

¹¹⁷ See Andrew J. Bacevich, *The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War*, (Oxford: Toronto, 2005): 2: “Americans have come to define the nation’s strength and well-being in terms of military preparedness, military action, and the fostering of (or nostalgia for) military ideals”; See also Ronald R. Krebs, “A School for the Nation? How Military Service Does Not Build Nations, and How it Might,” *International Security*, Vol.28, No.4 (Spring 2004), 85. Krebs provides a detailed analysis of how the military might, and is often used in an attempt to, be considered a “total institution” employed by the state in order to foster a sense of mission or identity.

speeches of the post-war Chief of Staff,¹¹⁸ James MacBrien, indicate clearly that readiness had nothing to do with classical militarism.

In MacBrien's view, the military had to be effective not in order to make policy, but to ensure that politicians had a greater freedom of action in a crisis and that decisions made by civilian institutions could be implemented. War was considered neither a normal state of affairs nor a normal policy tool; rather, it was the result of the failure of diplomatic actions. With the democratisation of policy, and especially foreign policy, MacBrien argued, those most likely to use force were "leaders of Nations [who] have been too autocratic and too determined in an aggressive policy to be deterred from a course of conquest. . . .It is hardly possible to conceive Napoleon or Bismarck submitting their policy to a neutral body of statesmen."¹¹⁹ Nor could international organisations be counted on, even if they should be supported as a matter of national policy. Several attempts at an international body for the preservation of peace had failed before, most notably the Holy Alliance of 1815, which had degenerated into a "tyranny" bent on domestic interventions in small countries to preserve stability. According to MacBrien, political leaders must be aware that the maintenance of an effective military force is necessary should war break out. Upon the declaration of war, however, "strategy" must replace "diplomacy" in order for the military means designed to restore peace to be effective. After all, if the government were truly democratic, then a

¹¹⁸ This position had changing terms of reference throughout the inter-war period. See Ch.3 on Canadian defence organisation for an exact definition of how this position was defined and exercised.

¹¹⁹ Library and Archives Canada (LAC), MG 30 E63 Vol. 7 "Diplomacy and Strategy in Relation to War," undated, 1.

declaration of war is really the embodiment of the popular will – and wouldn't the population want the war to be fought effectively?¹²⁰

The prevention of war, then, ought to be construed as a policy in itself. It would be noted that within MacBrien's terminology, this required a proactive "defensive policy," not a proactive strategic doctrine that involved the active use of force.¹²¹ In the past, MacBrien reasoned, nations had taken up arms against one another for such reasons as blind ambitions of rulers, religion and commerce; the future would see wars fought for reasons of "Governments seeking world-power," commercial interest, an "Outlet for population" and "Racial rivalry."¹²² Although some arms-reduction treaties were already in effect, world conditions, such as "[w]ars now in progress," presumably the Russian Civil War or Russo-Polish War, and a possible alliance of Germany, Austria and Russia, along with American-Japanese tensions and a vindictive Germany smarting from the humiliation of Versailles, all pointed to the likelihood that disarmament would not be truly universal and tempt larger nations to exploit smaller ones, primarily for economic reasons.¹²³ For MacBrien, the Great War had found Canada "willing – but unprepared," a situation which would be even less acceptable after 1918 given that the growing complexity of modern military operations. Greater sophistication would make mobilisation times shorter and training more complex. In order to be effective, MacBrien asserted, "we must fight as soldiers not as a mob."¹²⁴ This would require

¹²⁰ *Ibid*, 6-7.

¹²¹ LAC, MG 30, E63 Vol.7, "Speech, 'Prevention of War,'" undated: 3.

¹²² *Ibid*, 2.

¹²³ LAC, MG 30, E63 Vol.7, "Speech, 'Prevention of War,'" undated:, 2-3. Because the speech is undated, we cannot know which war exactly MacBrien was referring to. But since the speech is related to larger questions of militia reorganisation it can be assumed that it was written in the early 1920s, and thus probably referring to the Russian Civil War which ended in 1922 and/or the Russo-Polish war which ended in 1921.

¹²⁴ *Ibid*, 5.

universal military service to instil the idea of national responsibility and make mobilised men effective soldiers in the early days of a conflict. This was an essential precaution to be taken as part of a defensive policy which included non-military aspects such as maintaining a “[t]hroughly organize[d] nation” and maintaining “morale and physique” through larger cultural institutions such as the Scouts and Guides.¹²⁵

MacBrien was not alone in studying the complex and evolving role of the military with regards to national policy and maintaining the peace. Tommy Burns, then a captain who would rise to Lieutenant-General,¹²⁶ published “A Dialogue of a Soldier and a Pacifist” in the *Canadian Defence Quarterly* whereby he declared pacifist arguments for total disarmament as inherently “impossible,” and decried the fact that they were merely repeating the arguments of a vocal few. Given that casual pacifists never made any new points, Burns capitalised on the notion of an essentially selfish human nature to point out the need for adequate defence forces. Besides technological advances that brought Canada’s shores closer to potential enemies, the social changes brought about by the Russian Revolution made defence against Communist insurrection and possible foreign support necessary. Given that the British Empire was protecting Canada, should Canada not be capable of contributing to its own defence? If Canada could not contribute to the defence of the Empire, what reasons would the Empire have of protecting Canada? The United States probably would protect Canada in such an event, but “[i]n that case, you have only changed the party to whom you owe an

¹²⁵ LAC, MG 30, E63 Vol.7, “Speech, ‘Prevention of War,” undated: 3-4.

¹²⁶ Burns went on to gain a unique perspective on questions of pacifism and militarism. Although his inter-war articles largely support Liddell Hart’s view of machine-like training of soldiers in what would be known as “battle drills,” after several prominent command positions during the war, he would successfully head Veterans Affairs Canada, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and rise to become Canada’s adviser for disarmament and a full ambassador. See Granatstein’s chapter in *The Generals*: Granatstein, *The Generals*, p.116-144.

obligation. The U.S. would not care to protect Canada for nothing.”¹²⁷ To protect against foreign domination, it is only prudent, in fact necessary and moral, to maintain a military potential – “[b]ecause a man thinks about fire insurance,” Burns argues, “doesn’t mean he contemplates arson.”¹²⁸

Notions of readiness and of the military’s role in preparing the population were far from universal. MacBrien and Turner, his predecessor as Chief of the General Staff, Overseas Military Forces of Canada,¹²⁹ had hoped that peacetime conscription, under the term “Universal Training” would gain support among veteran’s groups and become a political issue.¹³⁰ This was a gross misunderstanding of the importance that veterans afforded the ethic of voluntarism, but even after the idea of peace-time conscription was rejected, MacBrien expressed his wishes that various school-based cadet units might be incorporated into a scheme of “compulsory training,” whereby schoolboys would undergo physical training and medical examination linked into a system of military registration and attend manoeuvres with the NPAM upon graduation.¹³¹ Furthermore, he wished to establish direct linkages between the disparate cadet units and the national command structure by moving the cadet organisation directly under the command of the

¹²⁷ ELM Burns, “Dialogue of a Soldier and a Pacifist,” *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol.II, No.1, p 23-24.[22-26]

¹²⁸ Burns, 26.

¹²⁹ Chief of Staff, Overseas Military Forces of Canada (CGS OFMC), was a wartime appointment which filled a need to have a military advisor to the overseas ministry. See Ch.3

¹³⁰ LAC, MG 30 E63 Vol.1 “Correspondence – Overseas Military Forces of Canada, File 1,” Letter from Turner to MacBrien, 13 December 1919. See also James Wood’s account of the reaction to conscription among veterans, p. 263-264.

¹³¹ LAC, MG 30 E63 Vol.1 “Correspondence – Overseas Military Forces of Canada – Vol.1”, letter from MacBrien to Currie, 31 December 1919.

Chief of the General Staff.¹³² This, it was hoped, would ensure a measure of technical proficiency and make mobilised recruits useful in the outbreak of war.

But how useful could this technical training be? Without constant funding to upgrade equipment and conduct manoeuvres, Canadian military forces would soon fall behind. The year 1914 had been a war of the rifleman; by 1918, the Canadian Corps was employing rifle-grenades, tanks, complex artillery plans using gas shells, counter-battery fire and varying types of guns, and reconnaissance was increasingly done by air. Canadian planners in the inter-war era simply did not have the resources to keep the armed force up to date.

Nonetheless, at least some form of national registration would, ironically, have gone a long way to prevent or postpone the unpopular and inefficient manpower schemes that eventually led to the conscription crisis of 1917, a result of “the mismanagement of manpower that had begun with Sam Hughes’s first call for men in August 1914 [that] had never been properly corrected.”¹³³ Clearly, the solution was not clear-cut and would require some sort of balance between competing priorities.

The priorities to be balanced were first, in preserving the militia spirit that had only been strengthened by the mythology of Canada’s war effort; and, second, in maintaining an efficient and technically-minded force. The general answer that emerged from much military writing at the time was to make the militia more relevant by strengthening the Permanent Force (PF).¹³⁴ This view was expressed by MacBrien, who argued that, “the efficiency of the Active Militia which is Canada’s real defence depends

¹³² LAC MG 30 E63 Vol.3 Letter from MacBrien to Currie, “Memoranda – Overseas Military Forces, 1919-1920,” 21 May 1920.

¹³³ JL Granatstein, “Conscription in the Great War,” in David MacKenzie, ed. *Canada and the First World War: Essays in Honour of Robert Craig Brown*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005): 65.

¹³⁴ Note that “PF” or “Permanent Force” may also be referred to as “Regulars.”

on its instructors. The instructors get their efficiency by being trained in efficient units.”¹³⁵ Editorials in *Canadian Defence Quarterly* provided complementary pieces: since Canada did depend on part-time soldiers for its defence, having an efficient officer corps was doubly important as such units would require close supervision and superb administration to be effective – even more so than a large full-time force, which was easier to control.¹³⁶

Attempts were made to tie this new sense of scientific professionalism into Canadian history by re-interpreting the narrative of Canada’s stand against the United States between 1812 and 1814. Of interest is a historical review of the mobilisation during the War of 1812 published in the *Quarterly* 1928. The author tries to break the myth of the Canadian militiaman, called up in the *levee en masse* to defend his homestead. Instead, it is made clear that only a scientific system of organisation whereby various levels of command could employ mobilised militiamen for strategically significant purposes made the militia effective and the defence of Canada possible: “The defence of His Majesty’s American dominions was a highly scientific piece of work. It was effected, not merely by exceptionally high moral courage and leadership, not merely by hard fighting, but also by an organization which was exceedingly sound in relation to the circumstances of the time. It combined the skill and discipline of the Regular with the patriotism and bravery of a people armed and free.”¹³⁷ Although the author was certainly correct in his analysis, many Canadians – and many of them in the Militia itself – certainly didn’t see it that way. And unlike 1812, there would be no

¹³⁵ LAC, MG 30 E63 Vol.3, Draft memorandum, “Concentration of the Permanent Force,” [presumed] May 1920.

¹³⁶ Anon. “Editorial,” *CDQ*, Vol.II No.1. p.3-4.

¹³⁷ CF Hamilton, “The Canadian Militia: Universal Service,” *CDQ*, Vol.V No.3, 300.

British regulars. Canada would have to produce and maintain its own professional core to build on in a time of war.

This policy of an elite, combat-ready PF to supplement an enthusiastic NPAM was only a vague concept and presented many technical problems. For one, there was the issue of NPAM leadership. The NPAM was having troubles keeping up its numbers, so, logically, officers should be recruited from those who would sustain the force. L/Col JM Prower argued in the *Canadian Defence Quarterly* that because of Canada's unique military heritage and circumstances, the standard British battalion organisation of a headquarters element and four groups should be based on a region, with each group based on a village. Furthermore, local cadet units should be tied directly into the activities of the Militia in order to provide physically fit and engaged recruits. But good recruiters don't necessarily make good officers, and the article laments that "Too many Officers consider that their work is done when they have had their cards printed and purchased their uniform."¹³⁸ No recruitment plan could solve the deficiencies in the technical knowledge and leadership attributes of hastily-trained part-time officers.¹³⁹ Some took the idea as far as forming "County Associations" to administer local military facilities, jointly funded and jointly manned by the Department of National Defence (DND) and the local community.¹⁴⁰ It was hoped that expanding the number of stakeholders in regimental affairs would stimulate more local interest in military matters and strengthen Canada's citizen army.¹⁴¹ There was no assurance, however, that hordes

¹³⁸ JM Prower, "The Organization of Rural Infantry Units in Relation to Their Personnel," *CDQ*, Vol. II, No.1 (October 1924): 59-62

¹³⁹ *Ibid*, 59.62.

¹⁴⁰ The Department of National Defence was created as a single ministry administering all fighting services in 1923. For more details, see Ch.3.

¹⁴¹ Hugh M. Bell, "The Problem of the Militia," *CDQ*, Vol. III, No.3 (April 1926): 276-277.

of enthusiastic recruits would be effective upon mobilisation – after all, hadn't the recruiting offices been swarmed in 1914?

Other officers doubted the wisdom of investing significant resources from a very scant pool in an attempt to keep a part-time militia, spread out over large distances, at such a high standard with extensive technical knowledge and a high operational capability. The cadet system, for example, would probably produce good citizens, but not necessarily good soldiers. Furthermore, a cadet programme aimed at building good citizens would avoid the two key criticisms of the institution: from the anti-militarists arguing that cadet training fostered militarism, and from some NPAM officers disgruntled with the lack of recruits it produced for their units. Building good citizens was enough, and good citizens were a benefit to the country in peace or war.¹⁴² Basic logistics got in the way – the training available to cadets was simply too rudimentary to be of any significant value. Instead, the cadet corps provided a young boy with a sense of “orderliness” and a level of physical fitness that would allow for improved academic performance, as “weak bodies cannot produce master minds.”¹⁴³

Training NPAM recruits provided another set of difficulties. Given that joining the NPAM was voluntary, and the pay was both minimal and often forfeited for unit funds,¹⁴⁴ the recruits had to be retained by promoting enthusiasm – recounting the “great acts” of fighting Canadians throughout time and cultivating patriotic fervour, loyalty to the unit, and dedication to soldiering, which would ensure that, over time, troops would gradually accumulate the technical training necessary to make them effective in

¹⁴² JM Cumming, “The Cadet System and Its Relation to National Defence,” *CDQ* Vol.II, No.2(January 1925): 181-182.

¹⁴³ Colonel G.H. Gillespie, “Some Benefits of Cadet Training,” *CDQ*, Vol. IV, No.1 (October 1926): 74.

¹⁴⁴ JL Granatstein, *Canada's Army*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002): 160-161.

combat.¹⁴⁵ But what about those who were supposed to oversee even this rudimentary training – surely, if the leadership did not inspire confidence in recruits, then stories about the Great War would seem rather meaningless.

Officer training in the NPAM had much of the same flavour. Strome Galloway, who later served in the Royal Canadian Regiment during the Second World War, said of his time before the war as a young subaltern in the Elgin Regiment that, “Our military training was pretty much of an amateur performance. Some of the chaps were in the regiment only for the shooting, others for the bar privileges. . . . But many were keen on all aspects of soldiering and this became apparent in June 1940 when the regiment was mobilized. All ranks volunteered, almost to a man.”¹⁴⁶ Bert Hoffmeister, who would go on to become Canada’s most respected battlefield general of the Second World War, noted that despite a lack of technical training, involvement with the community and local industry in such events as sports and parades built up confidence and leadership capabilities.¹⁴⁷ This was the traditional social role of the Canadian Militia at its finest, though it was starkly in contrast to the technical proficiency and high state of readiness sought by MacBrien and other PF officers. But with so few resources and no strategic direction, what else would have been possible? What was the Militia preparing for – what kind of war? Where? How would it be fought, and what would be the roles of the regulars and the part-timers? What were the underlying assumptions? Until these questions were answered, the leadership of the vast majority of Canada’s potential

¹⁴⁵ “Expediting Efficiency Through Training,” *CDQ*, Vol. II, No.2 (January 1925): 168-169.

¹⁴⁶ Strome Galloway, *The General Who Never Was*, (Belleville: Mika Publishing, 1981): 25.

¹⁴⁷ Douglas E Delaney, *The Soldiers’ General: Bert Hoffmeister at War*, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005): 9-17

combat power was directionless. In the meantime, all they could do was to be fit, engaged and “ready” – even if they were not clear what they were to be “ready” for.

Was readiness a form of militarism? Clearly, some threads of post-war professional thought were more militarist than others, in the sense of using the military as a vehicle for social change. Furthermore, those who saw the military as a vehicle for social change were primarily politicians, some of whom promoted conscription as a means of ensuring national unity.¹⁴⁸ The professionals were more interested in using Canada’s existing institutions, such as the cadets and part-time militia, along lines more consistent with the ideal of a carefully-managed, scientifically organised force that was better suited to defend Canadian interests. Nevertheless, Militarism was a charge levied at military leadership and actively pursued. Perhaps one of the most indicative responses came from L/Col Gillespie of the Cadet Services: “Practically the only charge directed against Cadet training is that it is ‘Military Training’ and as such it is sure to inculcate and foster ideas of “Militarism” in the minds of our youth. . . . Militarism does not and cannot exist in Canada, and if that fact were fully appreciated there would likely be less criticism of Cadet training being akin to Militarism. Our appropriations for military purposes are the smallest of any country in the world.”¹⁴⁹ Even the most ardent supporter of conscription, MacBrien, sought a sound historical basis for advocating universal service: “From the time of their earliest settlements, the inhabitants of New France were engaged in a ceaseless struggle. . . . The system of compulsory service in the Militia brought home to the inhabitants the realities and responsibilities of

¹⁴⁸ See “Introduction” for details.

¹⁴⁹ Gillespie, 73.

citizenship.”¹⁵⁰ Military leadership had simply seen too many problems with the older, more romantic systems of defence that had taken root before the Great War and saw it is a professional, and probably national and imperial, necessity to move these Canadian institutions forward along more modernist lines. Ironically, the civic engagement so valued by both the hard-line conscriptionists and the more traditional community-based localists was the result of a shortage of funding for the Militia in the first place.

An enthusiastic but generally untrained militia would be difficult to mobilise and despatch overseas, but an up-to-date military force of professionals risked losing touch with Canadians and hence endangering its already limited public support. Furthermore, the notion of using regulars to stiffen the administrative and tactical abilities of the NPAM was difficult to implement, as the attachment of PF personnel to Militia units might make the Militia more efficient, but it would leave the PF weaker and would not allow NPAM units to be self-sufficient upon mobilisation.¹⁵¹ This was the central question that would be reflected in the organisation of the Militia until the outbreak of the Second World War.

The most widely documented struggle between these two visions of the Canadian Army took place between Sutherland-Brown, the father of Defence Scheme No.1 (United States), advocating a large, Militia-based, 15-division land force designed for service on the North American continent and the single-division expeditionary force advocated by AGL McNaughton.¹⁵² Essentially, the key debate was over the central

¹⁵⁰ JH MacBrien, “A Brief Sketch of the Development of the Canadian Militia, 1627-1927,” *CDQ*, Vol. IV No.4 (July, 1927): 383. Interestingly, MacBrien is derisive of the American militiamen who fought for their “so-called liberty,” claiming that the British had more trouble with the 50 000 American regulars as opposed to 500 000 irregulars.

¹⁵¹ Of the Line (pseudonym), “The Problem of the Militia – A Reply to Major Hugh M. Bell,” *CDQ*, Vol.III, No.4 (July 1926): 447-448.

¹⁵² Harris, *Canadian Brass*, 174-175.

strategic role of the land forces and defence policy in general. But with a political drive that was deliberately vague and a diplomacy that intentionally did not make commitments in any direction, this was an impossible question to have answered definitively. The structure of the inter-war Militia would change as those in power favoured one side of this debate over the other, and would be somewhat, but not completely, resolved by 1928 with the rise of McNaughton to the position of CGS.

Despite the very detailed debates on organising and raising military forces in the Canadian context, there was very little debate on what the strategic role of the Militia exactly comprised. Sir Arthur Currie chronicled this omission in 1926:

There is no question of Imperialism or of Nationalism, there is no Question of Militarism, or as some would call it Junkerism, there is no question of glorifying war or teaching young men to kill their brothers. . . . it is our plain duty as business men to realize that even those nations which are most anxious to preserve peace think that armed force is necessary to keep the world in order. *It is our plain duty as business men to insure against war, – not necessarily any particular war, but any war.*¹⁵³ [emphasis added]

It was thus assumed that war was possible, and that Canada should have some sort of military potential readily available. This is the very vaguest of strategic direction, and, as has been discussed, the only possible source of such direction had no inclination to set out a role for the military. It was clear to those planning for Canadian defence that military force would eventually be required to project power and protect Canadian interests, but they lacked guidance on what those interests might be. Hugh M. Bell, who engaged in a series of bitter debates on the role of the Militia and its relation to national defence, set out his ideal “National Defence Plan” as an almost purely administrative one, focusing on how to raise funds locally and employing the Permanent Force as a

¹⁵³ Sir Arthur Currie, “The Case for a Canadian Militia,” *CDQ*, Vol.III, No.4, (July 1926):, 439.

more effective core for the part-time Militia.¹⁵⁴ His opponent, “Of the Line,” had ideas about the employment of military force that were essentially the same, saying that “the military policy of the country is based upon the organization and training of a militia army for use in case of emergency.”¹⁵⁵ Without this fundamental question being answered, the debates surrounding the Canadian Militia would be inwardly focused, and the creation of a force structure to carry out specific strategic aims would be impossible. This question was not addressed until the conflict between McNaughton and Sutherland-Brown played itself out in the late 1920s. The debate between Bell and his pseudonymed antagonist is symptomatic of the central problem facing the Militia’s leadership: that despite the energy put into organising the Militia from 1920 to 1928, much of it was wasted because no one was sure exactly what they were organising for.

Upon the outbreak of war in 1939, Department of External Affairs insider Loring Christie was “shocked” to discover that despite “propaganda” emanating from the Department of National Defence that the direct defence of Canada was the first priority, there existed a plan for a two-division expeditionary force.¹⁵⁶ Christie had no-one to blame but himself and his fellow diplomats. Without a clear set of ideas on what the defence of Canada meant, it was a daunting challenge to organise for war and every contingency had to be considered.

There was a consensus among professional officers that the situation of 1914 could not be repeated. Somehow, through structural, legal and even ideological and

¹⁵⁴ Hugh M Bell, “The Problem of the Militia: A Rejoinder to ‘Of the Line,’ *CDQ*, Vol. IV, No.2 (October 1926): 70-72.

¹⁵⁵ Of the Line (pseudonym), “The Problem of the Militia: Further Remarks Concerning Major Bell’s Proposal,” *CDQ*, Vol. IV, No.2 (January 1927): 235-236.

¹⁵⁶ Stephen Harris, “The Canadian General Staff and the Higher Organization of Defence, 1919-1939” in *Canada’s Defence: Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth Century*, BD Hunt and Ronald Haycock, eds. (Toronto: Copp Clark Pittman, 1993): 78-79.

cultural means, it was the duty of those who had served under a slightly ridiculous and ultimately dangerous Sam Hughes to prevent the amateurism and mismanagement that had begun upon mobilisation and was still making its effects felt in 1918.¹⁵⁷ Whether it was through conscription or the re-invigoration of Canada's militia spirit along modernised lines, the goal was to combine patriotic fervour and military proficiency into a powerful force that would be able to replicate the great successes of 1918 without the tragedies of 1915 and 1916. Although this desire simply to avoid another 1914 lacked considerable depth in terms of global and national strategy, it was all that was possible within the narrow base of discussion caused by the deliberate vagueness of political leadership. The starkly contrasted memories of the Great War and what it meant would ensure that not only would politicians, the public and senior military leaders have different answers, they would be asking vastly different and somewhat incompatible questions. By not addressing these questions and providing clear direction early on, the military and other key institutions of the growing Canadian state would develop in very different ways between 1920 and 1928, and often well out of step with the rest of Canadian society.

¹⁵⁷ Sam Hughes' tireless interference could be felt after the war when he launched a vicious public campaign against Sir Arthur Currie. Hughes and his supporters accused Currie of mismanagement during the war and a vainglorious blood-lust in pushing through to Mons, Belgium on the last day of the war, Hughes inflicted a serious personal toll on Canada's most successful general. Currie eventually took his detractors to court, where he won a libel suit in 1927. For the most recent account of the "war of reputations" between Currie and Hughes, see Tim Cook, "The Madman and the Butcher: Sir Sam Hughes, Sir Arthur Currie, and Their War of Reputations," *Canadian Historical Review*, Vol.85, No.4 (December 2004): 693-720. Cook has also recently published a book by the same title.

Chapter 2: Canadian Diplomacy Without a Diplomatic Service

“It is a remarkable fact that the First World War, which affected Canadian development so fundamentally in so many ways, had no long-term influence upon the country’s military policy.”

- CP Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 1955.¹⁵⁸

The Great War had been a victory, but a painful one, for Canada’s young polity. Ottawa was the seat of power for a self-governing dominion, not a fully independent country. The federal and provincial parliaments were only given powers over domestic affairs, leaving external affairs in the hands of London. As a result, although Canadians technically had authority over their own army, they could not decide whether or not their country went to war.¹⁵⁹ By 1917, many Canadians could not decide on an individual level whether or not they would take up arms – the demands of war had required the enactment of conscription, perhaps the most divisive issue then yet to confront political leaders of the day.

Although the war had done much to unite the country, it had also done much to divide it.¹⁶⁰ Canadian leaders would never forget the threats to national unity and the massive economic strain engendered by a war an ocean away.¹⁶¹ Formal, legal commitments would become a taboo subject among politicians in the years after the

¹⁵⁸ CP Stacey, *Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific*, Vol.1. (Ottawa: DND, 1955): 4.

¹⁵⁹ JL Granatstein, *Canada’s Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002): 53.

¹⁶⁰ Jeff Keshen, “The Great War Solider as a Nation Builder in Canada and Australia,” in Briton C. Busch, ed. *Canada and the Great War: Western Front Association Papers*, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003):3.

¹⁶¹ Granatstein noted the “delicious” irony that in order to finance the United Kingdom during the war as a means of preserving the Empire, this had put so much strain on the economy that by 1917, Canada had begun to rely on US financiers, thus ensuring its drift away from London’s influence. See JL Granatstein, *How Britain’s Weakness Forced Canada into the Arms of the United States*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989): 16-17.

war, whether they were automatic commitments to aid Britain, the newly-founded League of Nations or a formal statement of neutrality. All of the above would have been politically costly and had the potential to further divisions within the country. The best course politically would be to move towards autonomy, slowly, indefinitely and without making firm commitments. Such a policy, however, would not provide an easily distinguishable set of foreign policy objectives and as a result, defence planners would be consistently left in the dark as to the true intentions of the government. This chapter will argue that it was the memory of the Great War which convinced politicians to avoid stating the overt aims and commitments necessary for incorporating defence planning into the national grand strategy.

The institutions that Canadian leaders inherited at the end of the First World War were not equipped to develop and support a complex foreign policy, nor was there a political will to create national bodies that could. The war and Canada's signature on the Treaty of Versailles (1919) had effectively dismantled the old British imperial structure. But for a decade after the end of hostilities, Canadian leaders dithered on outlining what might replace the old Empire. Without a clearly articulated foreign policy, it was impossible to guide the development of a defence policy that fully supported larger social or political priorities. The complexity began with the fact that there was a sharp divide between relations within the British Empire (soon to be the British Commonwealth) and relations that were truly "foreign." This distinction lay in the vastly changed nature of the British Empire at the end of the Great War. The demands made by four years of mass industrial warfare and the sacrifices made by the semi-colonial dominions of Canada, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand to meet them

had created a strong national identities in these territories and with it a drive to make the Dominions de facto nation-states. The legal ties that bound the Empire together were now tenuous at best.¹⁶² Canada finally gained independence over its foreign affairs with the Statue of Westminster in 1931. Until then, diplomats played a complex game of legalistic constitutional dodge-ball. Meanwhile, confused military planners looked on, vainly attempting to work out the strategic implications of a decentralised empire.

Even in 1914, before the war had greatly emboldened nationalists in the Dominions, important questions about the duties of Canadian troops existed. Although Canada had no say in whether or not it declared war on the Central Powers in August 1914, its mobilisation was not controlled by British authorities and neither were its resources. Although Canadian troops were theoretically under London's operational control until an act of Parliament in 1916, the British were generally hesitant to override Canadian decisions too frequently or too high-handedly as Ottawa could effectively turn the tap off in terms of resources for the war.¹⁶³ By the middle of war, the Canadian government had extended its authority over its expeditionary force in France, reserving the right to directly control Canadian troops on overseas operations.¹⁶⁴ Sir Arthur Currie, as the commander of the Canadian Corps from 1917 onwards, could always appeal to his political masters when he believed that Canadians were being subjected to unnecessary or imprudent orders.¹⁶⁵ Canadians served as part of the British Army, but

¹⁶² The very definition of "empire" is an ambiguous one; the debates over when the British Empire ended range from 1914 to the 1997 surrender of Hong Kong. See John Darwin "Imperial Twilight, or, When did the Empire End?" in Philip Buckler, ed. *Canada and the End of Empire* (Toronto: UBC Press, 2005): 16.

¹⁶³ See Ch.1.

¹⁶⁴ The Canadian Expeditionary Force had originally been despatched as an imperial contingent paid for by Ottawa. For more detail, see the account in Chapter 1 and Tim Cook, *At the Sharp End: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1914-1916*, (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007):, 34-37.

¹⁶⁵ One of the best documented cases of Currie's appeal to Canadian politicians to prevent the Canadian Corps from embarking on what he believed to be poorly conceived operations occurred in the planning for

there was the promise of influencing higher strategy by 1917 when the Imperial War Cabinet was established as a body for consultation among the various parts of the British Empire.¹⁶⁶ This consultation was supposed to produce a commonly agreed policy that would ultimately be carried out by the Foreign Office, thus giving the Empire one strong voice in world politics. The Imperial War Cabinet, which included the political heads of government for the Dominions, became the British Empire Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. But beyond the war and peace negotiations, it had no mandate. By the time that the Treaty of Versailles was signed, the Empire had no central coordinating body to develop a unified imperial foreign or defence policy, nor did Canada have the instruments of state that would have allowed for the development of independent Canadian foreign and defence policy. The lack of a sound foundation for drafting post-war imperial policy ensured that Canadian, and indeed imperial, foreign policy (or the attempts at it) was dealt with on an ad-hoc basis that did not provide a sound footing on which to build relevant defence plans.

Contemporaries were well aware of the looming constitutional crisis in the British Empire. During the 1917 Imperial War Conference, it was resolved that constitutional matters would only be addressed after the war. Sir Robert Laird Borden, Prime Minister of Canada, still felt it prudent to point out that, “any readjustments of relations must, in the first place, preserve all the existing powers of self-government and complete control of domestic affairs, that it must be based on a complete recognition of the dominions as autonomous national units of an imperial commonwealth, and must

the Battle of Passchendaele (Fourth Ypres) in 1918. See Tim Cook, *Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1917-1918*, (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2008): 316-317

¹⁶⁶ The term “cabinet”, usually implying executive power in the Westminster tradition, is somewhat deceiving. The Imperial War Cabinet had, in fact, no executive authority over Dominion governments.

fully recognize their right to a voice in foreign policy and in foreign relations.”¹⁶⁷

Borden was also keen to point out that, “it is by no means improbable that children now living will see their population surpass that of the United Kingdom ... Therefore it seems to me beyond question that the theory of trusteeship to which I have alluded cannot be continued indefinitely in the future.”¹⁶⁸ If the dominions could conceivably outstrip the United Kingdom in terms of manpower and industry, then the only logical step would be to acknowledge the equality of status between the nations that comprised the British Empire.

Borden had tacitly stated that there was no realistic way that the United Kingdom could enforce its will on nations which had more potential than the British Isles themselves. When, in 1918, peace broke out and a range of questions on Canada’s status, and not just within Canadian borders, suddenly emerged. To the Canadians, it was clear that colonial status was no longer realistic. But the promised Imperial Conference to sort out constitutional and legal questions did not come until 1921, and even then it did not resolve all of the outstanding constitutional issues. In contrast to the uncertainty over the nature of the Empire, Borden had very clear ideas about the new world order and Canada’s place in it. The years 1914-1918 had been very long ones for all of the combatants, and by 1918, wrestling with the complex issues regulating British imperial relations was not a priority for most. Moreover, even the British failed to realise the new reality: until the Great War, colonial security depended on British assistance, now, British security relied on the Empire. Although it was clear that the

¹⁶⁷Sir Robert Borden, “Statement on Resolution IX of the Imperial War Conference,” 16 April 1917 in Walter A Riddell, ed. *Documents on Canadian Foreign Policy, 1917-1939* Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1962): 3-4.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 2.

balance of power was moving away from London, it was unclear how this would affect the political will of the Dominions to continue supporting British policy – after all, they had just stuck by the Mother Country for four very hard years with seemingly little complaint. “It is not surprising that difficulties arose,” Borden later commented, “for the status of the British Dominions was not fully realized by foreign nations.”¹⁶⁹ This misunderstanding became very clear after British Prime Minister David Lloyd George accepted President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points in early 1918 as the basis for negotiating a peace.

Despite the establishment in 1917 of the Imperial War Cabinet as a mechanism to coordinate policy through consultation, Lloyd George backed Wilson obtaining its consent. Led by Australian Prime Minister Billy Hughes, the Dominions lined up to express their outrage. More displeasure ensued when the British suggested that the Dominions might sit as a part of the British delegation at the Paris Peace Conference.¹⁷⁰ What the Dominions, and especially Canada, wanted was an independent seat at the negotiating table. To France and the United States, this seemed like a British manoeuvre to gain more votes; when it was suggested that Canada and Australia each be given one delegate (the same number as Siam or Portugal) the disgust only grew. In the end, the Dominions were each allocated two seats.¹⁷¹

The Canadian delegates and attending staff at Versailles were considered part of the ‘British Empire Delegation,’ a massive assembly of people, typewriters and telephone lines crammed into five hotels in Paris. It would be through this imperial body

¹⁶⁹Riddell, 94

¹⁷⁰ Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World*, (New York: Random House, 2003): 44-45.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid*, 45

that Canada tried to formulate her own specific foreign policy while developing constitutional arrangements with the British and with other Dominions. During the war, Canada had demonstrated growing confidence in how she handled activities outside of her borders. The dauntless Borden led an increasingly skilled group of Canadian representatives who were able to push Canadian interests forward within a British framework, much the same way that the Canadian Corps under Sir Arthur Currie was becoming known as a shock formation within the British Expeditionary Force on the Western Front. But after the war ended, the Canadian Corps melted back into Canadian society, and the Canadian drive for international recognition and position ran out of steam. Without this drive, a clear resolution of outstanding national and international questions was impossible.

Participation in the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 made it abundantly clear to the British Foreign Office that the Dominions were no longer colonies. What they were now, however, was much less than certain and nothing in existing British legislation could clearly delineate their new status. Moreover, what the new status meant was even less clear to other countries. Was Canada a colony, a *de facto* independent nation-state, or both? If it did claim to be both, how would the inherent contradictions between colonialism and independence play themselves out in the real world? Newton Wesley Rowell, a Unionist MP under Borden, was left to explain Canada's constitutional situation in anticipation of the 1921 Imperial Conference, which was expected to handle the delicate issue of inter-imperial League of Nations relationships:

During the war unity of policy between the self-governing states of the Empire was maintained by the means of the 'Imperial War Cabinet', and during the peace negotiations in Paris by the 'British Empire Delegation'. In both these bodies dominion ministers and British ministers sat and deliberated freely

together, under the presidency of the British Prime Minister. ... [W]e are nations all equal in status, though not of equal power, under a common sovereign, and bound together by interest and sentiment, by ties which though light as air, are strong as iron in binding together this league of nations which we call the British Empire or Britannic Commonwealth.¹⁷²

The idea of an independent nation tied to Britain by “interest and sentiment,” inferior in power but regarded as an equal in law was best exemplified by Canadian participation in a consultative pan-imperial body whose president, the British Prime Minister, was by no means *primus inter pares*. The tensions and contradictions in this position are numerous and revealing. It was at this point, therefore, that two distinct lines of Canadian external policies developed: an imperial policy designed to increase Canadian influence and project Canadian interests inside a powerful British Empire, and a foreign policy which would avoid imperial ties when competing interests within the Empire compromised Canadian diplomatic objectives. This bisected external policy left defence planners in a strategic limbo for over a decade.

The resulting foreign policy was characterised by consultation within the Empire. Although the concept would have varying definitions (or lack thereof) for its supporters and detractors, at its core was the notion of a common imperial foreign policy reached by discussion between the self-governing elements of the Commonwealth. In Canada, this policy had a staunch early supporter in the form of the legal advisor to the DEA, Loring Christie. It also had support from British and Canadian imperialists as a means of maintaining Canadian participation in the Empire; some feared that if

¹⁷² Newton Wesley Rowell, Address to the House of Commons, 11 March 1920 in Riddell 58-59.

Canadians felt they lacked a voice in a common foreign policy, they would become dogmatically isolationist.¹⁷³

The policy of consultation worked relatively well during the Paris peace conference, where documents reserved for the major powers circulated among the large British Empire Delegation, giving Canadians access to privileged information.¹⁷⁴ By March 1919, when a “Council of Four,” comprising the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy, began to reach decisions independent of the rest of the conference,¹⁷⁵ the imperial connection gave Canada some form of representation in great-power negotiations. Although the Canadians never got the removal of Article X¹⁷⁶ – the provision guaranteeing mutual security under the League of Nations – as they had desired,¹⁷⁷ Canadian delegates proudly signed the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 as representatives of an internationally-recognised independent state.¹⁷⁸ However, when dealing with great powers, the usefulness of being associated with a premier naval and military power was clear. Being a “British” dominion gave Canada access to powerful imperial resources at little to no cost, as well as an international recognition of its political independence. On the other hand, there were also some visible disadvantages. The Paris conference had suggested – indeed demonstrated – that arrangements within the Empire were coming to reflect the larger strategic reality which gave more power to

¹⁷³ Roy MacLaren, *Commissions High: Canada in London, 1870-1971*, (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006): 210-212.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid*, 211.

¹⁷⁵ MacMillan, 273

¹⁷⁶ For the full article, see “Covenant of the League of Nations,” *Avalon Project*. <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp>. 2008. Accessed 8 July 2010.

¹⁷⁷ C.P. Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies*, Vol.2. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981): 56-58.

¹⁷⁸ Robert Bothwell and JL Granatstein, *Our Century: The Canadian Journey in the Twentieth Century*, (Toronto: McArthur & Company, 2000): 68. It should be noted that the exact definition of “dominion” continues to trouble even seasoned historians such as Granatstein and Bothwell. Their exact wording is “No longer a colony, Canada was on its way to becoming an independent state.”

the Dominions but it did not clarify exactly what “dominion status” meant. This ambiguity would continually hinder Canada’s attempts at formulating a foreign policy, or, for that matter, an imperial one.

The coming years saw many great power confrontations, and the pursuit of British interests around the world adversely affected Canadian interests within the Commonwealth. Ironically, many imperial disputes could have been resolved by a form of imperial constitution, the development of which was made difficult if not impossible by intra-Empire discord. The Imperial War Cabinet of 1917 had transitioned smoothly into the British Empire Delegation in 1919,¹⁷⁹ but when the Versailles Treaty was signed in June 1919 the governance structure developed to fight the Great War melted away.

Sir Arthur Meighen, who took over from Borden as Prime Minister in 1920, held much the same view as his predecessor, stating in the House of Commons that, “[b]y tradition, by the sense of common inheritance and of common ideals, the dominion of Canada aspires to one destiny, and one only – nationhood within the British Empire.”¹⁸⁰ This principle was affirmed at the 1921 Imperial Conference, where, “[h]aving regard to constitutional developments since 1917,” it was determined that “no advantage is to be gained by holding a constitutional conference.”¹⁸¹ By this point in time, domestic concerns had clearly overridden the desire for the affirmation of seemingly abstract principles on the conduct of external relations.¹⁸² Nonetheless, there was some impetus, especially from Lord Milner, the Colonial Secretary, to delineate clearly imperial rights

¹⁷⁹ MacLaren, 211

¹⁸⁰ Sir Arthur Meighen, “Nationhood Within the British Empire,” Statement to the House of Commons, 4 November 1921 in Riddell, 60.

¹⁸¹ Imperial Conference, “Resolution XIV: The Proposed Conference on Constitutional Relations,” in Riddell, 61.

¹⁸² This was reflected in the election platforms of the 1920s, none of which featured any significant declarations about external relations. See Ch.1.

and responsibilities. Milner's efforts, though, would only be successful if the dominion government shared his enthusiasm.

Upon assuming office in 1920, Meighen received a long letter from Milner arguing that, at the very minimum, there should be some kind of gathering to set out an "Imperial Cabinet" as a permanent consultative body that would basically be a standing extension of the British Empire Delegation at Versailles, which itself was an extension of the Imperial War Cabinet.¹⁸³ But even this proposal never came to fruition: there had been a proposal to hold a conference in Ottawa since 1920, but the Australians would not meet anywhere except London.¹⁸⁴ Milner remained keen to have a meeting anywhere, even of a purely consultative 'Imperial Cabinet' with no executive powers in 1921. But, just as Milner had unable to call a meeting in Britain in 1920 due to domestic British political problems, Meighen claimed that the conference would have to wait until at least 1922 if it was going to handle any potentially intractable debates on the constitution.¹⁸⁵ This was politically convenient, as it prevented a large and problematic debate surrounding an exact legal settlement of dominion status. The route of least political resistance, however, rarely proved to be the most effective at resolving constitutional issues – especially when leaders were bound to change, leaving behind no solid body of documentation or institutional frameworks on which to build. By 1922, the principle of consultation was more or less set, even if it was vague, non-committal and tenuous.

¹⁸³ Alfred Milner, Letter to Arthur Meighen, 4 October 1920, in Lovell C. Clark, ed. *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, Vol.3 1919-1925. Canada: Department of External Affairs, 1970: 158.

¹⁸⁴ Alfred Milner, Letter to Victor Cavendish, 28 April 1920, in Clark, 160.

¹⁸⁵ Alfred Milner, Letter to Arthur Meighen, 4 October 1920 in Clark, 157-158 and Victor Cavendish, Telegram to Alfred Milner, 15 February 1921 in Clark, 162.

Canada's foreign and imperial policies of the 1920s both had a clear North American bent, based on practical realities as opposed to well-defined and easily applicable principles. A good example is Canada's reluctant role in the League of Nations during its formative years. The most pressing issue for Canadians was Article X of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which guaranteed that all existing borders of League members be enforced through the employment of collective security. Collective security, although the brainchild of American President Woodrow Wilson, was deeply unpopular in North America on both sides of the 49th parallel as it would have required an automatic use of force to guarantee all borders of all members of the League around the world. Many Americans made reference to George Washington's warning against "foreign entanglements," and Canadians drew parallels between Washington's warnings and those of the beloved former Prime Minister Sir Wilfred Laurier, who had sought to keep Canada at a safe distance from the "vortex of European militarism."¹⁸⁶ Borden was personally sceptical of guaranteeing the existing borders of Europe in perpetuity, and the need for political support in Quebec, which was strongly isolationist in its outlook, generally guaranteed that an activist foreign policy would not take root.¹⁸⁷ Britain, of course, remained a great power and could not back out from the international scene. Canadian imperial policy would have to balance between limiting its foreign commitments to both the Empire and League, while ensuring a Canadian voice within both. The League, above all, would force Canada to take a stand on several divisive issues that would consume a large quantity of political capital – capital that was needed for vital internal reforms and the preservation of national unity. As such, Canada

¹⁸⁶ John Bartlet Brebner, *North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1966):287.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid*, 286-287.

simply avoided much substantive contact with the League in the 1920s, instead focusing its diplomatic efforts into the Empire which ironically contained far fewer liabilities and formal commitments.

Continuing friendship with the United States, Canada's central diplomatic concern, was also better served through the Empire than the League. Theoretically, Canada's diplomatic efforts in the Empire and the League should have naturally converged on the United States, giving Canadians a great opportunity to strengthen their relationship with Washington. For Loring Christie, imperial consultation was more than an expression of history and sentiment; it was a means to move the North Atlantic trade triangle into an alliance of (mostly) English-speaking democracies. By being a member of the League, Canada could deal directly with the United States, and by proceeding with some form of imperial diplomatic unity while establishing the right of Canada to opt out of an imperial policy, she would form a vital link between two major powers and be an important member of an indisputably powerful club. This was not to be, however, since the United States did not ratify the Versailles settlement and did not join the League of Nations.¹⁸⁸ In fact, the complex relationship between the three members of Christie's cherished Atlantic alliance played an important role in the American refusal to sit in Geneva.

Perhaps as an indication of how global Canadian strategic interests were becoming, a threat to Atlantic unity arose from an intersection of strategic considerations in the Pacific and legal considerations regarding national sovereignty within the Empire. Lacking the administrative capacity to formulate a well-managed,

¹⁸⁸ Robert Bothwell, *Loring Christie: The Failure of Bureaucratic Imperialism*, (New York: Garland, 1988): 227-229.

activist policy inside the Empire, Canada continued its efforts at disengaging from formal commitments outside the Empire. The first concern was the impact of being part of a League of which the United States was not a member. This entangled the two questions of imperial and foreign policy as early as 1919, when, during the debates in the US Senate, the Colonial Secretary sent a telegram labelled “Secret. Urgent. Immediate.” to the Governor-General in Ottawa, who was at that time officially mandated to act as the channel of communication for the British government to Canada.¹⁸⁹ The telegram expressed concern that American opponents of ratifying the Versailles treaty cited the fact that Commonwealth votes would give what was perceived as a British-dominated organisation a large voting bloc in the new League. Of particular concern were the provisions of Article 15 of the Covenant, which prevented the concerned parties in a “rupture” from voting at the Assembly of the League in order to ensure some balance and objectivity in arbitration.¹⁹⁰ Some Americans wanted the Dominions to be barred from the League’s executive. The joint reply from the British, Canadians and New Zealanders maintained that all members of the Empire were in fact “partners” and should be included as full members, but they would be willing to give up voting rights in any situation in which any part of the Empire was involved in a dispute.¹⁹¹

The negotiations grew in complexity as the matter was dealt with bilaterally between the Foreign Office and US officials since no Dominion at that stage had a diplomatic office in Washington. A flurry of cables followed. The United States expressed two reservations. First, that it would not hold itself bound by *any* resolution of

¹⁸⁹ Victor Cavendish, Letter to Collive Barclay, 7 July 1919 in Clark, 3-4.

¹⁹⁰ Alfred Milner, Letter to Victor Cavendish, 8 November 1919 in Clark, 383-384.

¹⁹¹ Alfred Milner, Letter to Victor Cavendish, 8 November 1919 in Clark, 384-386

the League in which the “British Empire” possessed more than one vote; and, second, that it would not accept a decision by the League involving a US-Empire dispute in which any part of the Empire voted.¹⁹² The League’s legal advisor pointed out that this was a matter concerning primarily the question of conflict between the United States and Canada, not Washington and London, and that any firm ruling might change as the political developments regarding dominion autonomy unfolded.¹⁹³ Canada’s own legal adviser, Christie, was adamant that Canada send its own representative and be allowed to sit on the Council of the League. Even the much-vaunted concept of consultation would not apply here: there could be no “British Empire” representative on the Council. As there had been no constitutional conference at the end of the Great War, according to Christie, “[t]he question [of consultation within the Empire] is really more political than legal. The whole position is full of anomalies and is illogical.”¹⁹⁴ Canada had her own limited interests, so why should she be represented by (and thus accountable for) a body with global interests? Without a formal agreement to codify how an imperial representative would be selected and what he would do, the idea of appointing one “weakens our position in respect of distinctive representation among other nations in the League, and it commits us (if we are really to be in earnest about the matter) to worldwide responsibilities with which under the present conditions of Imperial organisation we are not prepared to cope.”¹⁹⁵

¹⁹² Alfred Milner, Telegram to Victor Cavendish, 9 January 1920 in Clark, 386.

¹⁹³ Van Hamel (League of Nations Legal Adviser), “Regarding the Question of the Votes of the British Dominions Under the Covenant in Case of a Dispute Between One Part of British Empire and Another Member of the League of Nations,” 15 October 1919 in Clark, 389-390

¹⁹⁴ Loring Christie, Memorandum, “British Representation on the Council of the League of Nations,” (February 1920 in Clark, 395.

¹⁹⁵ Loring Christie, Memorandum, “British Representation on the Council of the League of Nations,” (February 1920 in Clark, 396.

Both Dr. JA Van Hamel, the legal advisor for the League, and Christie, representing Canada, agreed that the dispute was mostly a political one as legal structures did not exist to handle them. Awkwardly, this bone of contention between the United States and Canada was handled by British diplomatic representatives in Washington. From an American perspective, concerns about British influence over Canadian votes must have seemed all the more real, given that it was the British embassy conducting negotiations on the matter.

The linchpin in Canada's foreign and imperial policies was undoubtedly the United States. Relations with the US fell into the category of foreign policy, with the tariff occupying a position of uncontested prominence in Canadian politics. Nevertheless, the Empire's relations with the US affected Canada deeply, as Canada was viewed by the Americans as naturally part of the Empire. An illustrative example of this relationship was the question of a Canadian representative in Washington. The desire of Dominions to send their own representatives to foreign capitals had been received with some enthusiasm in 1919, emanating from a joint memorandum at the Paris Peace Conference where it was agreed that Dominions should send "High Commissioners" to be attached to relevant British embassies.¹⁹⁶ But that was before Canada had achieved recognised nationhood by becoming a member of the League of Nations. So when the Canadian Trade Commissioner, CB Gordon, pointed out that Canada had no diplomatic representative in Washington despite being a major trading partner and asked for a Canadian High Commissioner to "advise" the British Ambassador, Christie added that the Canadian representative should in fact be an internationally recognised diplomat

¹⁹⁶ Dominion Prime Ministers (Joint Declaration), Memorandum, "Dominions' Right of Legation," 25 February 1919, in Clark, 1-2.

who “ought to be ranked lower than Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary,” a rank just below Ambassador.¹⁹⁷

This was an important distinction. “High Commissioner” was a term that carried currency within the field of imperial, but not foreign, policy. The British were originally warm to Christie’s idea, with the Colonial Secretary having no problem with a Canadian Minister Plenipotentiary residing at the British Embassy, technically below the British ambassador, but reporting directly to the Canadian government.¹⁹⁸ Given that more constitutional changes were likely to happen, Milner proposed in February 1920 that the term *ad hoc* be used in the King’s letter of credentials for the Canadian representative.¹⁹⁹ The Governor-General replied that this term was a bit demeaning, and instead suggested: “and to attach him to Our embassy to the United States of America with the especial object of representing Us in respect of Our Dominion of Canada and of dealing with matters affecting the interests of Our said Dominion.”²⁰⁰ This was rejected as implying “an inherent division of genuine representation of the policy of the British Empire,” and Milner proposed more toned-down language, which was accepted by Ottawa.²⁰¹ The problem was almost solved, but not quite.

When this confusing mass of reporting chains, titles and responsibilities was presented to the Americans, they responded with understandable bewilderment. Both the Canadian and British governments were keen on presenting the Empire as a unified diplomatic bloc, but, if this was so, why was Canada sending a representative who

¹⁹⁷ CB Gordon, Letter to the President of the Privy Council, 17 September 1919 and Loring Christie, Memorandum, “Notes on the Title and Status of the Proposed Canadian Agent in Washington,” 19 September 1919 in Clark,, 5-7.

¹⁹⁸ Alfred Milner, Telegram to Victor Cavendish, 28 October 1919, in Clark, 9-10.

¹⁹⁹ Alfred Milner, Telegram to Victor Cavendish, 2 February 1920, 11.

²⁰⁰ Victor Cavendish, Telegram to Alfred Milner, 5 February 1920 in Clark, 12-13.

²⁰¹ Alfred Milner, Telegram to Victor Cavendish, 5 February 1920 and Victor Cavendish, Telegram to Alfred Milner, 25 February 1920 in Clark, 13.

didn't technically report to the Ambassador?²⁰² Moreover, the Canadians and the British had just gone through a long process of trying to convince the United States that it was safe to join the League of Nations for the sole reason that Canada and the United Kingdom were, in fact, separate countries that would *not* constitute an indivisible bloc in world politics! The Americans, for sake of clarity, wanted the powers of the Canadian representative to be limited, but this was deemed to be more than Canadian public opinion would tolerate.²⁰³

The debate dragged on as the situation became critical. The Canadian War Mission, which had been handling many key elements of trade and commerce, lacked a *raison d'être*, since the war was over, and now Joseph Pope, the founder of the DEA, was pushing for a distinct Canadian representative and had the backing of the influential Christie. The American system was so complex, they argued, that it made sense to have a permanent Canadian representative in Washington as opposed to the constantly-rotating cycle of Foreign Office diplomats who simply did not have time to fully comprehend the system before switching stations. Canadians knew Americans well, so why not have a few Canadians focus on handling American affairs – especially since Canadian trade with the United States was skyrocketing?²⁰⁴ The issue dragged on into 1922, where the forceful nationalist Mackenzie King became Prime Minister.

Even with the advent of a new Prime Minister there was no political will to make a Canadian representative in Washington a major issue. Mackenzie King's Cabinet contained a rogue imperialist, WS Fielding, the Minister of Finance, who vehemently

²⁰² RC Lindsay, Telegram to Victor Cavendish, 11 March 1920 in Clark, 15-16.

²⁰³ RC Lindsay, Telegram no. 21 to Victor Cavendish, 16 March 1920, 16-17.

²⁰⁴ Loring Christie, Letter to Arthur Meighen, 27 October 1920 in Clark, 23-27. and Joseph Pope, Letter to Arthur Meighen, 15 December 1920 in Clark, 29-30.

opposed a Canadian representative. The Prime Minister had the embarrassing task of exhorting Peter Larkin, Canada's High Commissioner in London, to restrain the vocal Minister of Finance while he was in Britain in order to prevent him doing too much damage to Canada's diplomatic objectives while overseeing trade relations there.²⁰⁵ Despite the massive amount of trade between Canada and the United States (at that time over 500 million dollars)²⁰⁶ Fielding argued that the expected costs of \$50,000-\$60,000 annually for a permanent Canadian representative were too high, and he would have little diplomatic work to do.²⁰⁷ Again, without a strong political will to make a Canadian representative a priority, such vocal, if isolated, opposition could continue to hold up a more or less natural progression. The issue dragged on to the point that in 1925 the British sent written inquiries as to just what the Canadian government was doing about its own representation, and, if it was doing anything, to please let London know.²⁰⁸ In the end, Canada did not open a mission in Washington until 1927.²⁰⁹ In the meantime, this constitutional and diplomatic chaos ensured that Canadian foreign policy remained difficult to follow and extremely vague.

The most crucial diplomatic topic with regard to security was the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The agreement guaranteed the British a friendly Pacific flank in the event of war, and when the 1914 war broke out the Japanese were more than

²⁰⁵ Peter C Larkin, Letter to WL Mackenzie King, 2 November 1922 in Clark., 33.

²⁰⁶ Data from 1921. 1921 was the first year that exports to the United States outstripped that of trade with the United Kingdom. See:

Statistics Canada, "Foreign trade, exports, excluding gold, by destination, major areas, selected year ends, 1886 to 1946," Series G389-395. Accessed from < http://www.statcan.gc.ca/cgi-bin/af-fdr.cgi?l=eng&loc=G389_395-eng.csv> on 31 May 2010.

²⁰⁷ WS Fielding, Memorandum, "Canadian Representation in the United States," 24 April 1924, in Clark, 41-43.

²⁰⁸ LS Amery, Telegram to Julian Byng, 2 July 1925 and Julian Byng, Telegram to LS Amery, 3 July 1925 in Clark, 50.

²⁰⁹ Stacey, 88-91.

happy to seize German possessions in China.²¹⁰ Japanese expansionism, of course, made the Americans nervous, and the question of renewal a sensitive one in Washington.²¹¹ Australia strongly needed a continuing friendship with Tokyo in order to assure her security, and Britain was about to go ahead until Canadian objections, backed with information from Christie, indicated that there would be a far harsher backlash in the United States than London had anticipated. The Foreign Office eventually changed course and agreed upon a multi-power pact for naval reductions.²¹² It seemed to be a victory for Christie and Meighen, who had successfully used imperial policy in order to maintain a stronger world position. In other words, the Washington Conference of 1921-1922 weakened the need for an independent Canadian foreign policy because it proved that imperial consultation could work. This victory, in many ways, was a dangerous self-deception.

The Washington Conference demonstrated how difficult it was for Canada to exercise a foreign policy or define strategic interests without a real foreign service or a clear consensus on the imperial constitution. Canada did have some good fortune in that by the time the conference was organised, Meighen was Prime Minister, allowing the experienced Borden and Christie to act as Canada's representatives. Borden and Christie clearly understood the issues at hand. Just as Australia was concerned about maintaining friendly ties with Japan, Canada was eager to maintain ties with an already-large and growing industrial power just over the border. If Canada were to be on the same side as

²¹⁰ Specifically, the German concession port of Kiautschou in China and the Pacific territories of the Marshall Islands, the Carolines, the Marianas and the Palau Islands.

²¹¹ So much so that some historians contend that the primary impetus came from British, and not Canadian, sources. See Ira Klein, "Washington and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1919-1921." *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol.41, No.2 (Nov 1972): 460-464 . Klein contends that the British knew of American attitudes towards the Anglo-Japanese alliance. It should be noted that some of the groundbreaking work by Robert Bothwell on the life of Loring Christie also relies heavily on British sources.

²¹² Klein, 460-461.

the US, it would be more or less invulnerable; should she be at war with the United States, she would be almost indefensible. In the words of Arthur Meighen,

If from any cause, or from the initiation of any disastrous policy, we should become involved in worse relationships than we are now, Canada will suffer most of all. And if, in the last awful event – God forbid it should ever come! – we reach the penalty of war, Canada will be the Belgium.²¹³

Because Canada was so influenced by its relationship with the United States, Meighen argued, Canada's effective autonomy within the Empire demanded that Canadians have control over their diplomacy with the Americans.²¹⁴ But how did this fit in with the "diplomatic unity" of the Empire? Britain, which was under no obligation to keep the Dominions informed of the proceedings leading up to the Washington Conference, did not extend the courtesy until very late in the negotiations, and the Canadians were not offered an independent invitation to the conference.²¹⁵ Christie and Borden ended up as part of a British Empire delegation not dissimilar to the delegation that had gone to Paris in 1919. So while Canada avoided a damaging episode resulting from a poorly calculated Foreign Office machination, the resulting compromise established no precedent or framework to ensure that a similar impasse would not arise in the future.

This venture in crisis resolution was fraught with risk. A 1921 Prime Ministers' conference, where Meighen's comments above had so starkly laid out Canada's position, produced no consensus on the constitutional authority of the British Empire. In Christie's opinion, this left some very dangerous loose ends. British policy was undoubtedly the keystone of any agreement, as the British could either maintain their alliance with Tokyo or become neutral – although it was, in Christie's mind, generally

²¹³ Prime Ministers' Conference, Ninth Meeting, "Anglo-Japanese Alliance," 29 June 1921, in Clark, 178.

²¹⁴ Prime Ministers' Conference, Sixth Meeting, "General Statements on Foreign Policy," 24 June 1921 in Clark, 171.

²¹⁵ Bothwell, *Loring Christie*, 313-319

understood that, “if Japan provokes a conflict in the Pacific, all the English speaking nations will stand together.”²¹⁶ But given that there was no Empire-wide agreement on the attitude that the British Empire delegation should take, and no imperial foreign service to create one, there was a significant risk of a major division within the Empire becoming visible to the rest of the world – a division that would reflect very poorly on Canada, as “this would clearly rest upon that part which initiated the discussion.”²¹⁷ The DEA nervously tracked press reports that indicated New Zealand’s displeasure with the delegation’s decision to favour an all-party agreement.²¹⁸ In the end, an agreement for a “Quadruple Alliance” was signed that imposed naval building limits on the Pacific powers and, most important for Canada, ensured there would be no serious Anglo-American tensions in the Pacific. But this was at best a tactical victory – there was no guarantee that Canada would have such a voice in other imperial questions, and there was certainly no imperial policy-making structure for the next Prime Minister to inherit.

William Lyon Mackenzie King began his reign as the dominant prime minister of the inter-war period by defeating the Conservatives²¹⁹ with a sound majority and taking office on 29 December 1921.²²⁰ As Prime Minister, King was also Secretary of State for External Affairs, like Borden before him. Unlike Borden, however, King was not experienced in foreign affairs. His prime concern was not to lose the Quebec vote on

²¹⁶ LAC, RG 25, Vol 916, Folder 15, “Memorandum – British Policy in the Pacific” 22 September 1921. Christie’s name is not signed on the document, but, it is assumed to be his work, especially given the extensive list of American contact he provides in the introductory paragraph.

²¹⁷ LAC RG 25 Vol 916 Folder 15, Handwritten Note (undated) – presumed to be Christie.

²¹⁸ LAC RG 25 Vol 916 Folder 15. Newspaper clipping, “New Zealand Favours Anglo-Japanese Treaty, Baltimore Sun, 24 December 1921.”

²¹⁹ After Borden’s retirement in 1920, the Union government fell apart and the party that ran under Sir Arthur Meighen is considered to be a Tory one.

See: John English, “Union Government,” *The Canadian Encyclopaedia*,

<<http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=A1ARTA0008217>>, Accessed 8 July 2010.

²²⁰ Stacey, 3.

which his control of Parliament depended.²²¹ Indeed, it was even a prime concern in his speech exhorting the Parliament of Canada to declare war on Nazi Germany eighteen years later.²²² King was, by profession, an industrial consultant and he had worked as a facilitator on labour relations in the United States during the Great War, writing *Industry and Humanity* (1918), a rather weighty tome on the subject. In other words, he was very much removed from the war's larger strategic and diplomatic concerns. Although there is some debate about his guiding assumption for foreign policy – a Christian fundamentalist desire for peace or a desperate need to hold Quebec – neither view presents Mackenzie King as one likely to formulate a clear strategic role for Canadian diplomatic and military services.²²³ He was in a lonely position, as the one man with whom he could have worked, Christie, would soon be working, ironically, for the British.

On the face of it, King and Christie should have gotten along. When King took office, Christie was masterfully blending imperial and foreign policy to avoid conflict with the United States and assert a Canadian voice in the Commonwealth while making no tangible commitments to London, Washington or Geneva. But King suspected Christie of Toryism²²⁴ (a sin that rated as deadly in the Prime Minister's mind) and Christie, waiting in the wings to replace the dull Joseph Pope as Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was slowly pushed out of his position at the centre of the small inner circle of foreign policy in the Canadian government. Lacking a public voice and disenchanted by his relatively low position, Christie left the civil service in 1923. He

²²¹Stacey,4.

²²²JW Pickersgill, *The Mackenzie-King Record*, vol.1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1960): 20-21.

²²³ Joy E. Esbery, *Knight of the Holy Spirit: A Study of William Lyon Mackenzie King*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980): 200.

²²⁴ Toryism being defined as belonging to the Conservative Party of either Great Britain or Canada.

was quickly employed by the British Foreign Office as an expert on Canadian-US relations and appointed to the British Debt Mission in the United States.²²⁵ With him went most of Canada's expertise on international relations, the relationship between foreign and imperial policy, and the negotiation of complex security arrangements. Canada had lost the one man capable of transforming strategic theory into concrete policy.

Christie would not be replaced. Joseph Pope remained as Undersecretary of State for External Affairs and played a minor part in the upcoming diplomatic and constitutional developments. Until the appointment of Dr. OD Skelton as the Under-Secretary of State for in 1925, Mackenzie King's foreign policy machine was similar to that of the Empire's – working entirely on an ad-hoc basis. Mackenzie King's inexperience led him to rely on popular commentators, especially ones of a Liberal stripe. This was problematic since there was no DEA to which they all belonged; therefore, there was little opportunity to co-ordinate their disparate views and expertise into well-reasoned, enlightened and workable foreign policies.

Ralph Holder Williams, writing in 1922 for the *Journal of International Relations* (predecessor to *Foreign Affairs*), wrote to a primarily non-Canadian audience that,

no definitely asserted national policy limits or directs Sir Robert Borden's movement at Washington in the tangled triangle of British-American oriental relationships. International status has been talked, claimed and won by the force and for the sake of a young and ardent nationalism. It is too early for the onlooker to expect national consciousness to express itself in a truly international point of view.²²⁶

²²⁵ *Ibid*, 333-334.

²²⁶ Ralph Holder Williams, "Canadian Opinion on Foreign Affairs," *The Journal of International Relations*, Vol.12, No. 3 (Jan 1922), 333.

This question of national consciousness was used as a weapon by the lawyer, writer and editor, JS Ewart, who was probably the most vociferous critic of the British Empire in the Prime Minister's inner circle. "Consultation upon foreign policy," Ewart wrote, "pre-supposes identity of interest and similarity in international outlook. As between the United Kingdom and Canada, these do not exist. ... The one lives on the edge of a turbulent Europe. The other lives in North America."²²⁷ In other words, although Canada was able to look out for what she perceived as her own interests, these interests were narrowly demarcated.

The Liberals who favoured the autonomous, somewhat detached approach to international and imperial relations began by publishing a series of influential biographies of the great Sir Wilfrid Laurier (1841-1919), grandfather of their party, and, in many ways, their ideology as well. OD Skelton had a long tradition of publishing for academic and public consumption, mostly in the fields of business, trade and economics. Skelton did see Canada as growing in strength, but his reality was an economic one; his ideas about international security were decidedly vague.²²⁸ Having been appointed Laurier's official biographer, he was forced to write on strategic and defence matters for the first time. Although Skelton was an academic who should have been well-schooled in presenting an objective viewpoint, the second volume of *The Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier* betrayed much of the author's viewpoint. "[I]ndustrial maturity and national status" were things to be achieved simultaneously,²²⁹ implying that economic

²²⁷ JS Ewart, *The Independence Papers, Vol.1 1925-1930* (Ottawa: Self-published between 1925 and 1930): 53.

²²⁸ J.L. Granatstein, *The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935-1957*. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1982), 28-32.

²²⁹ OD Skelton, *The Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier*, Vol. II. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965): 1.

reality would produce the conditions for an independent Canadian voice, but that it would take a shift in national thinking to translate industrial growth into national power. Skelton charted the reverse of this thinking in Laurier: having initially pushed for Canadian independence, Laurier was swept up in “the flood tide of imperialism” that had “infected” Europe and the United States and moved him towards a stronger imperial organisation for defence and power in this new period of colonial expansion.²³⁰ This colonial attachment would sentimentally bind Canada closer to Britain than she was constitutionally.

To introduce the Great War, Skelton painted a picture of an “idyllic village scene” of “green hills, with white roads through the valleys, the little river running shallow in the heat of an inland summer,” over which “the clouds of European war lowered black and threatening.”²³¹ The war was not a world war, then, it was a *European* one. Being firmly of the “North American mind,” Dr. Skelton saw the peaceful conflict resolution of disputed territory between Canada and the United States as a model Europe should follow – the idea of North Americans dying in a war of European origin was simply beyond the pale.²³² Skelton’s descriptions of the conflict focused not on geostrategic considerations but on issues of casualties, conscription and sentiment:

The First Great War had come to Canada. It was to bring fateful consequences: the destruction of political parties, the rise of sectional and class movements, the clash of racial groups. These consequences imposed a grave strain on the fragile structure of Canadian unity and challenged all the aspirations for which Sir Wilfrid Laurier had contended.²³³

²³⁰ Skelton, *Laurier*, 27-28.

²³¹ *Ibid*, 159.

²³² Norman Hillmer, “OD Skelton and the North American Mind,” *International Journal*, Vol. 60, No.1 (Winter 2004/2005): 94-95.

²³³ Skelton, *Laurier*, 160.

Skelton was thus challenging the established distinction between imperial and foreign policy: by binding Canada to Britain, imperial ties would also bind Canada to Britain's foreign policies, which were inextricably tied to European interests.

Skelton's decidedly anti-imperial biography of Laurier (he had gone so far as to criticise Laurier for being so swept away by imperial sentiment as to "cloud his national vision")²³⁴ received a reply from another well-known public commentator, JW Dafoe. Dafoe, a journalist who had been working the Ottawa file since 1885, published his own memoir of Laurier as a response to Skelton's two-volume companion and intended it for a wider audience. Much of Dafoe's purpose in the shorter biography was to further Laurier's notions of national autonomy within an empire.²³⁵ Dafoe correctly traced Laurier's evolution in thought on imperial relations from a belief that Canada would stay as a subservient colony until she sought full independence to a more nuanced use of imperial and diplomatic ties for furthering Canadian interests. The change in Laurier's vision resulted from his extended time in office, which included four imperial conferences.²³⁶ According to Dafoe, these conferences revealed one firm thread in Laurier's thinking: having no dominant ideology, Laurier played the politics of the time at each gathering, building national unity at home and improving Canada's position abroad. When showered with the imperial praise that so many had criticised (including the "Sir" preceding his name), Laurier appeared in the chambers of the imperial conference as "the cool, cautious statesman thinking of the folks at home," one who

²³⁴ Skelton, *Laurier*, 27-28

²³⁵ John W. Dafoe, *Canada: An American Nation*, (Morningside Heights: Columbia University Press, 1935): xvi-xvii.

²³⁶ Dafoe, 45-46.

probably prevented the establishment of an Imperial Council and who fought for the right to opt out of imperial policies.²³⁷

Dafoe, who constantly referenced (and often disagreed with) Skelton, was trying to clear the record of a man he had known longer than Skelton had, but he was also addressing some of Skelton's views on external relations. Unlike Skelton, Dafoe saw Laurier as a visionary for a decentralised imperial federation who was working *against* his constituents by tempering English Canadian imperialism in order to “await the development of a national spirit in Canada.”²³⁸ In Laurier's view, Imperialism's prime supporters were not a domineering England, but a swath of Canadians who identified themselves as “British” and pushed for an imperial structure that would have been a completely artificial creation. Given that Dafoe was writing in 1921, it can be assumed that he saw the national spirit (at least in English Canada) come to fruition during the Great War – ironically, under a Unionist Conservative, Sir Robert Borden. But these were largely debates of national spirit and the philosophy of the Canadian constitution, two subjects from which Canadians have never had reprieve. The technical aspects of the Canadian constitution would come to the fore in the same year that Laurier's party returned to power.

In the end, Skelton prevailed. He would be, by far, the most powerful of Mackenzie King's advisors and, in the words of the historian CP Stacey, “the most powerful civil servant in Canadian history.”²³⁹ After delivering a speech at the Canadian Club expressing his now well-established views on Canadian imperial and foreign policy, Skelton caught the attention of the new Prime Minister and was quickly

²³⁷ *Ibid*, 49-50

²³⁸ *Ibid*, 51.

²³⁹ Stacey, 10.

appointed as an advisor for the 1923 Imperial Conference. Skelton's rise in government circles was largely due to the close, but not identical, ideas on empire and peace that he shared with Mackenzie King. Previously powerful Liberal commentators, such as the openly separatist Ewart, were dislodged by Skelton's more nuanced, practical view of the British Empire. For Skelton believed that advocating for complete independence was unproductive, but Canada should seek maximum freedom within the Empire, a powerful economic alliance that touched the lives of a quarter of the world's population.²⁴⁰ Mackenzie King therefore saw Skelton as the ideal implementer for his objective of maintaining a fundamentally moral and liberal Empire.

Mackenzie King's and Skelton's approaches to the Empire as less of a military alliance and more of an international association reflected larger shifts in thought throughout the English-speaking world. For Churchill, who spoke and wrote extensively on the subject, Empire was inherently linked into the notions of a shared set of institutions and ideals which allowed for the flourishing of liberty. Essentially a maritime concept, Empire was best served by a large navy to guard communications and trade backed by a small standing army.²⁴¹ Although Churchill believed in self-determination, he believed in an inherently anglocentric version of it: although the "civilised" dominions *ought* to govern themselves, this did not mean they were ready to. And although he favoured a form of liberal "imperial federation," who would be better to lead it than those with the most maritime and commercial power – those of the Motherland?²⁴²

²⁴⁰Terry Crowley, *Marriage of Minds: Isabel and Oscar Skelton Reinventing Canada*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003): 124-125.

²⁴¹ Kirk Emmert, *Winston S. Churchill on Empire*, (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1989): 1.

²⁴² *Ibid*, 92-93

Canadian liberals predictably took a very different view of the matter. If the Great War had shown anything, it was that the formidable Royal Navy was vital in securing sea lanes – so that Canadian, Australian, New Zealand, South African and Indian troops could come to the aid of Britain. How could a liberal imperialist like Churchill claim that the Royal Navy assured leadership within an imperial federation when it was merely guarding the transport routes for the Dominion and colonial troops that were necessary to Britain’s survival? The best metaphor for the problems with Churchill’s liberal anglocentrism is that of an “imperial scale” which was supposed to balance the interest of self-governing national units of the Commonwealth against the good of the organisation as a whole. The scale had become difficult to judge even before the Great War, especially as Canadian industrial development was tied to very different trade policies than those of the United Kingdom.²⁴³ Since the Dominions were all democratic, their leaders would predictably view the markings on the scale with a lens that was shaped by their electorates at home.

Thus while Australia and New Zealand, concerned not just economically but racially about the growth of Japan, favoured a strong, united empire with a formal structure as a means of protection, the Irish Free State and South Africa resented what they viewed as a the hangover from conquest and defeat. Canada, for its part, often acted as a mediator between the two camps.²⁴⁴ It is likely that Canadian leaders were particularly well-suited to negotiation between the two, given the substantial voice of Quebecers, who in many ways had more in common with *Afrikaners* than with their

²⁴³Paul Knaplund, *Britain, Commonwealth and Empire: 1901-1955*, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1956): 81.

²⁴⁴ Stacey, 134.

Ontarian Loyalist countrymen. Canadian policy toward imperial unity, therefore, had to begin with considerations of unity within the Canadian federation.

Despite his lack of experience in international politics, King held very strong views on imperial commitment. With his prime concern of maintaining national unity, he understood that Canadian representatives would have to keep control of national commitments in order to ensure the government's continuing legitimacy. However, King took the monarchy and the Empire seriously on a personal and emotional level, putting him at odds with the more radical isolationists such as Dafoe and Ewart. Unlike these advisors and commentators, Mackenzie King saw the devolution of power as a means of preserving the Empire, not destroying it. The Prime Minister was not afraid to censure Skelton when he expressed views that were decidedly anti-imperial, leading to growing tension as Skelton became more isolationist in his thought.²⁴⁵ The contradictions of an empire based on sentiment (but not on formal, legal commitment) would come to the fore soon after the Liberal reign began, when an event very far from either London or Ottawa provoked a game of imperial brinkmanship.

The first chance that Mackenzie King would get to extricate himself from any sort of imperial commitment came with the Chanak Crisis of 1922. The affair began when Turkish troops under a resurgent government led by Kemal Ataturk broke with the Treaty of Sevres, which had brought peace between the former Ottoman Empire and the Allies, and commenced hostilities with the Greeks. Turkish armies rapidly advanced towards Istanbul, then occupied by British troops who were in an increasingly desperate position, especially since the Turks occupied the town of Chanak which controlled access to the Istanbul through the Dardanelles. Great Britain sought to reinforce them,

²⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 12-13

and at a Cabinet meeting on 15 September, it was decided to ask for troops from New Zealand and Australia due to their interest in the region²⁴⁶ while sending a similar message to Canada and South Africa for information purposes. The main problem was that the messages were coded similarly, and due to a delay in decoding the message, it reached Mackenzie King just as press releases about the call for troops were being released.²⁴⁷ Naturally, Mackenzie King did not know that he received this message from London so late as the result of a clerical error. He admitted to being “annoyed” and stated that Parliament would have to endorse any despatch of troops, which he was certain they would not.

The outrage over this last-minute call to arms, King mused, was a chance to corner the Imperialists who had given his mentor, Laurier, so much trouble, and possibly to widen his political base by recruiting Progressives over the issue. Being convinced that Canadians were wholeheartedly against another European conflict, Mackenzie-King was ready to face “anything – attempts on my life etc.” to avoid being swept up by “jingoism & with jingoism passion.” Parliament was not in session, however, and the crisis subsided before any significant debate could be had on the issue.²⁴⁸ Divisions aside, it was clear that Canadians would not tolerate giving London a *carte blanche* to call up their manhood at a whim – even if that was not what the British were asking for in the first place!

The problem of communications represented just one of many with regard to British-Canadian consultation, and in the years that followed Chanak these

²⁴⁶ The Australian-New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) had fought an ultimately unsuccessful, but mythologized campaign in the Dardanelles.

²⁴⁷ Stacey, 21-23.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 26-29.

contradictions and tensions ate away at the notion of imperial commonality and consultation. JS Ewart defined the central problems with consultation quite succinctly:

(I) The only basis upon which consultation can proceed is identity of interest ... between the United Kingdom and Canada there is no identity, or even similarity, in their international outlooks. (II) The British government will not tolerate the only kind of consultation that could in the least degree be satisfactory to Canada. ... (III) Geographical and other considerations render continuous consultation impossible.²⁴⁹

As a result of the crisis, Canada would simply refuse to sign the Treaty of Lausanne, which negotiated a new peace between the British and the Turks,²⁵⁰ and Mackenzie King began to focus international efforts away from finding a new imperial arrangement and towards trade with the United States. Imperial and defence questions were, in a way, made moot by the doctrine of “Parliament will decide.” Although in practice it would have been possible to adopt this principle within an imperial structure, the mood of the times was certainly against it. Again, Ewart symbolised the public reaction towards defence planning in general by pointing to the “moral obligation” made by Britain to police the English Channel in the event of a Franco-German war as a prime catalyst for dragging London into the conflict.²⁵¹ If Britain was prone to undertaking dangerous imperial adventures, what could Canada gain by tying itself to Britain through any sort of obligation, moral or otherwise?

Skelton would have to tackle the persistent question of Canada’s constitutional status and the nature of the Empire shortly after his joining the DEA in 1924. His first encounter with this difficult problem occurred the same year over the question of the

²⁴⁹ Ewart, 29.

²⁵⁰ Stacey, 38-41.

²⁵¹ Ewart, 783-784.

Anglo-Irish treaty.²⁵² Although the treaty establishing the Irish Free State was concluded in 1921, Dublin registered the Treaty with the League in 1924, making it an international agreement, not an internal Commonwealth one. Britain objected, and the Foreign Secretary, a clumsy Austen Chamberlain, made a series of remarks about British representatives of the Council speaking for the entirety of the British Empire, and not just the United Kingdom. This alarmed Skelton, who noted that these utterances had received a poor reception in the US press that now confirmed Canada as a part of a British “bloc,” thus justifying the US refusal to join the League. Skelton sought to discount the “dogma” of “one Empire foreign policy” by publicly contradicting Chamberlain’s remarks. There was more debate at the League and among legal advisors concerning Canada’s status, but, ultimately, Skelton concluded, at the end of the affair, that the question was still open.²⁵³ Of course, what was needed to dispel these notions rather than just worrying about them was a Canadian diplomatic post for each of the Dominion’s “limited interests.” Until that occurred, no-one was clear about Canada’s legal status and, worse, Canada had no means of clarifying it without the considerable handicap of working through the British Foreign Office which had proved impracticable.

The reluctance to provide a definitive answer on Canada’s commitments arose again in 1925, with direct ramifications for Canadian defence policy. Engineered by the major European powers as a means of collective security, with all signatories guaranteeing the frontiers of France, Belgium and Germany, the Locarno Pact had been negotiated outside the League of Nations. Canadians, including Loring Christie, now in

²⁵² Although Skelton was brought on as an adviser in 1923, he would not be appointed to the DEA full time until 1924 and Undersecretary in 1925.

²⁵³ OD Skelton, Memorandum, 21 January 1925 in Clark, 430-432.

London, were wary of further commitments, and were annoyed about being shut out of the negotiations but still being expected to sign the treaty. A rather pompous telegram came from London describing the wisdom of “British statesmen.” King, unsurprisingly, decided against its implementation, and it was not ratified in Canada.²⁵⁴ Still, the British had signed for the Empire with a clause that allowed the Dominions to opt out of any conflict that arose from the treaty, leading to ambivalent legal status for the dominions. *Canada and World Politics*, written in 1926 by two legal scholars, noted that British promises made at Locarno “specifically exempt [the dominions] from any obligations arising out of it unless and until they shall have designated their desire to accede.”²⁵⁵ But this did not mean that Canada was not bound to the treaty; it meant “only that she is under no obligation to contribute anything to such a war. She would be in a position of passive belligerency and at any time an attack on her shipping or territory might make it necessary for her to take an active part” in the conflict. The government, on the other hand, thought very clearly that Canada was not bound to the treaty, had no intention of signing it, and designated it a “European” matter. Just as Britain would not guarantee Poland, Canada would not guarantee Belgium.²⁵⁶ These mechanics and procedures seriously hindered any observer from perceiving any firm Canadian foreign policy; furthermore, they were making it difficult for the Canadian government to formulate a clear set of external policies.

This complex constitutional course followed by Mackenzie King is often bewildering to historians more than eighty years after the fact. For those planning the

²⁵⁴Stacey, 78-82

²⁵⁵ Percy Ellwood Corbett, *Canada and World Politics: A Study of the Constitutional and International Relations of the British Empire*, (Toronto: MacMillan, 1928): 67

²⁵⁶Ernest Lapointe, conversation with Mackenzie King, 30 March 1927 in Riddell, 133-134.

defence of Canada, the situation must have seemed equally baffling. The only consistent means for furthering Canadian foreign policy, the Empire, had its institutions constantly being reformed and renegotiated. In the 1920s, it seemed that Canada was able to decide easily what it would *not* commit to, but it was not clear what it actually supported.

Canada's moral obligations remained a serious concern for King until relations between Canada and Britain were put on a quasi-diplomatic footing in 1926, a process that will be described later on. King, in answering questions posed by Sir Arthur Meighen (now in opposition) in the House of Commons in 1923, declared that,

we have felt and feel very strongly that, if the relations between the different parts of the British Empire are to be made of an enduring character, this will only be through a full recognition of the supremacy of Parliament, and this particularly with regard to matters which may involve participation in war. It is for Parliament to decide ... it is neither right nor proper for any individuals or for any group of individuals to take any step which in any way might limit the rights of Parliament in a matter which is of such great concern to our country.²⁵⁷

Nonetheless, Mackenzie King would go on to say in a different forum that Canada would stand behind Britain in any major war.²⁵⁸

King was thus taking a middle road. By not committing to any formal agreements, he stayed out of debacles like Chanak, but he was still able to weave the Empire into his conception of Canada – an Empire that he took very seriously on an emotional level. It seems in retrospect that Canada – to paraphrase one of King's famous quotes from the Second World War - was a member of the Empire if necessary, but not necessarily a member of the Empire.²⁵⁹ Although there were important constitutional developments between 1926 and 1931, there were no major crises to test how the

²⁵⁷ William Lyon Mackenzie King, "The Chanak Crisis," Statement to Parliament, 1 February 1923 in Riddell, 94

²⁵⁸ Stacey, 72.

²⁵⁹ The original phrase was "conscription if necessary, but not necessarily conscription." The credit for this particular paraphrase can be attributed to a conversation with Dr. Marc Milner in early 2010.

constitutional changes would affect the strategic use of military forces. Of note is the 1926 Imperial Conference, which was the first point in the decade where any attempt was made at formally redefining the terms of what “dominion” meant.

Unsurprisingly, the first major legal reform of the 1920s affecting Canada’s international relations was sparked by a domestic crisis. In the Westminster parliamentary system that Canada inherited from the British, executive authority was theoretically concentrated in the hands of the regent, in Canada’s case, the Governor-General Sir Julian Byng of Vimy. This Governor-General did have the authority to dissolve Parliament, and this was typically done at the advice of the Prime Minister. But in 1925, Mackenzie-King had returned to power with a minority government and by 1926, he was facing the possibility of censure in the House of Commons which would have forced an election. Rather than be booted out of office, King decided to call on the Governor-General to disband the House – but Byng thought otherwise. Instead, he gave the reins of power to Sir Arthur Meighen, leader of the opposition by asking him to form his own minority government. This shocked King, who led a successful campaign to censure Meighen. The Grits then used the crisis as a political tool in the subsequent election, portraying Byng as an imperial Goliath stamping out the Davidian struggle for autonomy waged by the Liberals. This was blatantly false – Byng, a former commander of the Canadian Corps, had rejected Mackenzie-King’s own advice to consult the Dominion Office in London on the proper course of action and had acted within his responsibilities granted by the Canadian constitution. Nonetheless, King returned with a solid majority in 1926.²⁶⁰ Although Stacey has labelled the incident “not really an episode in the history of Canadian external relations” and JE Esbery attributed the

²⁶⁰ Stacey, vol.2, 75-77.

problems arising in the affair to domestic political contradictions stretching as far back as 1919,²⁶¹ the crisis forced politicians to re-examine the constitutional arrangements between the United Kingdom and Canada.

The effect of the King-Byng Affair, as it came to be known, was to give a new impetus to find solutions to some lingering constitutional problems. One such problem involved the formal means of communication between Ottawa and London. Until 1926, the Governor-General was considered the representative of the British government, meaning that all communications nominally went through him. Conversely, Canadian representation in London consisted of a High Commissioner who was obviously no equal in status. The Imperial Conference of 1926 established the Governor-General as the representative of the British *crown*, not the British *government* and thus led to the establishment of a British High Commissioner in Ottawa. This indicated a fundamental shift in the relationship: for all practical purposes, the High Commissioner went through the same accreditation procedures as a full Ambassador. Although theoretically, a High Commissioner was considered lower than an Ambassador, even after the establishment of Canadian embassies in 1928, the High Commissioner in London was considered the premiere post in the Canadian foreign service, “a somewhat anomalous situation.”²⁶² Furthermore, the fact that both countries felt the need to send emissaries to one another is an indication that both viewed each other as fundamentally independent. For the moment, these were largely symbolic actions, not the definite, clearly-articulated changes in the relationship which came with the Statute of Westminster in 1931.

²⁶¹ JS Esbery, “Personality and Politics: A New Look at the King-Byng Dispute,” *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol.6, No.1 (March 1973): 37.

²⁶² Skilling, 117-118.

This slow evolution towards a clear constitutional framework for Canada – and the Empire – did little to clarify the strategic concerns occupying the minds of defence planners in Ottawa. Lacking real departmental influence or even the strong voice given to it by Loring Christie, External Affairs was ineffectual at creating clear policies until OD Skelton was brought in as an officer in 1924. Even then, with the DEA run by two declared pacifists – although neither King nor Skelton were beyond allowing short-term pragmatic realities to shape policy – the development of imperial or defence policy for a *war* that *might* happen was not only politically inconvenient, it was personally repugnant. Histories published by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA) after the Second World War did not consider Canada to have a real foreign service at all until the expansion of the DEA in 1927-1928 and the establishment of Canadian legations in Washington, Paris and Tokyo.²⁶³ Until Canada's diplomatic organisations were strengthened, there would be policy, but it would all be roughly handcrafted as there was no machinery in place to ensure consistency, nor a master craftsman to carefully build a masterpiece. For those who had to follow Canadian diplomacy closely, the situation was muddled and confused. Small wonder that Canada's defence planning in this period would later be accused of not conforming to the diplomatic priorities of the era.

²⁶³ H Gordon Skilling, *Canadian Representation Abroad: From Agency to Embassy*, (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1945): ix.

Chapter 3: The Poltergeist of Unpreparedness

“None of these [previous wars] proved sufficient to convince Canadians that there was a close connection between their nation’s welfare and the state of her military preparations. Fortunately for the country, there were always some people in it who interested themselves in such matters and sought to maintain a degree of active military spirit; but they were always a small minority.”
CP Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 1955.²⁶⁴

While Canadian political leadership and nascent diplomatic corps were treading cautiously in the early 1920s, military leaders embarked upon a bold campaign to change the nature of Canada’s defence establishment. Unlike the primarily legalistic and political concerns raised by the likes of Borden, Christie, Mackenzie-King and Skelton, the senior leadership of the Canadian Militia was absorbed by technical and operational problems. As Canada had never had much of a voice in foreign affairs before the First World War, there were no precedents for military planners to envision large scale deployments outside of Canada’s borders. With a civilian establishment focused intently on internal development, national unity and negotiating complex arrangements with regards to Canadian sovereignty, there was little time to re-form Canada’s defence community to reflect strategic concerns. The militia’s strategic planners, lacking direction and maintaining a civil-military structure similar to that of 1914, defaulted towards their organisation’s pre-war role: the direct defence of Canada from an American invasion.

It was the battlefields of France and Flanders, however, that had made the most profound impact on the minds of the post-war leadership of Canada’s armed forces. They had witnessed a poorly-organised and poorly-equipped group of soldiers with inconsistent leadership transform itself into a modern fighting machine, but only after a

²⁶⁴ CP Stacey, *Six Years of War: The Army in Canadian, Britain and the Pacific*, Vol.1. (Ottawa, DND, 1955):3.

brutal period of trial-and-error on the Western Front. This chapter will argue that it was how professional military officers remembered the Great War, which varied considerably from the political elite and the public at large, which guided the development of the Canadian defence establishment in the 1920s and resulted in strategic planning which did not conform to the state's diplomatic and economic priorities.

Four years of open war had profoundly altered the way in which many Canadian officers viewed the profession of arms. Perhaps the greatest victim of the war, among professional officers at least, was the ideal of heroic leadership, whereby dashing officers lead men through the enemy line in a contest of wills and the human spirit. Out of the war came officers who embraced the ideal of the "military manager," a cool professional who intricately planned his operations and carried them out using a carefully-managed force, methodically organised and specially trained. These scientifically-minded officers saw the need for rationalisation and professionalisation in both peace and war. This view would remain an essential component of much of the senior leadership of the Canadian military and dominate Canadian military thought as the Second World War approached.²⁶⁵

The Canadians who fought overseas did so as part of an army legally separate from that of the Active Militia,²⁶⁶ so there was no real drive to find a strategic role for the Militia beyond their traditional role of defending Canada from invasion. The Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) was raised specifically for the Great War, and

²⁶⁵ Geoffrey W. Hayes, "The Development of the Canadian Army Officer Corps, 1939-1945." PhD diss. Unpublished: University of Western Ontario, March 1992: 21.

²⁶⁶ "Active Militia" referred to all currently enlisted troops under the authority of the Department of Militia and Defence. This included the Permanent Force (PF) of full-time regulars and the Non-Permanent Active Militia (NPAM) who were part-time militiamen.

could not continue as the army-in-being after the shooting stopped. The CEF was dismantled by 1919, leaving only the pre-war structure of a dispersed collection of part-time, citizen-soldier units known as the Non-Permanent Active Militia (NPAM) and a very small group of professionals known as the Permanent Force (PF) as their instructors to defend Canada. So although the CEF and the Canadian Corps would not remain as the force structure for a postbellum national army, it was important to professional officers that its tactical acumen, professional competence and sound leadership be grafted on to the Militia.

Military leaders therefore feared a paradoxical situation. They were forced to search for a strategic purpose for the military, both nationally and internationally, at a time when few Canadians expressed an interest in anything related to the military or defence. During the first post-war election in 1921, for example, almost nothing was mentioned in campaign speeches with regards to foreign affairs and even less about the Militia.²⁶⁷ The Great War had been, after all, the “war to end all wars,” and post-war developments such as the League of Nations and the upcoming Washington Naval Conference, designed to end great-power rivalries in the Pacific, provided some promise that war might finally be relegated to history. For the moment, however, militaries still existed. But few seemed interested in it. This lack of interest in defence policy at a crucial time in the development of the Canadian state produced a series of ineffectual restructurings that failed to give the Militia the vital direction it needed for its reorganisation, and the foundation for forging effective contingency plans and military policies.

²⁶⁷ Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies*. Vol.2, 1921-1948, (Toronto: University of Toronto press, 1981): 3-4.

Much the same way that the war had changed notions of ideal leadership, the 1914 model for organising the Militia was no longer acceptable to the post-war professionals. The meddling of the Minister of Militia and Defence, Sir Sam Hughes, in the early stages of mobilisation and even in operations on the Western Front until 1916, decreased the efficiency of Canadian units. The post-war military professionals were, in the words of Stephen J. Harris, bedevilled by “the minister’s ghost,” who “continued to haunt the general staff long after the war.”²⁶⁸ Canadian military leaders struggled at all costs to prevent another Hughes-style call-to-arms. As leaders of a small army, the staff officers of the Canadian Militia²⁶⁹ could not plan for the next big overseas war. But they could plan for the mobilisation process which would occur the next time the world was driven into conflict.

Securing a headquarters from which to make rational decisions was the first challenge facing the post-war professionals. This was complicated in 1919-1920 by the fact that Canada then had two distinct armies and, in fact, two distinct military ministries. The Overseas Military Forces of Canada (OMFC) managed both the CEF units in France and the Canadians assigned to the United Kingdom, whereas the Department of Militia and Defence managed the Militia proper, which stayed on Canadian soil. On 1 August 1919, Major-General James MacBrien, who was already deeply involved in the demobilisation overseas, was appointed military chief of the OMFC. This allowed him to have near-complete control over reorganisation as it related

²⁶⁸ Stephen J. Harris, “Or There Would be Chaos: The Legacy of Sam Hughes and Military Planning in Canada, 1919-1939,” *Military Affairs*, Vol.46, No.3 (October 1982):120 [120-126].

²⁶⁹ The “Canadian Militia” became the “Canadian Army” officially in 1940.

to demobilisation.²⁷⁰ Meanwhile, Sir Arthur Currie, recently commander of the Canadian Corps on the Western Front, returned to Canada to assume command of the Militia. With such a complex and divided bureaucracy and little input from Ottawa as to the military's exact strategic purpose – indeed, with Ottawa unclear as to the level of its own political independence – there were no clear and consistent organising principles for MacBrien to follow as Canada's field army embarked on the transports home. Nonetheless, due to MacBrien's closeness and frequent correspondence with Currie, the two men tried to lead the Militia towards a more efficient force dedicated more to preparing for war and less towards the local politics, social status and focus on administration which had characterised the pre-war Militia.

MacBrien and Currie first sought to gain control over the services themselves as a means of ensuring that outside political interference could be contained. Sir Arthur Currie, having commanded the now-disbanded Canadian Corps, was appointed the Inspector-General of the Militia and based in Canada while MacBrien who remained overseas for the moment, he was to become Chief of the General Staff (CGS) of the Militia upon Currie's retirement. Currie's first concern was the Naval and Military Committee, a body that had been created in 1909 to deal primarily with technical matters affecting both the Militia and the Naval Service. It remained in operation throughout the war, and had expanded in size. This committee was the central co-ordinating body for various arms of Canada's defence forces, including the RCMP. By controlling this committee, intended as a co-ordinating body for a *militia* (essentially an administrative organisation designed to provide troops to a more coherent *army*), Currie

²⁷⁰ LAC, MG 30 E63, Vol.3. Overseas Military Council of Canada- Correspondence. "Minutes of the Overseas Military Council of Canada for 19 September 1919. The Council was a body within the OMFC.

reoriented an organisation designed only for force generation into a staff that could train, organise, equip, and *command* units in the accomplishment of its strategic purpose. In other words, Currie and MacBrien were seeking not so much to re-build the Militia, but to combine it with the demobilising CEF and build a new national army which was capable of providing reinforcements, leadership and up-to-date training and equipment to a Canadian field force operating at home or abroad. For MacBrien, the stakes were high, as he knew from recent experience that success in modern war depended on good staff work and a well-organised, well-led organisation; the kind of efficiency that the traditional Militia spirit simply could not provide.

Despite this new emphasis on professionalism and efficiency, the leadership of the post-war Canadian defence establishment was often bogged down in debates surrounding minutiae that can only be described as petty. During the war, in fact, there had been two Chiefs of the General Staff – a CGS of the OFMC, Lieutenant-General Sir REW Turner reporting to Sir Edward Kemp, Minister of the OFMC, and Major-General Sir Willoughby Gwatkin, CGS of the Militia, reporting to Sydney Chilton Mewburn, Minister of Militia and Defence.²⁷¹ Currie, who had been commanding the Canadian Corps, the largest body of operational troops within the CEF, replaced Gwatkin²⁷² as head of the Canadian Militia. But Currie was not given the position of Chief of the General Staff, rather, he filled the newly-created position of Inspector-General. The

²⁷¹ Harris, *Canadian Brass*, 141-142 and *Overseas Military Forces of Canada, Report of the Ministry, Overseas Military Forces of Canada 1918*. (London: OFMC, 1918): iii, 5.

²⁷² In an confusing marriage of events and titles, Gwatkin was appointed Inspector-General of the Canadian Air Force. Gwatkin, more or less on good terms with both Currie and MacBrien, focused his efforts on maintaining a separate service mostly in the sense of its own customs and traditions, and the Air Board eventually became part of the General Staff, although the burgeoning CAF maintained its own uniforms and command structure. See "Gwatkin, Sir Willoughby Garnons," *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*. < http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01-e.php?id_nbr=8178>. Accessed 7 July 2010.

difference between the two titles was important. Before the war, a consultative Militia Council made all decisions requiring executive authority and served as the only point of contact between the Militia and the government. As Inspector-General and Chief Military Advisor, however, Currie – and Currie alone – had direct access to the minister.²⁷³ In essence, he had a monopoly on executive power and the ability to present a single, united opinion to the government. Given that the other leading figure in the reorganisation, James MacBrien, was a close friend of his, Currie as the Inspector-General had all the resources needed to transform co-ordinating bodies in the essentially administrative structure of the Canadian defence establishment towards something resembling the chain of command in a fighting organisation like the CEF.

It was unlikely that anyone besides Currie would be given that amount of power. With his executive powers, Currie was able to reduce the size of the Naval and Military Committee to two full members – himself and the Director of the Naval Service (DNS), Admiral Sir Charles Kingsmill.²⁷⁴ This excluded voices that would have been important for an administrative body, such as the Adjutant-General (AG) and the Quartermaster-General (QMG,) and emphasised the role of those commanding the actual services. Although there was some scepticism from the RCN on appointing additional members from the Air Board (then under control of the Militia), there was a firm commitment to strengthening the committee, making it “an embryo, which, after a period of gestation, might develop into an organisation second only to the Cabinet in power and

²⁷³ Stephen J Harris, “The Canadian General Staff and the Higher Organisation of Defence, 1919-1939,” in BD Hunt and Ronald Haycock, eds. *Canada's Defence: Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth Century*. (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1993): 72.

²⁷⁴ LAC, Microform reel C-5202 H.Q. 365-11 Memorandum. “The Naval and Military Committee,” 22 December 1919 .

importance.”²⁷⁵ These ambitions were never realised and Canadians could be thankful that no unelected body would gain power comparable to the executive. In fact, the Defence Committee, as the Naval and Military Committee came to be known, never got far. It was brought into being as an inter-departmental committee in 1920, but when the Militia and Naval Service were brought under one department in 1923 (a matter which will be discussed below), it had no mandate. It was therefore disbanded, and an intradepartmental committee of a similar nature was not authorised until 1927 –but only after objections by the Navy and the Minister had delayed its establishment for four years.²⁷⁶ Bureaucratic frustrations aside, the drive to secure a solid foundation for resolving key technical issues demonstrated a renewed vigour on the part of professionals to establish an army run by soldiers and soldiers alone.

Upon taking over from Currie as head of the Militia in 1920, MacBrien would continue the work of moving the organisation towards one more closely resembling an army. MacBrien faced several formidable obstacles. For one, after the departure of Currie, there was no longer a powerful Inspector-General. Instead there was a Chief of the General Staff with far fewer powers. Most notably, executive decisions would have to go through a civil-military body known as the Militia Council. This limitation of powers prevented MacBrien from making sweeping changes; and he would have to act through the Minister of Militia and cooperate with the RCN.²⁷⁷

²⁷⁵ LAC, Microform reel C-5202 “Note between unknown individuals [archival errors, presumed to be the DNS and Currie],” 29 January 1920, 103;

²⁷⁶ LAC, Microform reel C-5202. Memorandum from HA Panet to James Ralston, “Joint Staff Committee,” 6 May 1927; LAC, Microform reel C-5202, Memorandum from GJ Desbarats to HA Panet, “Joint Staff Committee,” 18 July 1927; LAC, Microform reel C-5202, Memorandum from GJ Desbarats to HC Thacker, “Joint Staff Committee,” 29 September 1927; Note that there is a further memorandum from the Naval Service on the reel in this period but due to the condition of the microform it is unreadable.

²⁷⁷ Harris, “And There Would be Chaos,” 72.

Furthermore, Canadian culture was not, and generally still is not, amenable to a large professional army.²⁷⁸ Before the war, the Permanent Force (PF) was seen as a necessary adjunct to the larger and culturally accepted part-time force. This was especially true after the political rise of Sir Sam Hughes as Minister of Militia and Defence under the Borden government in 1911, when Hughes made NPAM dominance official policy.²⁷⁹ But the Great War had shown just how unready the Militia was for war, and the dispersal of units and variation in their quality also hampered mobilisation. The emphasis was now to be put on a meritocratic PF, who would be trained as fully-capable combat units, not treated as mere instructors.²⁸⁰

MacBrien began his reforms by recommending the creation of new all-arms bases “4 to 5 miles outside of main centres,” to replace the more diffuse and cumbersome instructional system that had existed before the war. This would be coupled with the reduction of the number of Military Districts through amalgamation.²⁸¹ Although the stated aims of these changes were efficiency and the reduction of costs, there was also the objective of centralisation, improving control of excessively independent COs and the curtailment of political appointments.

Along with the new training bases, the formation of a corps of paid (read Permanent Force) adjutants would be assigned to each unit, or, failing that, a series of brigade inspectors and training staffs to ensure uniformity of equipment and training across the country. Militia Headquarters was to be reorganised, and the Militia Council,

²⁷⁸ James Wood, *Militia Myths: Ideas of the Canadian Citizen Soldier, 1896-1921*. (Toronto: UBC Press, 2010): 1.

²⁷⁹ Wood, 174-175.

²⁸⁰ LAC, MG 30 E63, Vol.3, Memoranda – Overseas Military Forces of Canada, 1919-1920. Memorandum. “Concentration of the Permanent Force,” Undated.

²⁸¹ LAC, MG 30 E63, Vol.3, Memoranda – Overseas Military Forces of Canada. “Note from CGS to the Inspector-General,” 21 May 1920: 1-2.

which had previously been the main policy body for the Militia, was to be reinstated – but in an altered form. The Council’s membership was to be cut, allowing decisions to be made by a smaller group of officers with a firmer professional control of policy and planning.²⁸² In essence, MacBrien was seeking to implement similar changes in the Militia Council as he had effected in the Defence Committee: by cutting the number of voices, he was streamlining a committee structure into something more closely resembling an operational chain of command. But it was not just politically appointed officer that MacBrien had to worry about – he remembered Hughes’ hydra of officer appointments and debilitating interference during the early stages of the Great War, and understood that origin of the monster was the Minister himself.²⁸³

If the drive to reform the internal workings of the Canadian defence establishment proved tiresome and difficult, the process of recasting the civil-military linkages in the midst of complex political reforms underway in the 1920s would be nearly impossible. Having just slogged through the fields of France and Flanders side-by-side with Imperial forces, the British connection exerted a powerful influence on the Canadian officers redesigning the Canadian Militia. Just as Currie had been willing to call in favours from militia contacts and Canadian politicians in order to achieve his objectives during the war, Canadian military leaders used professional contacts with British officers during peacetime as a means of promoting their ideas. One such area was the education of senior officers. Of the many institutions that the Canadian defence establishment lacked, one of the most vital was a staff college. The Royal

²⁸² LAC, MG 30 E63, Vol.3, Memoranda – Overseas Military Forces of Canada. “Note from CGS to the Inspector-General,” 21 May 1920., 5-6.

²⁸³ This term originates with Dr. Ronald Haycock’s biography of Sam Hughes. See Ronald Haycock, *Sam Hughes: the Public Career of a Controversial Canadian, 1885-1916*. (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1986): 258.

Military College in Kingston provided some basic courses, but Canadians had to rely on British staff colleges to groom their future leadership.²⁸⁴ This had its advantages. For one, with a limited selection of places reserved for Canadian officers, the professionals could more easily control promotions. Rising stars such as Andrew George Latta McNaughton, future CGS and General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the Canadian Army during the first part of the Second World War, were singled out early on for the British Army Staff College at Camberley.²⁸⁵ MacBrien hoped that the placement of Canadian staff officers at Camberley might be augmented with further appointments to the staff college in Quetta, India (now Pakistan) and an exchange with Australia. This “[I]nson with the Motherland” was deemed vital “to keep abreast of the times and properly in touch with the military situation.”²⁸⁶

This imperial bond would be a productive and important intellectual link in the years to come. London, however, could not supply the most vital elements of the military force that MacBrien and Currie had envisioned in 1919: arms, men and equipment. Only the Canadian government could provide these. What the Militia needed was a leader very much in tune with the rumblings of Parliament Hill, with political savvy and an understanding of the complex manoeuvring required to push through vital reforms and gain access to desperately-needed resources. James MacBrien was not this leader.

Despite his clear understanding of technical military issues, MacBrien was not well-suited to conduct intricate organisational negotiations in a politically complex

²⁸⁴ Stephen Harris, *Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988): 194.

²⁸⁵ LAC, MG 30 E63, Vol.1. “Letter from James MacBrien to Arthur Currie,” 27 February 1920.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

setting. The military had never enjoyed much political influence in Canada and this was no different after four years of seemingly endless slaughter on the Western Front. Furthermore, James MacBrien was no politician. He was a soldier's soldier – having run away to join the army in 1896, by 1919 he had proven himself on foreign exchanges and as an undeniably courageous brigade commander on the Western Front. A soldier to the core, he appreciated the “[d]irect, forceful and demanding” – attributes that would not serve him well in Ottawa.²⁸⁷ He knew what he wanted: not so much a Canadian Militia, but a Canadian Army, one that would be able to make definite commitments and act as part of a larger command structure, not merely provide masses of half-trained recruits for ad-hoc formations. It was unlikely that he would accept anything less. Norman Hillmer and Bill McAndrew argue that this soldierly drive, vital for success on the battlefield, forced MacBrien to play an all-or-nothing game in a world built on compromise, much to his own detriment; in their words, he “notably lacked the ‘cunning of restraint.’”²⁸⁸ This predisposition to ignore the important tenets of tact and diplomacy would not just hurt MacBrien personally, but would ensure that the formulation of an effective and clear defence policy would not proceed smoothly.

Both Major General Sir Willoughby Gwatkin, who had been CGS during the war, and MacBrien drafted schemes for reorganising the Militia that involved vastly expanding the country's military strength. As early as 1917, Gwatkin had proposed a force of 20,000 full-time soldiers recruited by means of two years' compulsory

²⁸⁷ Norman Hillmer and William McAndrew, “The Cunning of Restraint: General J.H. MacBrien and the Problems of Peacetime Soldiering,” *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol.8, No.4 (Spring 1979): 41. Note: There may be some confusion with regards to this volume number designation. The *Canadian Defence Quarterly* of 1979 was part of a distinctly separate series from the *Quarterly* of the inter-war years.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid*, 46

service.²⁸⁹ MacBrien, after taking control of the OMFC in 1919, proposed an army of 30,000, sustained by three years' compulsory service and cadet training.²⁹⁰ Conscription, however, had no support even among the veterans' groups, and MacBrien inherited a Permanent Force of no more than 5,000.²⁹¹

Although this was a stinging blow, there was still work to be done in terms of civil-military relations. The military lacked concrete integration with Imperial forces and the Militia was so small that it seemed insignificant. Indeed, with no constitutional conference taking place after the war, the General Staff had no basis for developing military relations with the United Kingdom or any of the other dominions. The result was a drive for imitation, at least at the policy-making level. MacBrien had worked on a subcommittee of the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) dealing with the structures necessary to make imperial defence practicable.²⁹² This Imperial Organisation Committee had determined that Canada would best serve the needs of imperial defence through a contribution of six infantry divisions and one cavalry division to be self-sustaining for six months.²⁹³ In addition to these overseas divisions, the CID determined, Canada should raise eight divisions for home defence.²⁹⁴ Of course, the CID was only a consultation body, and carried no authority. Only the House of Commons carried that authority, and Parliament Hill was only willing to give the Permanent Force a third of one division. Five thousand regulars would not be sufficient to raise a contingent

²⁸⁹ Harris, *Canadian Brass*, 142-143

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 144-145.

²⁹¹ Jack Granatstein, *Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002): 156-157.

²⁹² LAC, MG 30 E63 Vol.5 "Letter from James MacBrien to Henry Wilson," 18 October 1919.

²⁹³ LAC, MG 30 E63 Vol. 1, "Letter from James MacBrien to Sir Arthur Currie," "Correspondence – Overseas Military Forces of Canada – file 2," 6 October 1919.

²⁹⁴ Harris, *Canadian Brass*, 145-146.

comparable to the Canadian Corps of the Great War and sustain it with modern weapons, equipment and leadership.

Given that there was no constitutional structure to integrate the remainder of the Canadian military into a scheme for imperial defence, a new structure would be needed to formulate higher defence policy and manage this small, underfunded force in a manner that was consistent with Canadian interests. Early in 1920, MacBrien was still hoping for a modified form of universal service by which every male would undergo cadet training and medical examinations. By this point, MacBrien was tapping into antebellum ideas of “universal training” which were concerned more with equipping young men with wholesome attributes in order to be good citizens than equipping them with weapons and training to be effective soldiers.²⁹⁵ Using the French Council of War as his model, there would be a Canadian Defence Council comprising the Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, Minister of Naval Affairs, Minister for Air Service, Inspector-General and Military Advisor, Senior Naval Officer and Senior Flying Corps Officer. The CGS would be under the authority of the Inspector-General, who would act as military advisor to the Minister of Defence. There would also be a Military Council, to handle what would probably be purely political problems, and a Joint General Staff, in essence the Defence Committee (see Annex A).²⁹⁶

MacBrien’s use of language is revealing. Before the war, the Militia Council allowed multiple officers – CGS, Adjutant-General (AG) and the Quartermaster-General

²⁹⁵ James Wood highlights the activities of the Canadian Defence League, an early pro-conscription advocacy group, in particular. The Canadian Service League had many enemies in the Militia establishment, most notably Sam Hughes; but even Hughes supported the idea of compulsory cadet training. See Wood, 208-209. For a more complete account of the complex ideas of conscription, duty and citizenship in the years leading up the Great War, read Ch.6, “Involuntary Action, 1911-1914” in Wood.

²⁹⁶ LAC, MG 30 E63 Vol.1, Correspondence – Overseas Military forces of Canada - -file 1, “Letter from James MacBrien to Sir Arthur Curie,” 29 January 1920.

(QMG) direct access to the Minister, and the Navy had access to the Cabinet through its own ministry. Now there would be one voice, in the office which had been held by the influential Sir Arthur Currie – the Inspector-General. There would be “Senior Officers” from the Militia’s younger brethren in the Navy and RCAF, but they were not delineated as “Chiefs” in the same sense as “Chief of the General Staff.” Clearly, the Militia would provide the Inspector-General, whose one voice would speak with clarity to political masters and with unquestioned authority to the fighting services.

MacBrien’s drive for centralisation and a strong military authority to make policy had origins in the notions of imperial defence, however, it was also seen as a necessity to maintaining an efficient force in the face of a political environment hostile to a strong professional army. Although the government had rejected conscription in 1919 and reduced the size of the standing army to an upper limit of 10,000, in June 1920 the paper strength of the services was gutted finally to a peacetime level of 5,000.²⁹⁷ Moreover, upon the resignation of Sir Arthur Currie in 1920, the position of Inspector-General was abolished and the AG and QMG took up their places as equals of the CGS on the Militia Council.²⁹⁸ It is no surprise, then, that MacBrien would commit himself, almost fanatically, to implementing a change in the policy-making structure that would allow a unified strategic vision to guide all three services and lay the foundation for future imperial cooperation. The CGS would have to wait, however, until the next wave of reform. Luckily for MacBrien, he would not be forced to wait very long.

By 1920 defence forces of Canada had already undergone two significant restructurings in three years. The first, which immediately followed the war, led to

²⁹⁷ Harris, *Canadian Brass*, 147-148.

²⁹⁸ Harris, “And There Would be Chaos,” 72.

Currie's appointment as Inspector-General. The second occurred with Currie's resignation in 1920, resulting in the re-establishment of the position of CGS and a move back towards a structure that more closely resembled an administrative body. The next major reorganisation took place in 1922-1923, with the integration of the three services under one ministry, the Department of National Defence (DND). The idea of integrating the three services under the same department came about at the end of the Great War on the advice of Sir Arthur Currie. Similar proposals had been tabled in the United Kingdom and United States as a means of reducing inter-service rivalry and overhead costs. Although the British and Americans rejected ideas for a combined department on the grounds that it would actually intensify inter-service rivalry, the budget-conscious Mackenzie King government implemented the plan, and by 1 January 1923, the three services were brought under a single portfolio, reporting to the Minister of National Defence (MND).²⁹⁹ Regrettably for the Canadian services, the British and Americans were correct. MacBrien, fearing that the Navy and the embryonic RCAF might interfere with the Militia's traditional dominance, acted aggressively to control the younger branches. The CGS worked to have himself appointed as a new Departmental Chief of Staff (COS), with executive authority over both the RCN and the Militia.³⁰⁰ MacBrien eventually succeeded, but his victory was pyrrhic and did not bring about greater integration in defence planning or strategic doctrine.

The Royal Canadian Navy was predictably not happy about MacBrien's coup and Commodore Sir Walter Hose, the new Director of the Naval Service, led bitter resistance from within the department. Hose had proposed during the reorganisation that

²⁹⁹ Harris, *Canadian Brass*, 152-153.

³⁰⁰ Harris, *Canadian Brass*, 153-154.

there should be no Departmental Chief of Staff; rather, there should be a CGS and Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS) who would make policy solely through the Defence Council (the successor to the Militia Council). The language here is again revealing. Until 1927, the head of the Royal Canadian Navy was referred to as the Director of the Naval Service (DNS), an appointment more in line with MacBrien's idea of an obedient senior representative, not a naval counterpart to the CGS. If the services were going to act in a truly collaborative manner, argued Hose, would it not make sense to have the nation's navy headed by its own "Chief?" Hose's reasoning, however sound, was misinterpreted by the minister, George Graham, as being anti-integration and his proposals were rejected.³⁰¹ The result was that the new structure under a Departmental Chief of Staff, was simply rejected by Hose, who refused to subordinate the RCN to an officer whom he believed had no professional qualifications to run a naval service. (See Annex B).³⁰²

MacBrien's willingness to pick a fight with the Navy demonstrated that he had internalised the conclusions reached by the Imperial Organisation Committee of which he was a member while he was still in the United Kingdom in 1920. Although the Committee had no legislative authority over Canadian assets, its conclusions proved to be a holy text of sorts for MacBrien's unifying crusade. During the Great War, the working group concluded, cumbersome planning by committee had prevented clear strategic direction. Being determined to replicate British efforts to centralise planning and to ensure that one officer would have firm control of the fighting services in the event of war, MacBrien advocated a single voice to communicate with the minister.³⁰³ Not only would this ensure similarity with the British (thus aiding integration in the time

³⁰¹ Eayrs, 230-233.

³⁰² Marc Milner, *Canada's Navy: The First Century*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999): 64-65.

³⁰³ Harris, *Canadian Brass*, 149-150.

of war), it would also prevent the confused mass of command links that had left the army subject to political interference during the mobilisation of 1914.

Hose, in the words of Marc Milner, “stood like the small Dutch boy with his finger in the dike, holding back the vast sea of Canadian militia and army tradition that threatened to sweep the tiny RCN away.”³⁰⁴ The central problem was a dearth of resources that put both the Militia and the Navy in fear of effective extinction. Given that there was little recent precedent for a preponderant Chief of Staff (the only previous example being the powerful position of Inspector-General filled by Currie) there was little incentive to cooperate, and MacBrien’s imperious demeanour certainly did not encourage collaboration. Hose, knowing that the Graham was unconcerned with the minutiae of his department, developed a strong relationship with the Deputy Minister, George-Joseph Desbarats, a man who had a long history with, and sympathy for, Canada’s tiny navy.³⁰⁵ Having effectively undermined MacBrien’s authority, the RCN began a process of disengagement from the integrated departmental structure, refusing to plan even an Armistice Day ceremony jointly with their brothers in khaki, never mind discussing combined strategic contingency plans.³⁰⁶ By April 1923, an exasperated MacBrien was complaining directly to the minister that even the Defence Committee had not been authorised “through the opposition of the Acting Deputy Minister and Captain Hose, Naval Service ... the drawing up of defence schemes have now been delayed nearly four months through the opposition referred to.”³⁰⁷

³⁰⁴ Milner, 65.

³⁰⁵ Desbarats had first become involved in Canada’s naval matters in 1908, when he was appointed Deputy Minister for the Marine services. He was then appointed Deputy Minister for the newborn Canadian Navy that same year. See Milner, 14, 29

³⁰⁶ Harris, *Canadian Brass*, 154-155.

³⁰⁷ LAC, MG 30 E63 Vol. 8, Memoranda – Defence, organisation of the Department of National Defence. “Letter from James MacBrien to George Graham,” 30 April 1923.

The result was that the coordinating bodies for defence planning and policy were more or less dysfunctional, with the participants putting more effort into bureaucratic manoeuvring than into producing a strategy and dealing with pressing defence questions. With the majority of senior officers preoccupied with organisational rivalry and survival, long-term military planning did not receive much attention.

While the bitter fighting between Hose and MacBrien continued, only one officer was fully committed to defining the Militia's strategic role and designing military contingencies which reflected these priorities. This man was the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence (DMO&I), Colonel James Sutherland-Brown. Though not a rising star, Sutherland-Brown was an extremely competent officer. Having organised the first sealift of Canadians to fight in the Great War, he spent most of his wartime career on staff work and was recognised for possessing a good general understanding of military matters and large-scale organisation. It was these qualities that led Sutherland-Brown to be appointed DMO&I over the ambitious McNaughton.³⁰⁸ Despite his competence and good general knowledge of military affairs, Sutherland-Brown had a "thinking directorate" of only nine NCOs and himself.³⁰⁹ The only other intelligence units in the country were the Corps of Guides, a bicycle-mounted tactical reconnaissance force, and the RCMP, which focused exclusively on internal subversion.³¹⁰ The RCN had a Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI), a British officer paid by the Canadian government, but there is no record that he ever shared information

³⁰⁸ LAC, MG 30 E63 Vol. 1 Overseas Military Forces Canada 1919-1920 – file 1, "Letter from James MacBrien to Arthur Currie," 31 December 1919.

³⁰⁹ Harold A. Skaarup. *Out of the Darkness - Light: A History of Canadian Military Intelligence*. Vol. 1. (Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, 2005), 33-36.

³¹⁰ Skaarup, 33-36.

or opinions with Sutherland-Brown.³¹¹ Given the lack of staff and the complexity of formulating and producing defence plans designed to prevent another disastrous mobilisation, Sutherland-Brown was only able to compose one plan, Defence Scheme No.1 (United States) and a general outline of a plan to respond to an Anglo-Japanese War.³¹²

Defence Scheme No.1 envisioned a contingency whereby the United States and the British Empire would be on the brink of war. Canada, lacking strategic depth, would then initiate a massive pre-emptive strike involving a minimum of thirteen divisions against its southern neighbour.³¹³ Defence Scheme No.1 has since been dismissed by scholars as the fanciful machination of an overly imaginative –and probably bored – staff officer. In the words of James Eayrs, the document was the unfortunate result of “strategists’ cramp” indicated by “a kind of creeping paralysis of the imagination when it comes to assessing the influence of a changing political and technological environment upon the fortunes of his country.”³¹⁴ Eayrs, in some respects, is correct. Defence Scheme No.1 was a document based upon a very narrow strategic vision, and it indicated a fundamental disconnect in thinking between defence planners, the government and a good portion of the Militia itself. On the other hand, the dismissive attitude of subsequent analysts and historians can only be termed as “historian’s cramp.” By focusing only on specific pieces of archival evidence, it is easy to lose sight of the context in which Sutherland-Brown was operating in the early 1920s.

³¹¹ Milner, 59-60.

³¹² Granatstein, *Canada’s Army*, 171.

³¹³ LAC, RG 24, Vol 2925, Defence Scheme No.1, Part 1.12 September 1921.

³¹⁴ Eayrs, 73

Academics have lined up against or in support of Defence Scheme No.1 and Sutherland-Brown. Although Defence Scheme No.1 has been condemned (or, in a few cases, defended), the train of thought which produced it has not been debated in depth among historians. Among its major critics was CP Stacey, who described the short outburst of interest following the declassification of the somewhat farcical plan to invade the USA as “a matter that has lately received more attention than it deserves.”³¹⁵ He described Defence Scheme No.1 as “almost entirely the brainchild of one officer, Colonel James Sutherland Brown.” In Stacey’s account, nobody important took Sutherland-Brown seriously, making his whimsical plan harmless. When Andrew McNaughton took over as the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) in 1929, he scrapped the plan because of its foolishness.³¹⁶ Although Eayrs completed an extensive review of the Canadian defence establishment in the 1920s, he still blames the defects of the plan on Sutherland-Brown’s anti-American bias and obsession with secrecy. In doing so, he misses the deep intellectual currents within the Militia that allowed it to survive, beyond the argument that the DMO&I wrote with so much “*panache*” that the Militia hierarchy was “swept along”.³¹⁷ Even some who championed the plan miss some of the same fundamental questions overlooked by Eayrs.

The beleaguered Col. Sutherland-Brown does have some friends among the historical community. Richard A Preston was the first to shed a countervailing view on Defence Scheme No.1 in his 1977 survey of war planning in North America between 1867 and 1939. Preston offers a very brief assessment of Sutherland-Brown’s thought process. He argues that Sutherland-Brown’s plan is a combination of a “seemingly

³¹⁵ Stacey, 155.

³¹⁶ *Ibid*, 157-158

³¹⁷ Eayrs, 70-72, 74.

pathological concern about an American danger to Canada” and a more realistic understanding that there was little chance that Canada would mount a large-scale expeditionary force so soon after the end of the Great War.³¹⁸

Sutherland-Brown’s most dedicated defender is Stephen Harris, whose groundbreaking 1988 work *Canadian Brass* tracks the high-level debates, reasoning and rivalry among the General Staff. Harris argues that Defence Scheme No.1 was tightly bound to the reorganisation of the Militia following the Great War and that its demise was tied largely to shuffling of the force’s senior leadership brought about by the appointment of McNaughton as CGS in 1929.³¹⁹ Until McNaughton’s firm hand took charge in late in the decade, when world conditions began changing rapidly, the Militia had no drive to escape its traditional, pre-1914 role to defend Canada against an American attack. This preoccupation with a potential continental conflict had a heavy influence on the intellectual traditions of the Militia,³²⁰ and without a clear policy to the contrary, the idea of defending the 49th parallel remained, at least in some circles, central in military thought.

Jack Granatstein also defends Sutherland-Brown in his one-volume history of the Canadian Army. Largely citing Harris and Preston, Granatstein gives credit to some of Sutherland-Brown’s strategic assumptions: a major industrial power would reasonably covet the resources of a nation rich in natural resources on its border.³²¹ This argument has a relatively sound logic behind it. Winston Churchill, the master grand strategist,

³¹⁸ Richard A. Preston, *The Defence of an Undefended Border: Planning for War in North America, 1867-1939*, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1977): 216-217.

³¹⁹ Harris, *Canadian Brass*, 168-178.

³²⁰ James Wood, *Militia Myths: Ideas of the Canadian Citizen-Soldier 1896-1921*, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010): 108-109.

³²¹ Granatstein, *Canada’s Army*, 169.

noted after the Second World War that “[u]p till the year 1934, the power of the conquerors remained unchallenged in Europe and throughout the world.”³²² War between the US and Britain was always a possibility, however remote. The first major conflict between the United States and United Kingdom had come on the heels – indeed, the aftermath – of a successful war against the French.

The justifications put forth by Sutherland-Brown’s supporters highlight an important debate then ongoing within the Canadian Militia about its strategic role, a question which could not be answered with the intentionally vague foreign policy of the Canadian government at the time. One factor was the amorphous nature of Canada’s constitution and commitments. Sutherland-Brown identified two essential contingencies for which to prepare:

- a) A Struggle for the Existence of the Empire such as that from which we have only recently emerged.
- b) Minor Crises which may be only local in Character but which may synchronize or spread until a situation develops straining the Resources of the Empire very greatly without enabling us to take the extreme methods which would be justified by a great National Emergency.³²³

These larger Imperial questions meant that Canadians had to consider two types of defence relating to Canada specifically:

- a) Direct Defence, i.e., the immediate defence of our own country against invasion by hostile forces.
- b) Indirect Defence, by which we send an Expeditionary Force to bring the hostile country or countries to action in their own country or countries, or in any case, in territory beyond the confines of the Dominion of Canada.³²⁴

³²² Winston S Churchill, *The Gathering Storm*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948): 16.

³²³ LAC, RG 24 Vol. 2926-2927, Defence Scheme No.1 – United States, 12 April 1921, 1.

³²⁴ LAC, Defence Scheme No.1 – United States, 12 April 1921, 3.

Of these contingencies, only one was truly haunted by the ghost of Sam Hughes: a major conflict overseas or a struggle for existence that involved indirect defence. But in 1921, where was the overseas enemy? Sutherland-Brown generally shared the same outlook as that of Churchill, theorising that a major war would most likely happen with a victor of the Great War, such as Japan or the United States.³²⁵ Given that defending Canada against the United States was the historic baseline role of the Militia, there should be little surprise that this role continued to preoccupy the DMO&I.

Furthermore, planning for a smaller expeditionary force engendered its own difficulties. In 1922 Canadian troops were requested to support a British presence in Turkey which was in danger of being overrun by the powerful nationalist armies of Kemal Ataturk. This triggered what became known as the Chanak Crisis and provided an opportunity for the General Staff to contemplate mobilising a Canadian contingent for an overseas war once more. At the request of the Minister, DMO&I produced summary of mobilisation arrangements surrounding the dispatch of a possible Canadian contingent to the Dardanelles. Sutherland-Brown listed some of the difficulties for organising a contingent for a brushfire war by citing a memorandum from the crisis itself:

[T]here is no information at present in the hands of the General Staff as to whether this is a struggle for the Existence of the Empire, which well it might be, if Germany or Russia should take ahand (sic) in this movement or whether it is only a minor crisis which will call for the full authorized forces of the Crown or only a portion of those forces. It is difficult to give concrete information, unless a concrete problem is cited.³²⁶

³²⁵LAC, Defence Scheme No.1, 3.

³²⁶DHH 2, 112.3M2009 A Comparison Between Mobilisation, 1919 and 1922, 18.

In other words, predicting minor crises is very difficult, especially since they rarely require the same kind of force as previous crises. In any case, it was noted, the mobilising of a small contingent from the PF would be possible, and the ranks of the regulars could be bolstered by freshly-mobilised NPAM units as more troops became necessary.³²⁷

This made-to-measure style of providing contingents for smaller conflicts had an observable precedent in Canadian history. During the Second Boer War (1899-1902) when a “special service” battalion of Canada’s only regular infantry regiment of the time, the Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry³²⁸ was deployed to the veldt and supplemented by additional troops as necessary.³²⁹ Sutherland-Brown reasoned that more extensive mobilisation plans could be implemented in sequence, thus tailoring the force as the conflict required.³³⁰ This means of raising contingents would linger into the 1950s when “special service” battalions were raised for the Korean War (1950-1953) and units were rotated through the Commonwealth Brigade as required.³³¹

Preparing for a total mobilisation thus had the benefit of allowing for flexibility in smaller conflicts. Large wars require more extensive preparation than do small ones, and as Sutherland-Brown would later note:

The primary duty of every country is to provide for its own defence, and secondly to provide for other commitments. ... It is the primary duty of each and every Dominion of the British Empire to provide for its own local defence. ... The Mother Country and the Dominions ... have a duty of

³²⁷ DHH, “Mobilization,” 19-22.

³²⁸ Later to be renamed the Royal Canadian Regiment, easily the most handsome regiment in the Canadian Militia and most likely the entire British Army and NATO itself.

³²⁹ Carman Miller, *Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War 1899-1902*, (Ottawa: Canadian War Museum, 1993): 51-53.

³³⁰ DHH2, “Mobilization,” 20-22.

³³¹ Richard Gimblett, “The Canadian Way of War: Experiences and Principle.” Paper presented to the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies Sea Power Conference. Halifax: Dalhousie University, 8 June 2002: 2-4. Accessed from < <http://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/papers/other/gimblett.pdf>>

going to each others` aid in case of invasion or co-operating with expeditionary forces... The provision of the primary duty to an almost complete extent covers the secondary duty.³³²

By providing for a nightmare scenario of a major land war on the North American continent, Sutherland-Brown then hoped to prepare Canada for somewhat less troubling disturbances as well. In other words, preparing for a war with the United States allowed for the highest degree of *readiness*.

MacBrien actively participated in the planning for Defence Scheme No.1, ironically, by trying to get a degree of cooperation from the RCN. Naval defence was considered vital to the plan, as it would be required to keep the ports of Halifax and Esquimalt open, prevent flanking attacks on Canadian operations and protect the coasts. Furthermore, there would be a need to secure the Great Lakes, possibly with additional British sea power.³³³ MacBrien had written to Hose during the composition of Defence Scheme No.1, requesting technical information regarding the canal systems of the East and the Great Lakes, as well as the possible employment of Canadian seamen in US service and the RCN's plan's for "the seizing of American shipping and destruction of their nautical stores and resources in the Great Lakes ports." MacBrien also asked abruptly, "In the event of the St. Lawrence being the defence line held by us from Lake Ontario to say, the mouth of the Richelieu at Sorel, what plans have you for helping our defence by the use of Naval forces [?]"³³⁴ Hose replied that he would eventually forward a response, but this promised communication is not on file. Given the lack of technical

³³² Queen's University Archives (hereafter referred to as QUA), Colonel, Sutherland-Brown Fonds, Box 8 Folder 163, Defence Committee Proceedings 1921-1923.

³³³ LAC, Defence Scheme No.1, p.5-6.

³³⁴ LAC, "Letter from MacBrien to Hose," RG 24 Vol. 2925, 24 January 1922.

detail with regards to naval matters in the Scheme and the deep animosity between the two men, it is not likely that it was ever received.³³⁵

Although the RCN had a tremendous intelligence-gathering potential, bureaucratic infighting ensured that it was not co-ordinated with, or factored into, the Militia's planning process. In 1924, for example, HMCS *Thiepval* conducted clandestine surveillance of American and Japanese activity in the North Pacific while assisting a British pilot in a global circumnavigation attempt. This intelligence-gathering operation was ordered personally by Hose and was similar to contemporary operations being carried out by the United States Navy.³³⁶ Moreover, the RCN had become the main hub for British naval intelligence in North America from 1921 onwards, but, as discussed above, this naval intelligence did not make its way from the Ottawa office of the DNI to the office of the DMO&I in the same city.³³⁷ Information from such sources would have been invaluable to anyone planning for the deployment of Canadian troops in any contingency, whether at home or abroad. Integrated planning could have also provided clearer national priorities that would have been factored into the complex choices faced by the Navy in determining what class of ships to obtain on a limited budget.³³⁸ Furthermore, this naval activity was in sharp contrast to the purely reactive stance of the Militia. This cooperation never occurred and the structure for the higher direction of defence remained deadlocked, planning staffs, or what approximated to them, remained isolated, and defence policy, defence planning and inter-service coordination was hazy at best.

³³⁵LAC, "Letter from Walter Hose to James MacBrien," RG 24 Vol. 2925 26 January 1922

³³⁶Galen Roger Perras, "Covert Canucks: Intelligence Gathering and the 1924 Voyage of the HMCS *Thiepval* in the North Pacific Ocean," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 28, No.3 (June(2005): 505-506.

³³⁷Milner, 59-60

³³⁸Milner, 62-64.

Despite the emphasis on readiness, there is no denying that Sutherland-Brown considered the possibility of war with the United States seriously, and would continue to do so throughout his tenure as DMO&I. So did many of his colleagues, including MacBrien. Sutherland-Brown had left local operational planning to the peace-time military districts and theoretical geographical commands. These geographical commands were never part of the official peace-time military structure; however, they were set up as shadow commands and were intended, upon the outbreak of war, to incorporate the various military districts into five larger groups capable of carrying out operations independently.³³⁹ Of note is the more vigorous participation of the Western and Pacific commands, who saw a greater threat of annexation or diplomatic difficulties arising from an American-Japanese war than the more industrial East, which was more closely tied to the US economy. No doubt, those in the West were more concerned about American intervention to secure Pacific bases in the event of war with Japan. In fact, the selection of the commander for this shadow command provides some important insight into the prioritisation within the mobilisation tables of the Scheme.

The commander chosen for the Pacific area, WA Griesbach, was appointed especially and with great secrecy.³⁴⁰ In 1921 Griesbach was serving as a Conservative senator. But he also had an impressive war record. In 1914, he had raised a battalion in eight days, rose to command the 1st Brigade, despite being vocally opposed to the continuation of the Ross Rifle in direct opposition to his powerful political benefactor, Sam Hughes. As the war progressed many of Griesbach's superiors considered him to be an excellent mind for complex operational problems. He was elected to the Commons

³³⁹ LAC, "Defence Scheme No.1," 15.

³⁴⁰ LAC RG 24 Vols. 2926-2927 – Defence Scheme No.1 (Related Documents), "Operations Letter No.7(1)," 25 May 1921.

in 1917, although he continued to lead a brigade in France. Griesbach moved to the upper house at the end of his first term. Possessing a high standing in the community and having shown a great propensity for both the problems of recruiting and war-fighting, Griesbach was the ideal candidate for command in Defence Scheme No.1, and it is no coincidence that he was chosen for the Pacific area. It can also be presumed that Griesbach's war service and prominence in the West made him an ideal candidate to gather the information needed and, with local connections, make a successful war effort possible.³⁴¹ Upon taking up his appointment, Griesbach undertook his responsibilities with vigour, publishing lists of potential commanders on the outbreak of war and even enlisting the help of local mountaineers to classify the mountain passes most suitable for military operations.³⁴² Clearly, there was more at work than the notion advanced by Eayrs and Stacey of a lone, deranged staff officer plotting against the rebels of 1776.

Sutherland-Brown focused on the Pacific, where an expanding Japan was rubbing uncomfortably against British and US imperial holdings and pushing into China, a country viewed by Americans with a degree of patronage. The recent memory of a Russo-Japanese conflict, made all the more mysterious by the unknown quantity of Russia's new Bolshevik government, suggested that if a limited war was going to break out, it would probably be related to wider problems in the Pacific. The notion that

³⁴¹ Patrick H. Brennan, "From Amateur to Professional: The Experience of Brigadier General William Antonious Griesbach," in Briton C. Busch, ed., *Canada and the Great War: Western Front Association Papers*, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003): 78-92; and; "Griesbach, The Hon William Antrobus," Library of Parliament, 10 June 2010 < <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/P arlinfo/Files/Parliamentarian.aspx?Item=f157f275-1255-46c8-82b0-b0a17fb78c35&Language=E&Section=FederalExperience>>, accessed 10 June 2010.

³⁴² LAC, RG 24, Vol. 2925: (unsigned) memorandum to WA Griesbach, 17 March 1927. It is interesting to note that the topographer writing to Gen. Griesbach reported the conditions of all kinds of transport – including pack-horses and airships. See: LAC RG 24 Vol 2926-2927 Defence Scheme No.1 (Related Documents); Letter from RW Cautley to WA Griesbach, 18 March 1927. Advises Griesbach not to rely on "miners, guides, trappers and prospectors of the frontier type" who have "a distorted mental complex." Instead, it was recommended that the commander rely on members of the Canadian Alpine Club.

multiple scenarios could be addressed best by planning for a worst-case contingency applied here in terms of securing Canadian neutrality in a US-Japanese conflict. The lack of a separate plan dealing with a Pacific conflict demonstrates just how thin Canadian assets were spread – and how difficult it would be to use them to carry out a large-scale military operation against the United States.

Sutherland-Brown's American fixation nonetheless allowed rational calculations of readiness to expand into a plan that was operationally unworkable. Canada had struggled to maintain four divisions in the Great War and required plenty of British stewardship for its staffs to do so. On the other hand, Sutherland-Brown's information listed the US Army as having 31 divisions (9 regular infantry, 2 regular cavalry and 20 National Guard.) It was expected that these 31 divisions had the intent of occupying either Canada's industrial heartland of the east, the vital Pacific Coast, or the breadbasket of the west.³⁴³ In this context, Sutherland-Brown's hopeful estimates for fifteen divisions to materialise in the event of war with America are somewhat understandable. Although the Canadian Militia was vastly underfunded, it should be remembered that both MacBrien and the Committee of Imperial Defence supported the idea of a Canadian force of fifteen divisions, with up to seven equipped for overseas service.³⁴⁴ Of course, this fifteen-division army was recommended by the CID, a body to which DMO&I no longer had access. In fact, Sutherland-Brown listed no definite timeline for holding the American enemy at bay. Doing would have been impossible given that DMO&I had no access to British, Australian or Indian planning staffs and therefore lacked intelligence even about friendly nations.

³⁴³ LAC, Defence Scheme No.1, 43

³⁴⁴ See p.12.

Sutherland-Brown's plan did provide a variety of policy choices that could have made neutrality possible in a conflict between foreign powers. By decentralising local operational planning and organisation,³⁴⁵ Defence Scheme No.1 could conceivably have responded to smaller local crises – such as an American threat to ensure the “protection” of Pacific islands – without being dependent on the rest of the country mobilising for war. Furthermore, the mobilisation arrangements provided for a staged process of recruiting, beginning with serving soldiers (active and reserve) and sustained by “general [voluntary] enlistment” until the government decided to call up classes of fighting age males under the *levee en masse*.³⁴⁶ The plan's flexibility was further increased by the fact that Defence Scheme No.1's execution was delegated to five geographical regions staffed by skeleton commands that would be activated only in wartime.³⁴⁷ This reflected lessons from the Great War, where the divisional commanders for the CEF – a force separate from the remainder of the Militia – were appointed separately by Sam Hughes.³⁴⁸ The result was that the army was organised into military districts but had an alternative command structure that was ready to fulfill whatever strategic role it was given. Furthermore, it allowed for the creation of numerous divisional staffs-in-waiting that, it was hoped, would prevent political appointments.

Although the plan was impractical in many respects, it provided for a high degree of flexibility, thus fulfilling Sutherland-Brown's original intent of being ready for a variety of situations that were innately hard to predict. The active co-operation of many of his colleagues, and even MacBrien himself, demonstrates that a war with the

³⁴⁵ LAC, Defence Scheme No.1, 13.

³⁴⁶ LAC, Defence Scheme No.1, 38.

³⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 13-14.

³⁴⁸ Harris, “Or There Would be Chaos,” 120-121.

United States was on the minds of many of Canada's senior military leaders as were bitter memories of the botched mobilisation of 1914. Perhaps the most surprising aspect of Defence Scheme No.1 was not that it existed, but that it was the *only* plan in existence throughout the 1920s.

The absence of a neutrality scheme for the Canadian government is the central shortcoming of the planning effort between 1920 and 1928. Sutherland-Brown argued that due to the strength of the Royal Navy and the Monroe Doctrine practiced by the United States, the conflict would essentially be isolated. This isolation, would in turn, justify Canada's focus on her own direct defence being concentrated on a war against the United States, a greedy industrial power dependent on Canadian natural resources.³⁴⁹ This was sound reasoning, but did not justify a plan for hurling up to fifteen divisions' worth of flying columns in a massive, pre-emptive border raid that would surely exacerbate the conflict. The fact that Sutherland-Brown was able to transform the idea of readiness into such a politically, and probably strategically, unrealistic plan was the result of a chaotic defence organisation lacking a defined strategic role and subject to an ongoing public antipathy towards, and subsequently lack of political interest in, the armed forces. Few recognised the need for a professional military capable of acting as an arm of the state.

MacBrien never gave up his drive for a strong centralised body to produce a coherent defence policy, but in 1927 he was reaching the end of his patience. The incessant conflicts with Hose, the interference caused by the close relationship between the DNS and Deputy Minister, and, ultimately, private financial troubles drove MacBrien out of military service. Tellingly, he left behind a formal record of his views

³⁴⁹ LAC, RG 24, Vol. 2925, "Memorandum of the Direct Defence of Canada," undated.

regarding the organisation of the Department of National Defence. His objective, clearly stated, was to reorganise the Canadian defence establishment along the lines laid down by the Imperial Organisation Committee in 1919.³⁵⁰

MacBrien held the wartime Imperial Conferences as his ideal. By MacBrien's account, Canada had supposedly achieved a high degree of standardisation in common with the rest of the British Empire, which allowed the CEF eventually to achieve "exact uniformity with the British Armies" in 1914.³⁵¹ This is a curiously positive recollection of the Great War, as MacBrien surely remembered unstandardised rifles, shovels, boots, and webbing, as well as the steep learning curve experienced by Canadian officers, who JFC Fuller famously declared should "all be shot."³⁵² The reality of the Great War experience compared to an ideal system whereby national autonomy was balanced by imperial interoperability showed the difficulties in finding tangible solutions for what often appeared to be contradictory aims.

What MacBrien sought was for Canadian forces to be trained along British lines so that they could be available for local defence but would also be able to participate in imperial operations "should such decision be taken by the Canadian government."³⁵³ These ideas could not be fully implemented, however, as defence planning continued to be extraordinarily difficult given the Byzantine power struggle still ongoing in the Department of National Defence. This endless conflict consumed MacBrien to the

³⁵⁰ LAC, MG 30 E63 Vol.8, Memoranda, Defence Organisation of the Department of National Defence, "Memorandum on the Department of National Defence," undated, 1.

The memorandum probably dates from 1926, as MacBrien proposed various schemes for reorganisation and that "[i]t is hoped that these schemes will be reviewed in 1927." (p.3)

³⁵¹ LAC, MG 30 E63 Vol.8, Memoranda, Defence Organisation of the Department of National Defence, "Memorandum on the Department of National Defence," undated, 2.

³⁵² Tim Cook, *At the Sharp End: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1914-1916*, (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007): 71.

³⁵³ LAC, MG 30 E63 Vol.8, Memoranda, Defence Organisation of the Department of National Defence, "Memorandum on the Department of National Defence undated, 2-3.

extent that he refused to clarify what priority he allotted home defence versus imperial participation in defence planning.³⁵⁴

This acknowledgement of uncertainty as to whether the Canadian government would authorise sending forces abroad indicates that MacBrien understood the changing constitutional situation, or at least understood that Canada's imperial relations were in flux. No longer hoping for an integrated imperial defence structure, he was now simply hoping for interoperability as a means of making the Canadian effort effective in the early stages of a conflict. This is essentially the same concept as that of the Anglo-Canadian alliance of the 1930s based on shared sentiment and political institutions as described by Norman Hillmer.³⁵⁵ But where Hillmer attributed political factors and a close personal relationship between military leaders as the driving force behind this replication and unofficial integration, there was also a great degree of practicality. By training alongside the British, Canadian officers could access the latest in military thought, thus making the armed forces more effective for home defence and, by extension, imperial defence as well.³⁵⁶ The notion of creating an army for home defence that could be readily re-roled as an expeditionary force was directly related to the idea of readiness that had taken hold of the General Staff after the First World War.

The ironic side of MacBrien's drive to create a centralised, professional command for Canada was that his very insistence upon it created so much opposition that his detractors turned to political intrigue to harry its establishment. Cooperation was a high priority in MacBrien's organisational outlook, right through to 1927. In terms of

³⁵⁴ Harris, *Canadian Brass*, 155.

³⁵⁵ Norman Hillmer, "Defence and Ideology: The Anglo-Canadian 'Alliance' in the 1930s," *International Journal*, Vol.33, No.3 (Summer 1978): 611-612.

³⁵⁶ LAC, MG 30 E63 Vol.8, Memoranda, Defence Organisation of the Department of National Defence, "Memorandum on the Department of National Defence," undated, 2-3.

future wars, “[o]ne of the chief principles upon which the Canadian Defence Force should be organised is that a modern war between Nations of equal strength demands the whole resource of a country – in material as well as personnel.”³⁵⁷ This would require an extensive defence organisation, incorporating both military services and civilian departments. It should be noted that MacBrien’s intent was to include the “departments of the government [that] are concerned with the preparations for Defence” which may, or may not, have meant to include a diplomatic service.³⁵⁸ For the most part, however, this question was moot, as Canada did not really have a diplomatic service until 1928, while cooperation with the RCN would only materialise after MacBrien’s resignation.

The Militia got a new CGS, Major-General HC Thacker, in 1927. Thacker understood that he was only marking time, waiting for McNaughton to finish a stint commanding a military district, unsurprisingly, on the strategically important Pacific coast.³⁵⁹ Thacker oversaw the abolition of the Chief of Staff position soon after MacBrien’s departure, resulting in the adoption of an organisation similar to that proposed by Hose in 1922, albeit with a resurrected, single-service Militia Council that would exist alongside the Defence Council (see Annex C). Hose, for his part, finally received the position of Chief of the Naval Staff, shedding the diminutive title of “Director.”³⁶⁰

³⁵⁷ LAC, MG 30 E63 Vol. 8, Memorandum on the defence forces of Canada, 1927, “Memorandum on the Defence Forces of Canada,” 20 Jan 1927.

³⁵⁸ LAC, MG 30 E63 Vol. 8, Memorandum on the defence forces of Canada, 1927, “Memorandum on the Defence Forces of Canada,” 20 Jan 1927, 8..

³⁵⁹ Granatstein, *Generals*, 57.

³⁶⁰ Harris, *Canadian Brass*, 155-156.

As the Canadian defence establishment entered the pivotal year of 1928, the incessant reorganisations of the period coupled with the inter-service bitterness had left little time to direct strategic planning in a confusing and complex time in Canada's history. MacBrien attempted to reform the Department of National Defence to create a coherent approach to defence policy that balanced national commitments with indirect defence, but this attempt was bogged down in incessant quarrels with the navy over resources. Instead of economising on superfluous administrative bodies, one of the vulnerable flanks of the army left open for political interference, MacBrien's single-mindedness only encouraged political intrigue and did not produce the coordinated defence schemes that he desired.

The most critical outcome of this dysfunction was that the Department of National Defence was unable to define the central planning assumptions and role of Canada's armed forces. This essentially kept the political, naval and military components of the senior defence leadership divided, leaving the one small directorate with a dearth of resources to plan for the country's defence. This structural dysfunction would deprive Sutherland-Brown of guidance and direction even from his immediate superior, never mind a nonexistent diplomatic corps, hostile navy or an uninterested minister. The results were that Canada's diplomatic and political priorities would not be reflected in its military directives.

The pivotal years of 1928 and 1929 brought about a new direction, at least in some respects, for Canadian grand strategy. The rise of McNaughton, with his forceful personality and clear ideas on defence policy, to the position of CGS (which he would soon redefine as a having powerful executive function), along with the development of

the DEA into a full-fledged diplomatic service, changed the basic structure of the Canadian state that would confront new, seemingly bizarre and ultimately calamitous challenges from the halls of Munich and planning-rooms of Tokyo. Until then, the generals had done what soldiers without orders do: they had moved forward, found problems, and tried to solve them, for better or for worse.

Conclusion: Chasing Ghosts

“War would end if the dead could return”

- Stanley Baldwin³⁶¹

If the dead could have returned from France and Flanders, what would they have said? For the average Canadian, a conversation with the fallen surely would have been one of every-day affairs: work, family and leisure. Politicians imagined a cautionary tale, and military leaders were doomed to be haunted by tales of amateurish incompetence and frustration at the perceived inefficiency of the Canadian war effort.

Of course no one can talk to the dead, but each segment of the population chose to channel the ghosts of the war in a way that best reinforced their view on the world. The optimism of the Canadian people after the victory and the pressing need for continued development drove many to believe that there was little worth worrying about beyond the expansive confines of Canada’s borders. Politicians, especially Mackenzie-King, were all too keen to capitalise on this domestic, economic focus as it was what they knew best and it reflected popular concern. But the post-war military officers saw themselves as professionals carrying out a duty to ensure uphold national security in a chaotic, dangerous world. This duty demanded an increased emphasis on specialisation and the perfection of technical matters which ensured that the post-war reorganisation of Canada’s armed forces would prioritise measurable, fixed objectives and commitments. These demands for specificity would not be met by political and diplomatic elites who had little to gain from the large investment of political capital required to build a strategically independent, professionally-run national army in peacetime. It was these differing memories of the Great War and their impact on professional, political and

³⁶¹ Laurence J. Peter, *Peter’s Quotations: Ideas For Our Time*, (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1979): 514.

social life which resulted in such a disparity between defence policy and diplomatic efforts between 1920 and 1928.

Unfortunately, the tendency of historians to summarily dismiss the efforts of the professional officer corps in the early interbellum period as an aberration to larger social and economic currents leads many narratives to exclude important developments in the evolution of Canadian strategic thought. The Great War left a legacy of constitutional ambiguity and unclear national objectives, most notably, the problems of political control of Canada's armed forces and national autonomy in a time of crisis. Nothing done in the first decade following the end of hostilities did anything to effectively address these very important problems. When, for the sake of expediency, consultation was adopted as a means of generating a necessary consensus on the conduct of strategy during the war, little consideration of the long-term consequences of the war on the empire, especially the growing assertiveness of the dominions. No-one seemed to consider that the demands of the dominions might grow and that post-war national interests would be as diverse as those of Canada's North Americanism and Australia's Naval Imperialism. The unexpected Allied victory in 1918 carried with it an easy excuse not to address the delicate issue of inter-imperial relations in any definite way. These outstanding issues ensured that important discussions with regards to Canada's, and indeed the Empire's foreign policy and strategic choices, did not take place. This ensured that inter-imperial diplomatic and security arrangements would be in a state of near-constant crisis between 1920 and 1924, followed by relative stasis until late in the decade.

This cycle of crisis and stasis did not provide a steady platform for post-war Militia leadership to rebuild the structure of the Canadian defence establishment in a way that reflected the new international circumstances of the 1920s. With MacBrien engaged in a drawn-out battle for professionalisation, centralisation and Militia dominance, little consideration was given to rethinking the somewhat traditional roles of the Canadian services. The RCN, starved of funds and under siege from MacBrien's efforts at subjugation, remained focused on survival. Sutherland-Brown, working with no input and an organisation that had never been deployed overseas, reverted to planning for the Militia's traditional role of home defence. This emphasis on direct defence, combined with a perceived need for definite but flexible plans for mobilising and deploying large numbers of troops, led to the creation of Defence Scheme No.1.

Stephen Harris points out that Sutherland-Brown was merely reflecting the organisational culture of the Militia when he drafted an anti-American defence policy, and that many in the Militia itself were supportive of him, not least MacBrien, McNaughton and McNaughton's eventual successor of GOC 1st Canadian Army, Harry Crerar.³⁶² This helps to demolish the lone-wolf thesis advanced by James Eayrs and carried into the popular imagination by Pierre Berton.³⁶³ Although he generally agrees with Eayrs, even Stacey admits that the DEA did not fully discount the notion of war with the United States until the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1929.³⁶⁴ In fact,

³⁶² Stephen Harris, "Or There would be Chaos: The Legacy of Sam Hughes and Military Planning in Canada, 1919-1939," *Military Affairs*, Vol.46, No.3 (October 1982): 121-122.

³⁶³ Pierre Berton, *Marching as to War: Canada's Turbulent Years 1899-1953*, (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 2001): 250-253.

James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, Vol.1, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962): 70-71.

³⁶⁴ Stacey, 100.

the Scheme revealed several strategic traditions, with its continental orientation being just one.

Many of the more technical aspects of Defence Scheme No.1 were reflections of the realities of planning for war in a country that is “either indefensible or invulnerable.”³⁶⁵ The essential problem was that the Canadian Militia was the product of a simpler age, when merely providing troops to defend Canada was enough – the threat of American invasion as the main concern for the survival of the country was merely presumed. But the Great War had changed all that. The early days of the mobilisation had seen the Militia used as a force generator for a large overseas deployment in defence of the Empire as a whole. Sam Hughes’ meddling in the first two years of the war demonstrated to the professional officers of the 1920s that as times change, organisations must change with them. The bad memories of political interference, poor equipment and administrative chaos drove the DMO&I to create an operational command structure, the geographical regions which he hoped would resemble the CEF. This command structure was separate from the administrative structure, the military districts, which more closely resembled the pre-war defence structure, with its emphasis on force generation. This hybrid system would allow the *militia*, whose primary aim was to tap the latent military potential of the country, to produce an *army*: a self-contained formation used to actively fight conflicts. This notion of “force generation” versus “operational command” carried on well after Sutherland-Brown’s departure from the DMO&I in 1927.

³⁶⁵ Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, 5th ed. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 2007): X.

The modern organisation of the Canadian Forces displays some significant similarities to that proposed by Sutherland-Brown. During the restructuring of the Canadian defence establishment in the mid-2000s, units were separated into “force generators” and “force employers.” The traditional services, i.e., the army, air force and navy, were re-designated as force generators, which are tasked to provide units to be employed on active operations. In-theatre command is now exercised by one of four operational commands, depending on where the forces are deployed and in which capacity.³⁶⁶ The language, as always, is revealing. The Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM) of 2010 has a similar function to the Canadian Expeditionary Force of 1914-1919. CEFCOM’s role is to employ units, generated by the services in Canada, outside of national boundaries.

The historical linkages become even more apparent when one considers that the CF has recently stood up a “1st Canadian Division,” a unit with no operational troops but that can only be described as a ghost headquarters to co-ordinate operations overseas on the outbreak of conflict. The strong continuities in Canadian doctrine behind the rebirth of the 1st Canadian Division were not lost on the modern Canadian Forces as seen in this announcement in *Army News*:

1 Canadian Division has a tremendous historical link with Canada’s military past, dating back to the First World War when it arrived on the battlefields of France in February 1915. In September 1939, it was once again mobilized for service in the Second World War. 1 Canadian Division was established two more times, once following the Korean War in 1954 and again near the end of the Cold War in November 1989. The distinctive red square shoulder patch of

³⁶⁶ The four commands are known as: Canada Command (CANCOM), Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM), Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM) and Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) “CEFCOM – Organization.” Department of National Defence. 22 June 2010. <<http://www.cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/about-notre/org-eng.asp> > Accessed 29 July 2010.

the 1st Canadian Division, which has been worn by its members since the organization's inception, will continue to be used as a symbol of recognition today.³⁶⁷

History, HH Vaughn noted, is the study of change.³⁶⁸ One of the questions this study must answer, then, is “did anything change between 1918 and 2010?” The answer is undoubtedly that things have. Although Canada's defence policy in the 1920s demonstrated that traditional fears of the United States dating back to well before Confederation in 1867, had a very visible impact on Defence Scheme No.1, the plan also betrays a significant Great War influence. A more developed understanding of the complexities of civil-military relations and the difficulties in raising fighting contingents from the administrative body of the Militia pervades the document. The level of its detail, used by some historians as a means of portraying the plan as the product of a bored, deranged and overly energetic staff officer, can instead serve as a reminder at just how seriously the post-war professionals took the concepts and scientific management learned on the Western Front. To understand why such detail would be worked into a plan that was politically unlikely, one must understand the memory of the Great War, where seemingly benign technical details could mean the difference between life and death.

Change is not a concept which can be applied homogenously or universally. Just as the memories of the Great War affected different segments of the Canadian population differently, the effect of these memories on the public, political and military institutions of the time varied considerably. It is this differences in how change was

³⁶⁷ “Canadian Forces to Stand Up 1 Canadian Division.” Department of National Defence. 19 May 2010. <<http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/land-terre/news-nouvelles/story-reportage-eng.asp?id=4410>>. Accessed 29 July 2010.

³⁶⁸ Lawrence Stone, *The Past and Present Revisited*, (New York: Routledge, 1987): 3-4.

managed that formed the root cause of the disparity between diplomatic and military priorities of the decade. Militia leadership had four years of intense operations to build their leadership capabilities. MacBrien and Currie, through their posts as CGS OMFC and Inspector General, co-operated to dominate the post-war reorganisation process and MacBrien's membership on the Imperial Organisation Committee gave him clear guidance of the ideal shape of the Canadian Militia in peacetime.

Political and diplomatic leaders, on the other hand, had little in between 1914 and 1918 to develop their skills in international affairs. After the retirement of Borden in 1920 and Christie's decline after the election of Mackenzie-King in 1921, there was virtually no-one in either Cabinet or External Affairs with extensive knowledge of the changing imperial and international systems. Skelton, as Mackenzie-King's chief advisor, did have some knowledge of foreign and imperial affairs, but this was a result of his academic writing, not real-world experience. With almost no organisation to ensure continuity between the methodical and nuanced international politicking of Borden's tenure and Mackenzie-King's efforts to increase national autonomy at minimal cost, Ottawa's actions were often misunderstood by both Canadians and foreigners, generally stumbling from crisis to crisis.

By 1928, when Skelton had built a more robust DEA, a change in the popular memory of the Great War, the leadership of the Canadian Militia and growing awareness of deteriorating world conditions led to a closer co-ordination of diplomatic and military priorities. Until then, strategists were not confronting present crises so much as they were confronting their recent past. The retrospective derision heaped on the professionals of the 1920s has ensured that many of the larger narratives about

Canada's defence policies have ignored this era as a vital period of progress and evolution in Canadian strategic thought that occurred before the onset of the Great Depression and re-armament in the mid-1930s. For better or for worse, the ideas, circumstances and people surrounding the creation and destruction of Defence Scheme No.1 are an important part of Canada's intellectual, diplomatic and military heritage.

This study should not be interpreted as a vindication, justification or condemnation of either the military or diplomatic establishments of the era. Rather, it is has been an explanation of how disparate ideas, memories and individuals hampered the development of a well co-ordinated set of defence and external policies in the decade immediately following the Great War. Each of the protagonists feared a very different poltergeist – national disunity, military inefficiency, strategic vulnerability and domination by the old imperial power across the ocean (or a new one across the border). These battles would all be fought separately until the emergence of new demons brought them together. Understanding these battles in their early stages is ultimately essential to understanding the larger conflict that would come barely ten years after when this history ends.

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
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Annexes


FIGURE 1

ANNEX A

MacBrien's Proposed Defence Structure, January 1920



ANNEX A (CONT.'D)
MacBrien's Proposed Defence Structure, January 1920 (Cont'd).




Source: LAC, "Letter from James MacBrien to Sir Arthur Curie," MG 30 E63 Vol.1, "Correspondence – Overseas Military forces of Canada - -file 2," 29 January 1920.

FIGURE 2

ANNEX B


Proposals, DND reorganisation, 1922-1923
MacBrien's Proposal (accepted)



Source: James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, v.1.(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962): 240.

This diagram is different from fig.1 on p.240 of Eayrs, which showed the direct chain of command only working through the Defence Council. This does not recognise the fact that operational and mobilisation planning would have been in the hands of the CoS alone, and the CoS would have direct access to the Minister outside of the Defence Council.

ANNEX B (CONT'D) Hose's Proposal, 1922-1923




Source: James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, v.1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962): 237-241 and Stephen Harris, *Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988): 153-154.

FIGURE 3

ANNEX C

The Organisation of the DND in 1928.



Source: Stephen Harris, *Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army 1860-1939*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988): 155-156 and James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, v.1, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988): 256.

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